“Caminante, no hay puentes, se hace puentes al andar”

Special Issue
Moving Philosophies:

Bridging Latin American and U. S. Latina/o Thought

Edited by
Andrea J. Pitts & Adriana Novoa
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The primary purpose of this special issue is to connect the work of Latin American thinkers to contemporary issues affecting United States Latinas/os. This volume presents five essays focused on analyses of race, gender, class, and ethnicity to understand how today's debates in the United States are relevantly linked to philosophical discourses in Latin America. One of our main objectives is to analyze and highlight the importance that Latin American philosophical thought has had and continues to have for current inquiries in philosophical areas of analysis in the United States, such as social/political philosophy, ethics, phenomenology, aesthetics, epistemology, and metaphysics. We also are interested in the way in which debates in Latina/o philosophy are related with philosophical concerns that are present within various Latin American traditions, particularly in discussions of identity and race. Toward this end, the essays gathered in this volume are concerned with continuing lines of cross-cultural communication among the emerging fields of Latin American and Latina/o philosophies in the United States.

The volume stems, in part, from our interest in identifying philosophical concerns that characterize the scholarship of intellectuals who, while working from very different geopolitical and historical locations, are interested in connecting processes of identity formation with decolonial and liberatory projects. The philosophical questions raised by Latina/o intellectuals in the United States today are related to colonialism/neocolonialism, progressive politics, social identities, aesthetics, race, and assimilation, all problems faced by many Latin American theorists in both the past and the present. This edited collection attempts to create a dialogue between these areas in order to aid in identifying new interpretive paths for these crucial issues. In this sense, this proposal seeks to continue the pioneering work of United States-based philosopher, such as Ofelia Schutte and Jorge J. E. Gracia, by following their example of linking philosophy and history, and by bringing more pluralistic perspectives to bear on Latina/o issues in philosophy.

The first essay of the volume by Stephanie Rivera Berruz concretely engages with the institutional setting of academic philosophy in the United States. Rivera argues that the presence of Latinas/os within academic philosophy can aid in creating forms of resistance to dominant Anglo-American and Anglo-European philosophical traditions. Through enactments of disorientation, she claims, the use of the Spanish language within philosophical discourses attempts to undermine the predominance of the English language within academic institutional spaces in the United States. She offers an account of the production of space via the racialized presence of Latinas/os within academic philosophy to critique Anglo-centric models of philosophical engagement. Also, drawing from Latin American and Caribbean philosophers on the topic of
language, Rivera constructs a materialist reading of language to show how racial conceptions of the body extend beyond visible markers, and thus point toward new methods for disrupting the monological space of Anglocentric philosophical practices in the United States.

The next essay by Adam Burgos examines how the theoretical contributions of Argentine philosopher Ernesto Laclau can be relevantly linked to questions of identity formation and emancipation in the United States. Burgos explores Laclau’s articulation of populism and offers a discussion of its promises and potential pitfalls. Turning to the question of group identity formation more generally, Burgos argues that Laclau’s work provides conceptual resources for articulating the political demands and terms of inclusion for various Latina/o groups in the United States. Using Laclau’s example of Peronism as a populist movement, Burgos demonstrates a way to critique and build from Laclau’s work, and he thereby develops a model for interrogating forms of colonial difference and political particularism for distinct Latina/o groups in the United States, including the identity claims made via the Chicano rights movement, the Puerto Rican independence movement, and group-based identity claims made by Cuban Americans in the United States.

The third essay by Amy Oliver undertakes an analysis of the ways in which three figures within Latin American history have contributed to the formation of U.S. Latina identities and speaking positions. Through an analysis of the work of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Leopoldo Zea, and the legend of La Malinche, Oliver asks how various forms of silencing and speaking within contemporary philosophical discussions of Latin American philosophy in the United States contribute to the emergence of Latina identity positions within academic philosophy. Her essay demonstrates a critical perspective from which to interrogate the gender, racial, and sexual dynamics within the historical narratives of these three figures, and points forward toward continued philosophical reflection about identity formation for Latinas in the United States.

The following essay by Andrea Pitts offers a reading of the work of Anzaldúa alongside that of José Vasconcelos to present an account of racial perception through their respective writings. Building from each author’s conception of mestizaje and their distinct accounts of aesthetic engagement, Pitts structures her essay around modes of perception that affect experiences of racial difference. She argues that when read together, Vasconcelos’ and Anzaldúa’s writings on history and aesthetics can be understood as continuous with questions regarding embodiment and race within social epistemology. In this vein, Pitts offers a way to situate the often autobiographical and existential themes of their writings to open discursive space for critical inquiry into the perceptual practices and habits that operate within processes of racialization for Latinas/os in the United States.

Taking on thematic elements of time and historicity, the final essay of the volume by Adriana Novoa provides a reading of Anzaldúa’s conception of historical appropriation. Novoa argues that Anzaldúa’s mythic understanding of history can be
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by Adriana Novoa and Andrea J. Pitts

placed within broader narratives of temporality and social change from Hispanic American geopolitical contexts. Tracing a genealogical link between struggles for place and historical significance, Novoa demonstrates the importance of reading Anzaldúa within broader historical legacies than the ones related to the United States. Her discussion focuses on the importance of concrete embodied locations from which specific authors began to articulate their social identities. She claims that a grounded conception of place within the philosophical thought of ex-Spanish colonies was an historical development and one that grew to prominence in the 20th century. Thus, Anzaldúa’s mythological appropriation of history can be placed, both spatially and historically within this line of intellectual and practical engagement.

These five essays, we hope, will gesture toward forms of continuity and further fruitful exchange between the philosophical discourses of the United States and Latin America. While the differences often appear many and varied among these two vast sites of knowledge production, we aim to highlight some of their critical points of convergence. That is, the United States is often treated as though it were always a central site of philosophical rigor and authority. A full narrative of why this is so often believed to be the case would require much more room than we could offer in this issue. However, we propose, by echoing an idea that Leopoldo Zea defended in the 1950s, that this view of Anglo-American philosophy may be supported by a peculiar vision of the relationship between the United States and its philosophical history. In The Role of the Americas in History, Zea writes, “Modern man [and with modern man the creator of Anglo-Saxon America] starts out from the present and sees it in relation to his past, and as a part of a past that is already serving him and not vice versa” (Zea 1992, 15). The current predominance of Anglo-American academic philosophy and the various institutional settings in which it is located, in a similar vein, seems to bear heavily on much of the current historical and comparative work being done between differing Latin American philosophical contexts and that of the United States. Yet, if we were to adopt a methodological approach from Ofelia Schutte’s work to carry out comparative cross-cultural work, this would require a decentering of the current hegemonic positioning of academic philosophy in the United States. Schutte writes on the notion of cultural alterity undergirding her methodology for cross-cultural communication:

[T]he breakthrough in constructing the concept of the other occurs when one combines the notion of the other as different from the self with the acknowledgment of the self’s decentering that results from the experiences of such differences …. The other, the foreigner, the stranger, is that person occupying the space of the subaltern in the culturally asymmetrical power relation, but also those elements or dimensions of the self that unsettle or decenter the ego’s dominant, self-enclosed territorialized identity (Schutte 1998, 54).

The practice of decentering the self that Schutte describes is in stark contrast to the view that Zea describes. Moreover, her methodology guides the work that we have selected for this issue of The Inter-American Journal of Philosophy. That is, rather than approaching the historical relationship between Latin American and Anglo-American
philosophy as representing a history of those who were victors and those who were vanquished, we propose alternative readings that decenter the current historical location of the United States’ role within various global philosophical discourses.

The task of challenging the narrative of the radical independence and predetermined fortitude of Anglo-American philosophy requires renewed efforts to decenter the United States within philosophical history. Along these lines and in what follows, we offer in the second section of this introduction, a brief historical framing of the relationship between philosophical discussions of race and national progress in the United States and their placement within broader philosophical trends within Latin American philosophical thought during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The narrative we provide, however, is in no sense meant to exclude other potential framings of these periods and cultural contexts. Rather, we hope that this introductory narrative will serve as an example of the kind of historical linking and delinking between these two areas that we encourage with the publication of this special issue. Many other narratives remain underdeveloped within the framing that we offer here and we hope that this framing aids in their future development. For example, within our narrative, we leave largely unexamined the various Marxist traditions emerging and circulating within Latin America and their relationships with global politics. Also we leave largely unexplored the relationship between African American and African philosophical traditions and Latin American and Caribbean philosophical traditions. While such relevant historical narratives remain open as important philosophical projects for those interested in the relationship between Latin America and the United States we have chosen to focus a very small set of themes that link these two geopolitical sites of knowledge production.

United States and Latin America: A Brief Historical Analysis

For the remainder of this introduction we will concentrate on the end of nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, a period when many of the philosophical approaches that remain influential today were burgeoning. This period needs to be analyzed carefully to understand many of the philosophical projects of modernity/coloniality (i.e a series of events that are particularly relevant for understanding many of the links between Latin America and United States Latina/o philosophy today). This is clear if we compare how most nations in the Americas created modernizing projects after the trauma of civil war, and how the emergence of new generations were driven by concerns with the creation of new forms of social order and organization. By the 1870s, many independent nations were organizing themselves under a renewed faith in progress and republicanism that left behind previous internal conflicts and the continuity with previous forms of social order. According to Louis Menand, the end of the civil war in the United States by 1865 marked “the birth of modern America” (Menand 2001, ix).[3] In the same way, modernity started in other American nations with the emergence of an ideology that connected the development of capitalism and nation. This intellectual renewal that becomes obvious in the philosophical works that were developed by the 1870’s reflected a faith in new ideas...
that would pacify societies and allow the strengthening of the nation. The intellectuals that emerged from this period were strong defenders of free-trade, scientific training and research, and the creation of strong national institutions.

Philosophically this was framed by the Darwinian revolution and what such scientific developments meant in terms of human evolution and rational design.[4] On the Origins of Species was published in 1859, but as its philosophical implications started to be known over the next thirty years, it became clear that what was so radical about the book “was not its evolutionism, but its materialism” (Menand 2001, 121). In the case of human beings, evolution and materialism were connected with racial ideas, and embodiment. The perception of this radical materialism was that it undermined the idea that ideological projects undergirded the revolutionary processes that led to new forms of human social organization. Rather, the supremacy of matter emerged as a primary explanatory framework for human civil societies. It is for this reason that the work of Herbert Spencer acquired such importance among intellectuals in the Americas. In fact, his popularity among English speakers came not from England, but from the United States. His spectacular decline after 1890, when it was proven that his philosophical system was based on flawed science, started a renewed philosophical interest in metaphysics and anti-materialism. Namely, many thinkers of this period were interested in transforming the study of metaphysics in light of newly emergent trends in materialist thought that emerged after Darwin. For example, Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Phenomenology all developed in the twentieth century as distinct responses to the dominance of the natural sciences.

Since the 1890s in particular, philosophers in Europe and the Americas were trying to understand how new scientific discoveries and the emergence of new scientific fields could be conceived philosophically, particularly with regard to past philosophical traditions. In Europe, in particular, there had never been a top-down model of tradition and originality, since most theorists were attempting to address problems that had existed throughout early modern European philosophical thought. Those in the Americas, however, did not have a system of continuity in which they could insert their ideas. This was crucial, because while the ambiguities and contradictions of European philosophers could be resolved in the context of their traditions, the same problems in American philosophers were understood as mistakes, or as expressions of their philosophical ineptitude. This meant that American philosophers did not have a “system” that could frame and clarify their ideas within a larger philosophical lineage. Philosophy was in flux, and as such there were plenty of ideas circulating about what new direction it would take.

In light of these trends, in the Americas there became an immense interest in the vitalism of Henri Bergson. This fact was reflected in the work of American philosophers such as William James, Antonio Caso, and José Vasconcelos, among others. A letter from James to Bergson written in 1907 demonstrates this condition.
You will be receiving my own little “pragmatism” book simultaneously with this letter. How jejune and inconsiderable it seems in comparison with your great system! But it is so congruent with parts of your system, fits so well into interstices thereof, that you will easily understand why I am so enthusiastic. I feel that at bottom we are fighting the same fight, you a commander, I in the ranks. The position we are rescuing is “Tychism” and a really growing world. [...] They are sure to come to you later anyhow, and to make a new volume; and altogether, the clash of these ideas of yours with the traditional ones will be sure to make sparks fly that will illuminate all sorts of dark places and bring innumerable new considerations into view. But the process may be slow for the ideas are so revolutionary” (James 1920, 293-294).

In Spanish America the impact of Bergson was felt from the 1910s, and continued to be strong until the 1930s, when philosophers from Spain combined his work with phenomenological analytic methods. Bergson restored a path within speculative philosophy and with it a break away from the limitations of Positivism. As usual, philosophers of the era explored the ambiguities of other philosophical methods to develop their own synthetic views. In the case of Mexico, for example, Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos developed very different lines of philosophical inquiry.[5] The former created an ethical dualism “out of the dualistic (scientific) strain in Bergsonian thought.” Vasconcelos developed an aesthetic monism “out of the monistic (mystical) strain found there. Needless to say, this difference between the two Mexican Bergsonists is itself indicative of the ambiguity of Bergson’s own philosophical position,” and the fact that the instability of his system of philosophy was “due to the conflict of the two strains of his thought” (Romanell 1961, 505). More importantly, these philosophical questions emerge as a common beginning for the philosophical approaches that distinguish the Americas from other philosophical contexts.

The separation of the study of philosophy and the study of science began during the late years of the nineteenth century. The 1900’s started a period in which the declining importance of materialism and scientism renewed the study of philosophy, particularly regarding race and identity. This explains, in part, why José Ingenieros abandoned medicine and by the 1920s trained himself as a philosopher, as did Alejandro Korn, both in Argentina. It also helps explain the biography of William James, who started his studies in the natural sciences and chemistry, and even travelled through Brazil as a Harvard student in an expedition led by the naturalist Louis Agassiz early in 1865. Later, however, James too moved to study psychology and Pragmatism. This interest in philosophy across the Americas reflected an attempt to address two issues that were at the center of philosophical debate at the time: the divisions between materialism and spiritualism as well as determinism and free will. William James explained the post-Spencerian world in a way that also reflected what was happening philosophically in other American countries. Pessimism and the loss of a notion of the future, essential to the idea of progress, had thrown philosophy into disarray. Thus, the emergence of science, in its post-Darwinian stage, had made the connection between the social and scientific sphere quite complicated.
James’s understanding of the damage done by materialism was similar to that of some prominent Latin American thinkers. José Rodó, for example, published in 1900 a book that originated a philosophical renewal in Spanish America, which began with a dedication to the "youth of America." Drawing images from Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, "Ariel" represented the soaring spirit associated with an aesthetic interest in defending beauty against the vulgar pressures of materialism and utilitarianism (Rodó 1988, 58). Rodó writes, "Shakespeare’s ethereal Ariel symbolizes the noble, soaring aspect of the human spirit. He represents the superiority of reason and feeling over the base impulses of irrationality...Ariel is the ideal toward which human selection ascends" (Ibid, 31). Rodó presents "Caliban," the expression of the most vulgar and instinctual materialism that threatens civilization, as a contrast to Ariel, the hero that represented the spirit of Latin America. Among the intellectuals of the Americas, spiritual concerns linked to metaphysics and a new form of Idealism were becoming part of a local philosophical reaction to a world led by post-Darwinian sciences.

The debate between materialists and spiritualists was often related to aesthetics, which was also an important issue in the Americas at the time. James writes, "Matter is gross, coarse, crass, muddy; spirit is pure, elevated, noble." This helps explain for James why the latter was "more consonant with the dignity of the universe to give the primacy in it to what appears superior," and why for spiritualists "spirit must be affirmed as the ruling principle" (James 1907, 94). By reading the work of Rodó and the Arielistas published in the first quarter of the 20th century, the same warnings about how materialism and determinism were destroying modern civilizations becomes apparent. The crucial issue came not so much from strict scientific observation, but how new societies could sustain the idea of innovation and self-improvement.

Also, an emphasis on death, lack of future, and uncertainty, were common concerns addressed by philosophical inquiry. The reason for this was not only related with the uncertainty of progress in the future, but also with how this future was connected with race. Materialists had a deterministic way of understanding race as only matter, and in it there was a negation of free will and spiritualism, something that was particularly used against those races deemed inferior. Those who had Indigenous and African ancestry were presented as already in the process of extinction, or, worse, as people who had diverged so much from the correct evolutionary path that they could no longer be considered human. The philosophical renewal of people like James, Rodó, and Vasconcelos implied the return to ideas about racial improvement, free-will, and spiritual continuity.

Race, and the skepticism that grew among anti-materialists about the same existence of racial determinism, opened the door for more discussions on philosophy of race, and the differences that intellectuals in the continent gave to these issues. This interest in analyzing imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and race in a comparative way...
took into account those populations who had suffered similar problems. In the case of Spanish America, anti-imperialism was coined by the end of the nineteenth century around the writings of intellectuals like the Cuban thinker José Martí, but its philosophical connections were also reflected in the United States. Columbia philosophy professor James Hyslop wrote about this problem in 1905, when he tried to explain the reasons for his country’s imperialism, and the growing reactions against it. His explanation very closely resembles what was circulating at the same time outside the United States.

Commercialism and imperialism are in reality the same thing in our political condition, though the incidents of their action might be independent of each other. The antagonism they arouse, however, comes less from a conflict of interests than from the struggle of the old with the new morality, if the new can be called morality at all. The anti-imperialists stand for the old moral ideas. They are trying to stem the tide against them by appeals to standards which are no longer effective (Hyslop 1905, 2).

Rodó’s concerns about morality in the United States are similarly expressed through Hyslop’s article, and for similar reasons—the introduction of a new culture that was abandoning old ideals about what constituted civilized republican order. Hyslop recognized that Greco-Roman civilization “was based upon the pursuit of the economic ideal with its adjuncts of science and art, educative of the intellect and sensuous pleasures.” Moreover, “Christian civilization was based upon the moral and spiritual ideal with the adjunctive reference either to a discarnate existence or to personal moral character, and so was educative of the will and the higher spiritual emotions” (Ibid, 3). This emphasis on spiritualism as anti-imperialist, and related to arts and aesthetics, became associated with a “Latin” civilization that was perceived as being in decline. Hyslop called attention to the fact that Darwinian evolutionary theory had made spiritualism impossible, and that the latter was needed in order to reorganize social forces. This was a civilization that represented a new order, as many Spanish American thinkers were also debating at the time.

Imperialism was the representation of a new order that placed in control a racialized group that was deemed more appropriate to manage the world’s natural resources. The relevance of spiritualism to those populations that were controlled by imperialism explained the revival of Christianity among some intellectuals who, like Vasconcellos, wanted to propose a different ideal of civilization, i.e. a civilization centered on Latin American populations. The assimilative approach of ancient civilizations and the Christian love for others were connected to a racial sensibility that allowed for the amalgamation of diverse populations. This approach also contradicted the scientific materialism based on Darwinism mentioned by Hyslop, and allowed those deemed as inferior to develop a project of racial renewal.

The debates of this new idea of civilization also affected African-American writers who were dealing with the role of a population defined as a “problem” in the United States. This connected the Americas even further in terms of how to understand racial
and national identities. One example of this situation is the First Universal Race Congress that took place in London in 1911. In order to discuss problems of race relations in a world that was clearly changing, and a world that needed to address issues of racial diversity, there was a need to develop a different understanding of race. The Congress' committee had representation from several American countries, including the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. Felix Adler, professor of social ethics at Columbia University was the committee's president. His speech was a calling to reinstate ethics into international dealings among differing regions, and to begin a critical assessment of how Western nations dealt with other areas of the world. In his speech, Adler recommends “methods of race pedagogy” that allowed for a more “humane treatment of the backward races for the benefit of those races themselves,” which for him meant “the benefit of humanity in general” (Spiller 1911, 267). Other scholars who worked in the United States were also important speakers at the congress, including Franz Boas and W. E. B. DuBois. Boas was a professor of anthropology at Columbia University, and his highly influential work attempted to negate the established idea among racialist thinkers that some human types were stable, while others were able to change.[8] He pointed to the “plasticity of human types” and to the fact that “a certain type of man may be considerably influenced by his social and geographical environment.” He concluded that the “old idea of absolute stability of human types” had to be given up, “and with it the belief of the hereditary superiority of certain types over others” (Ibid, 102-103).

DuBois also agreed with Boaz in his criticism of fixed types. According to him, “at least one-third of the Negroes of the United States have distinct traces of white blood, and there is also a large amount of Negro blood in the white population.” In an argument that is very similar to that used in Latin America by some intellectuals, he affirmed that unlike what some theorists were saying, this “blending of the races has led to new and interesting human types, but race prejudice has hitherto prevented any scientific study of the matter” (Ibid, 350). DuBois also made other connections that were popular among those who were classified as inferior in such broader global discourses, e.g. focusing on men and virility as a sign of a social group’s health.

Another source of philosophical exchange in the Americas was the Mexican revolution that began in 1910. By the 1920’s processes of institutionalization led to a strong form of nationalism, and the adoption of a Mexican identity that was related to its indigenous roots and framed by anti-imperialism. The project of creating an educational system according to post-revolutionary needs connected John Dewey’s philosophy of education with a strengthening nationalist sentiment.[9] Dewey was recognized as president of the anti-imperialist league from 1910 to 1920, and for his philosophy of socialization.[10] As one commentator on education during this period notes, “Dewey’s two great services to Mexico lay in his confirming Mexico’s philosophy of education and in liberating” it from “formal school equipment.” These ideas supplemented Manuel Gamio’s own “educación global” [integral education] that covered all the aspects of life as related to education (Booth 1939, 131).
The exchanges with Mexico continued, as the publication in the United States of Aspects of Mexican Civilization by José Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio in 1926, and Moisés Saénz’s Some Mexican Problems make clear. These two books were reviewed in the International Journal of Ethics in 1927. In the review, Vasconcelos’s work is described as dealing with the problem “of Mexican civilization,” which attempted to “bring order and unity where nature and history have wrought to the end of chaos and disorganization.” Moisés Saénz, subsecretary of Mexico’s department of education suggested that progress was connected to the “humanization of the Mexican laborer” and also to the “integration of Mexico through education” (Simpson 1927, 106-107). Also in 1926, the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy took place at Harvard. One of the panels had as a subject “Philosophy and International Relations,” and gathered an international crowd, such as the German Erich Becher, who “delivered an admirably clear and forceful refutation of the so-called Darwinian defense of war and imperialism.” He also insisted on the “dangers inherent in the attempt to throw a cloak of scientific respectability over national greed and rivalry (Sabine 1927, 13). These forms of exchange continued into the 1930s, particularly in the context of the relationship between the United States and Mexico.

In the 1930s the interest in studying Latin America in terms of miscegenation and racial identity continued. Brazil became a favorite country, given its similarities with the United States and a past dominated by the plantation economy dependent on slave labor.[11] In 1937 the Journal of Negro History reported that Professor Richard Patee of the University of Puerto Rico had accepted to prepare an examination of the works of Arthur Ramos and Gilberto Freyre, who had distinguished themselves “in the study of the Negro in Brazil from the anthropological, sociological, and historical points of view” (Woodson 1937, 410). Patee was assigned to complete a translation into English of Ramos’s work on the population of African descent in Brazil, in what was expected to be an introduction to the study of the country.

As we saw in the previous examples, over the 1930s the connections between United States and Latin America strengthened around a new understanding of race, and around philosophical ideas related to racial development. In 1936, the sociologist Elizabeth Ferguson published a portion of her Yale M. A. thesis to describe the ideological changes of the time. In her view, there was a “race consciousness” that was connected to a “collective sentiment in which race becomes the object of loyalty and idealization. Through race consciousness the members of a race become a historic group, acquiring a past, aware of the present, and aspiring to a future” (Ferguson 1938, 32). Connected to this development there was “a growing world consciousness among all the colored peoples. It is a sentiment as yet not seriously entertained by the great mass of American Negroes, but interest in the recent Ethiopian-Italian conflict demonstrated the presence of such sentiment in America.” DuBois had long “been interested in world relationships among the non-white races, and has been the exponent of world consciousness in this country” (Ibid). European imperialism in Africa
helped to solidify a sense of identity that worked in similar way to the reaction of Latin Americans to American imperialism.[12]

In all the Americas, there was a transition from the determinism of biological race, to the creation of an immaterial national identity. There was, at the same time, an interest in abandoning racial materialism and determinism. In 1934 a book written by a white man and an African-American, Willis Duke Weatherford, a liberal Southerner, and the sociologist Charles Spurgeon Johnson, raised this consideration: “This doctrine of superiority on the part of the Nordic peoples is the basis of the doctrine of strict caste in the matter of social relations between divergent groups; and unfortunately it is the basis of a brutal disregard of the value and worth of all other groups save the Nordics” (Weatherford and Johnson 1934, 524). Those who opposed this idea were labeled as “cosmopolitans,” which was also a label used in Latin America for defining those who privileged European ideas. As it was common at the time, Watherford and Johnson compared Latin American nations to their own reality:

Crossing the races has gone forward on a large scale in South America and there are those who think it proves crossbreeding to be good. [...] Both heredity and the environment play upon every individual; hence how much each hybrid is influenced by one or the other cannot be determined” (Ibid, 528).

The enumeration of possible solutions to the “racial problem” questioned the possibility of understanding human evolution in its most Darwinian sense, through variation, a criteria that contradicted segregation and assimilation. As Johnson and Weatherford state, “The very glory of humanity is its variation with unity, or its unity in variety. We not only are not all alike, but we do not want to be so.” Moreover, the existence of diversity “enriches the culture of all. The contact of like and unlike bring new content to all life. This suggested solution assumes further that each race has a contribution to make to human culture which no other race can so well make” (Ibid, 530). This, we contend, is not so different than what was discussed in Latin America around the same period, particularly regarding the synthetic capacity of races. In fact, those authors affirmed, “the Nordic civilization is a composite of all that the human race had discovered up to the time of its westward migration” (Ibid, 531).

The exchanges between the United States and Latin American countries were even more frequent by the 1940’s. The reasons are complex, but among them was an interest in emphasizing an inter-continental alliance during a time of war, which renewed enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism. Moreover, post-positivism had opened a philosophical renewal in places like Mexico and Argentina, and their philosophical impact was being acknowledged in the United States. The mixing of Bergsonism with the work of José Ortega y Gasset also aided in the incorporation of the work of German philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler. Since some of Ortega’s disciples had left Spain to live in Latin America, they were important figures in spreading regional interests in vitalism and phenomenology. José Gaos, translator of Being and Time into Spanish, established himself in Mexico, and María Zambrano traveled and
stayed in different countries where she promoted her views on “poetic reason.”[13] All these events led to a resurgence in the analysis of locality and experience in Mexico.

In 1940 there was an important change among philosophers of the United States that helped to draw attention to many philosophical ideas produced in the Americas, and which also served to further reject racialized philosophical ideas. In that year, at the Eastern APA, all the members of the association signed a document against the aggression of the Axis powers on three ideas. First, there was a recognition that “philosophy is dedicated to a search for wisdom that shall be valid for all men”; second, that this universality was attainable only “through the free exercise of the human faculties”; and, finally, the fact that “the present governments of the Axis Power exalt race or nation over mankind, and force above the right and truth” (Brightman 1947, 391). Many European philosophers came to the United States, helping to revitalize philosophical exchange, and new fields received attention, such as Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Democracy, Philosophies of War and Peace, and Latin American Philosophy. According to Sheffield Brightman, himself well informed about Mexican philosophy, Latin American philosophy had been opened “as a new field of investigation.” Philosophers from this area visited the United States in increasing numbers, and philosophy appeared on the program of a series of Inter-American Institutes, in which the universities and other institutions of a region collaborated” (Ibid, 394). Brightman published articles on the work of leading Latin American philosophers, such as Vasconcellos and the Argentine Francisco Romero, a student of Alejandro Korn who continued the professionalization of philosophy in his country, also helped by the war and the arrival of European philosophers.[14]

Clearly the 1940’s were a moment of transition for philosophers in the Americas. [15] On one side there was a renewed interest and communication among the philosophers of different countries, on the other, the role of this transformation was different. In Argentina, Risieri Frondizi explained how over the 1930’s, philosophy started a process of acquiring an independent status, one that was not related to the political, cultural, or scientific concerns of the past. At the same time, the impact of the work of Spanish philosophers Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset opened the possibility of writing national philosophies that were related to the local circumstances, something that had not been possible in the past. Regarding the success of this philosophical localism, Frondizi affirmed that in his detailed reading of philosophical works produced in Latin America since 1939 he had found that only ten percent “of the body of Latin American writing of the past ten years has any claim to philosophic originality” (Frondizi 1949b, 345). And from these works most were “merely a reconsideration of subjects and problems of European origin, without assisting in considering or developing any original contribution” (Ibid, 346).

Frondizi not only rejected the synthetic method of the past, but also the emphasis on localism ignited by the Spanish philosophers who promoted Bergsonism and phenomenology. Thinkers like Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset had a double effect in Spanish America. On one side, it was good insofar as it cured intellectuals of “the desire
to imitate Europe literally.” It also served “to establish the contact of speculation with reality,” in the same way in which it had done in Mexico, according to Samuel Ramos. But, on the other side, Frondizi was extremely critical of the provincialism that this approach brought, particularly through the influence of Miguel de Unamuno and his introduction to the importance of “circumstances.” According to him, provincialism was “the enemy of philosophy, and it seems a provincial attitude to try to develop deliberately a Mexican or Argentinian philosophy” (Ibid, 353). Frondizi insisted in the importance of the “intimate connection of philosophy with the living problems of the community,” which had the virtue “of rooting philosophic preoccupations in living reality” (Ibid). He also suggested that perhaps the characteristic of “Hispanic-American” philosophy could be revealed in the actual practice that showed the interest that philosophers of the area had in “cultural philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and axiology.” According to Frondizi, an ethical concern “seems to nourish and give direction to all Ibero-American philosophical thinking” (Ibid).

The same question answered by Frondizi about the actual existence of a Latin American philosophy was also asked about the philosophy of the United States. Ralph Barton Perry was, like Frondizi, reluctant to identify a nation with a particular thought, though he did not deny the importance of location. He defended the ideal of universality present in philosophy, but he also believed, as did many Latin American intellectuals at the time, that “personal, regional, and national influences will be ineradicable” (Perry 1949, 357). Perry did not defend the existence of a North American philosophy, but affirmed that there was a character that was recognizable and was related to the experience of the United States. Perry states, “The melting pot has not merely melted, it has cooked a broth with an unmistakable flavor of its own” (Ibid). If for Frondizi in Spanish American philosophy there was a moral characteristic linked to a humanistic concern, for Perry individualism was the element that illustrates continuity in the United States. However, this characteristic did not imply “the insolation of one human being”, it meant “the intercourse and cooperation of many” (Ibid, 358).

Perry indicated that the main influence by the beginning of the twentieth century was an Americanized Post-Kantian Idealism that was quickly challenged by two thinkers that had transformed philosophy, William James and John Dewey. The former “sprang from the line of the British School,” while the latter “had in his earlier years been infected with Hegelianism.” The result of their efforts, Pragmatism, was “distinctively American” (Ibid, 364).[16] Both thinkers had found, according to Perry, “clue[s] to their philosophies in biology rather than physics, and looked to the creative power of the will as the escape from a necessitarian materialism.” But Dewey was more in line “with the American emphasis on organization and technology,” while James “stressed the force of the will and its reserves of energy to be called into play for the overcoming of obstacles” (Ibid, 365).

Yet, outside the United States this systematization did not receive much attention, though James was read in Europe. The ideas generated in the Americas did not attain respectability. Perry mentions that in the case of the United States the
problem with Pragmatism was that it was a philosophy “which does not readily led itself to authority, to orthodoxy, or to edification” (Ibid, 365). The philosophers that belonged to this area did not operate under a genealogical organization that was based on a single principle that continued over time, like in the case of European philosophical traditions such as rationalism or empiricism. In the case of the United States, there were very few thinkers who did not have “more than one idea. American philosophy does not tend to fanaticism, to doctrinaire rigidity, or to pontifical utterance, or, and this may be held a weakness, to system-building” (Ibid, 366). The same applies to Latin America, where philosophers were also interested in a variety of ideas that were selected, mixed, and recontextualized. Philosophies that are not genealogical, and framed in a lineage, always end up questioned in terms of authority. It is in part for this reason that Perry defended the unity of philosophy in order to “promote a unity of philosophical spirit—a common desire for the truthful solution of common problems—pervading and binding all mankind” (Ibid, 368).[17] While a genealogical system creates a sense of unity, the plasticity of the philosophies generated at this time in the Americas provided not only a methodological problem, but also an element of ambiguity that was difficult to accept at a time in which the increased professionalization of philosophy started to demand disciplinary rigor.

The question of philosophical authority and a way to define what constituted philosophical practice became a central issue by the end of the 1940’s. Euryalo Cannabrava, a Brazilian philosopher from the Colégio Pedro II in Rio de Janeiro, addressed this issue in his criticism of Latin American philosophy. In an article written in 1949, shortly after a philosophical congress organized in the United States where for the first time there was a strong presence of philosophers from Latin America, Cannabrava described the situation of philosophical thinking at the time. The article mentions how the works of Latin American intellectuals received “clamorous and in many cases eloquent attention” during the congress, though for the wrong reasons” (Cannabrava 1949, 113). Cannabrava launched an attack on the essays presented mostly because they were the result of the influence of the Bergsonism and Phenomenology that dominated the region.

The result of these presentations was that “verbalism, estheticism, and subjectivism” were “permeating yeast in the fermentation of Latin American thought.” This was the consequence of the influence of the idealistic metaphysics and existentialism that were the product “of artistic imagination seasoned by the dramatic issues of the contemporary scene.” Bergsonism was in part responsible for this problem, since it had “put philosophy within easy reach because it made philosophy the product of mystical raptures and the fostering of innate dispositions instead of a technical discipline.” Alongside this problem, the prestige of German philosophy of the time depended “also on its lack of intelligibility, on its metaphysical abuses and frequent violation of the rules of correct thinking” (Ibid, 114). In Cannabrava’s view, the work of Heidegger and Kierkegaard bewildered their “cultivated readers by its discursiveness and plurality of meanings which can be ascribed to its language” (Ibid). This “literary exercise” had produced an eclecticism, as Cannabrava states, that exists “as a general
disinterestedness in any serious attempt to make philosophy a method of reflective thinking about our doings and knowings. Instead, there is endless talk about values and axiological systems with man at their center” (Ibid, 115). Idealism, phenomenology, and existential metaphysics were also responsible in Cannabrava’s eyes “for the advent of ontologies, pre-ontologies, and meta-ontologies” (Ibid). It is for this reason that he agreed with those “philosophers who pointed out the irreducibility of empirical statements to logical ones and vice versa” (Ibid, 116). Dualism, therefore, constituted “one of the most worn-out platitudes of Latin American philosophy” and was linked to idealistic metaphysics (Ibid, 117).

The attempt among Spanish American intellectuals like Antonio Caso to constitute a different philosophy of science, one that reconciled the problems brought by dualism, are rebuffed by Cannabrava as failures, particularly in comparison with United States analytic philosophers. Unlike this example, Latin American thinkers “became interested in philosophy via humanistic studies, esthetics, and literature. Philosophy, there, has been a sort of cultural science at its best, with no bearing whatsoever on the field of exact and objective knowledge” (Ibid). Cannabrava had written a series of articles in Brazil criticizing speculative philosophy as a method, and reminding others that this approach was not “a special domain of knowledge. But the assertion that philosophy is not epistemologically autonomous is a scandalous statement in Latin America” (Ibid, 118).

Cannabrava’s description of Latin American philosophy points to a commonality with the way in which Cornel West has explained the development of an African-American philosophy. According to Paget Henry, West sees “an important convergence between the African-American and pragmatist conceptions of philosophy as forms of engaged cultural criticism” (Henry 2008, 49). West opposes this practice to the “epistemology-centered” philosophies that came from Europe. As in the Latin America of Cannabrava, an independent epistemology is not important, and for the same reasons “African American philosophy is not concerned with foundations and transcendental grounds, but with being ‘a material force for African-American freedom’” (Ibid). Also, similar to the way West describes philosophy, the philosophies criticized by Cannabrava responded with an interest in keeping history within philosophical narratives to be able to explain their own progress. As West states, “Pragmatism, in addition to its volunteerism, its fallibilism, and its experimentalism, is a philosophical orientation that highlights history, context, and problem solving” (West 2004, 225).[18]

Gregory Pappas has pointed out the fact that Pragmatism seems to reflect more on the values of Latin American culture than those of the United States, but while this is an apt characterization of Dewey and James, the issue is not a demarcation of a Latin American/United States reality. Rather Pappas’s view marks the very similar roots of the modernist philosophical tradition across the Americas (Pappas 1998) Until the 1930s there was a commonality among intellectuals in the Americas that expressed similar interests and needs, but eventually paths diverged over time due to debates regarding the right manner to pursue philosophy. Starting in the following decade, mainstream
philosophical practices will start to abandon the old understandings of Pragmatism, with
the exception of African-American philosophy, which also incorporated
phenomenological analysis. Cornel West characterized the appropriation of Heidegger’s
ideas by African-American philosophers as related to the experience “of what it means
to be for people who, as a result of active engagement in the world, reconstruct their
past, make choices in the present and envision possibilities for the future” (West 2008, 9).

In 1949, Frondizi, then a professor of Philosophy at Yale University, wrote an
article that contradicted Cannabrava’s enthusiasm for the way in which philosophy was
shaping up in the United States. Frondizi concluded that in Iberoamerica philosophical
inquiry was related to “the nature of man, his destiny and his creations”, while in the
United States the inquiry was centered around “epistemological, methodological,
semantic, and logical issues.” At the end, Frondizi suggested that an integration of both
approaches was a “legitimate and healthy aspiration for both Americas” (Frondizi 1949,
38). In 1957, John E. Smith reflected on the common situation faced by those who did
philosophy in the United States, and his analysis shows how the philosophical needs of
the United States more clearly departed from many interests of the past. Smith
expressed indignation about being told by philosophers in other countries that there was
“no philosophy in America, except perhaps Pragmatism (which Europeans, save for a
few notable exceptions, have always taken lightly) and certain movements of thought
derivative from the European situation” (Smith 1957, 280). According to him, his country
was characterized for its “brash approach to philosophy, with its overemphasis on
novelty but also deep concern for philosophy’s connection with human life and destiny,”
a type of thought that appeared “as without thoroughness of polish and as far removed
from what the Germans like to call grundsätzlich.” This lack of fundamental elements
that Smith refers to in his use of a German word is connected to the lack of tradition, or
“system” as we noted above. But now, Smith remarked, the interest in the philosophy of
his country was motivated by its “place in the contemporary world and its possible
impact upon other nations and cultures” (Ibid, 279). The emergence of the United States
as a more powerful nation than those in Europe demanded an understanding of the
country’s ideas and ideological standing.

Smith also explains the deficiencies of Pragmatism and how since the 1940s
“logical and analytic philosophies, studies in mathematical logic and the foundations of
mathematics, and [...] the linguistic approach of logical empiricism” were the dominant
fields in Philosophy (Ibid, 289). The loss of dominance of a philosophy that had been
identified with the nation had happened by “the demand for more rigorous theoretical
philosophy in contrast to the practical emphasis and social orientation of pragmatism” (Ibid).
It was also related to “widespread embarrassment on the part of philosophers in the face of the more secure and sensational successes of natural
scientists,” which favored the renunciation of “metaphysical interpretation in favor of
more modest aims; philosophy, so it came to be thought, must abandon its
comprehensive approach and confine its attention instead to specific problems to be
treated one at a time” (Ibid, 290). This narrower interpretation of philosophy “meant a
concentration upon logical and semantical problems and upon those very epistemological issues which Dewey had regarded unprofitable." This kind of approach had dominated philosophical inquiry “with the result that “the problems of philosophers” have taken precedence over the “problem of men”” (Ibid, 290). The number of logical positivists of the Vienna school who had to leave Europe due to the political developments of the 1930’s and 1940s also aided the process of training new philosophers in their fields. Pragmatism itself “unwittingly” had paved “the way; there was an operationalism implicit in it, and it stressed a supremacy of method” (Ibid, 291).

In the United States, analytic philosophies helped to drive the metaphysical side of Pragmatism into the background. At the same time, in Latin America, the 1950s started with a renewal of Marxist ideas, a change that was framed in part by the events of postwar Europe, the effects of the cold war in the Americas, French Existentialism, and the English New Left. In the 1960s this continued through the influence of intellectuals who represented Marxist Structuralism, such as Louis Althusser, and a renewed association between Marxism and Anti-Imperialism that in Spanish America was rooted in the work of the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui.[19] These influences shaped the historical and philosophical framing of the Cuban Revolution that triumphed in 1959, and the radicalization of politics that characterized the next decade. Eventually identity politics and reflections on the nature of populism also emerged from this background. Since many African-American philosophers continued their interest in “the problem of men,” their contact with what was being produced in Latin America was not that difficult. In the same way, the radicalization of politics among Chicanas/os linked them to philosophies that supported anti-imperialist emancipation. In Latin America a philosophy divorced of social and human concerns was unthinkable among those intellectuals that participated in the radicalization of politics during the sixties, which created links to most of the emancipatory movements that were active all over the world.

More recently, the transformation of the left in Latin America has provided a discussion on post-liberal politics and populism, a line of thought led by the Argentine theorist Ernesto Laclau.[20] One interesting overlap with the United States is related to issues of citizenship and political participation. Traditional ideas about a democratic citizenship connected to equality, voluntary participation, and the participation in the election of political authorities were put into crisis in the Americas. As recent social movements that emerged in Latin American demonstrate, the post-liberalism in the region involves “actions, demands, and proposals of social empowerment as a way to be political and democratic while focusing on redistribution instead of participation in the selection of public authorities” (Arditti 2008, 74). This discussion about rights and distribution of resources will be an important part of future philosophical discussions in the Americas. It is for this reason that we started this edition from the present, analyzing the questions of philosophical authority and political participation, in order to link them to the past and the roots that help us to analyze the commonalities and differences that originated the philosophical practices in the region.
We hope that the examination of the areas of inquiry suggested in this volume will enable collaborative cross-cultural communication between various Latin American and United States philosophers by effectively decentering the tradition of Anglo-American philosophy. Charles Mills has argued that “if we need to understand collective memory, we also need to understand collective amnesia” (Mills 2007, 28-29). We view the historical narrative above and the papers below as critical practices that point toward the collective amnesia of many historians of philosophy. Thus, a critical or decolonial retelling of this history of the philosophical tradition of the United States aims to give new normative significance to contemporary understandings of the phrase “Inter-American Philosophy.” We hope that this work will point toward renewed and thoroughly historicized efforts to reengage with the philosophical traditions of the Americas in ways that while affirming the demands of cultural alterity, as described by Schutte above, also expand the areas for philosophical investigation in Latin America and the United States as well.

Notes

[1] We would like to express our gratitude to Gregory Pappas and José Medina for their encouragement and their interest in this project. All the contributors to this special issue were also extremely helpful in their interest and effort in working on the study of Latinas/os within the context of various Latin American traditions. To them, we are very grateful for their dedication and participation in this project. Harris Bechtol has been a wonderful assistant in getting this edition ready for publication. We are very grateful to him for his patience and support. I (Adriana) would also like to thank K. Stephen Prince for his assistance in the historiography of those southerners who immigrated to Latin America after the civil war. Finally, we are very grateful to all of the anonymous reviewers who supported us with their time and careful readings of the essays gathered in this issue.


[3] Cheryl Misak is very critical of Menand’s understanding of the roots of pragmatism and his analysis of James, but this might be understood as taking into consideration that her interest is the evolution of analytic philosophy. We find Menand’s


[7] It is interesting to notice that these commonalities have not been studied in depth. An article from the late 1990s by Jaime Nubiola explained why there was not an interest in pragmatism in Spanish America. Jaime Nubiola (1998). C. S. Peirce and the Hispanic Philosophy of the Twentieth Century. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 24 (1):31-49.

[8] Boaz’s ideas on race were also very important for many of the students he trained. Some of his famous students included the Mexican Manuel Gamio; the Brazilian Gilberto Freyre, and the anthropologist and novelist Zora Neale Hurston.


[11] During the 1860's Brazil was a country closely followed by the United States due to the political clout that Confederates had in the country. It is important to remember that thousands of southerners had left the country to live in Brazil, a country that still allowed slavery. Interestingly, William James was one of the participants of the Thayer expedition led by the famous Harvard naturalist Agassiz. This trip took place from April 1865 to August 1866 because Agassiz intended to disprove Darwin, and also because of concerns that the government had to interrupt the influence that southerners had in the country. For more details, see: Lawrence F. Hill, “The Confederate Exodus to Latin America, I" *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* Vol. 39, No. 2 (Oct., 1935), pp. 100-134; Pratt Guterl, Matthew. *American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008; Dawsey, Cyrus B.,


[16] Quotations have emphasis in the original unless indicated.


[18] Despite these similarities, we are not saying that Latin American philosophers were pragmatists, but that they understood the practice of philosophy in a similar way.


**Bibliography**


