Debating Race, Ethnicity and Latino Identity
A Response to Ivan Jaksić, Naomi Zack, and Steven Tammelleo

by Jorge J. E. Gracia

English Abstract

This article responds to comments and criticisms articulated in an APA session (2016) by Ivan Jaksić, Naomi Zack, and Steve Tammelleo on Jorge J. E. Gracia’s work. The first section explores the dialectical nature of philosophy and the implications that it has for the relation between teacher and student. The second part argues for (1) the important role of an ontologically neutral analysis of race for an understanding of race; (2) making sure such analysis avoids confusions on what race is caused by value loaded social and political commitments, while arguing that (1) and (2) will continue to be of value in the future. Finally (3), it argues that, although ethnicity is in part a social construction and human opinion affects it, opinion is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethnicity.

Resumen en español

Este artículo responde a los comentarios y críticas articulados por Iván Jaksić, Naomi Zack y Steven Tammelleo en la sesión de la APA que tuvo lugar en el año 2016 en torno al trabajo de Jorge J. E. Gracia. La primera parte explora la naturaleza dialéctica de la filosofía y las implicaciones que esto tiene en la relación entre profesor y alumno. La segunda parte discute (1) el importante papel de un análisis ontológicamente neutral sobre la raza para un entendimiento del concepto mismo de raza; (2) asegurando dicho análisis evita confusiones sobre cuál concepción de raza es originada por compromisos sociales y políticos cargados de valor, a la vez que sostiene que (1) y (2) continuarán siendo importantes en el futuro. Finalmente, (3) defiende que, si bien la etnicidad es en parte una construcción social y la opinión humana afecta su concepción, dicha opinión no es ni necesaria ni suficiente para establecer el concepto de etnicidad.

Resumo em português

Este artigo responde a comentários e críticas articulados por Ivan Jaksić, Naomi Zack e Steven Tammelleo à obra de Jorge E. Gracia, numa sessão da American Philosophical Association (2016). A primeira seção explora a natureza dialética da filosofia e as implicações que ela tem para a relação entre professor e estudante. A segunda parte defende (1) a importante função da análise ontologicamente neutra [do conceito] de raça para uma compreensão da raça; (2) assegurando que essa análise evita confusões sobre o que afeta a raça vindo de comprometimentos sociais e políticos carregados de valor, ao mesmo tempo em que defende que (1) e (2) continuarão a ser valiosos no
I. The Dialectical Nature of Philosophical Inquiry

Not too long ago, a well known philosopher, who has been a good friend for many years, told me that she could not understand how I could put myself through these sessions at which other philosophers tried to shoot down every thesis I had defended in my publications. She understood that most philosophers who had produced a substantial body of work would do this a couple of times perhaps. But that I would do it regularly, submitting myself to criticism repeatedly, and for every book I published, was beyond her. Indeed, considering the examples of both negative and positive judgments taken from Debating Race listed by Ivan Jaksić one may sympathize with my friend's point. So why would I do it? Am I a philosophical masochist? And would not the exercise emotionally affect me to the point that I would not want to do it again?

My answer is that in fact these experiences energize, rather than discourage, me from doing philosophy. The reasons are two. The first is that, unlike many other philosophers, I do not identify personally with the views that I put forth and defend in my publications. If I did, then any arguments, objections, and any negative judgments against my theories, would wound me personally. After these sessions took place my ego would be badly bruised, even if I was able effectively to answer critical questions and respond to negative arguments. But my views have never been regarded by me as something personal. True, they are based on my own experiences and supported by my analyses, so they are, indeed, mine in some sense. Moreover, I take pride in the clarity and thoroughness with which I have tried to develop them, even though I have not always succeeded in reaching this goal. Finally, while in the fray, I argue persistently in their favor and often hotly. I respond as best I can and with the force of conviction. Nevertheless, I have never considered my ideas to be part of my self, and the enterprise that yields them is not one of self aggrandizement or self satisfaction.

The twofold aim of the process that gives them birth demonstrates it, for one aspect of it is to arrive at truth and the other to elicit further exploration and understanding of our limited horizon. If a view I defend allows both me and others to have some glimpse of the truth, or if it promotes further discussion and inquiry, then I am satisfied. In my view, engaging in the philosophical give and take common in these critical sessions, regardless of how well my positions and arguments fare, is essential for what I consider to be my goals as a philosopher. Philosophy involves the search for truth and if the discussion of my views leads to it, even if it shows that they are false, I
am satisfied. Call this a kind of Popperian move. I prefer to be defeated by the truth than to win through falsehood.

This does not mean that I underestimate the influence that individuals – their identity, background, race, nationality, culture, class, economic status, gender, and so on – have on the philosophy they favor, the philosophical perspectives they adopt, the philosophical problems they choose to take on, and the solutions they deem appropriate and viable. But philosophy, in my estimation, should not be a personally idiosyncratic enterprise. Yes, the individual is pertinent, but the aim of the philosopher, judged by the long tradition founded by the Greeks and continued in the Middle Ages and Early Modern philosophy all the way to the present, should go beyond the individual and search for answers to questions and solutions to problems that surpass the individual person, culture, or nation. In short, philosophy should aim at universality, in spite of how difficult it is to achieve it. In that, philosophy is, as many philosophers have acknowledged, a sister to the sciences. Indeed, is not the importance of philosophical claims measured by how they apply to others beside ourselves?

The second reason that these critical sessions energize rather than discourage me, is that dialogue is part of the very nature of philosophy, at least as understood in the western world. The very origins of philosophy in Greece amply illustrate this notion. For what is it that Socrates and Plato did but to engage in dialogue in order to show, more often than not, that although no satisfactory answer may be reached in this dialectical process, some progress is made nonetheless insofar as at the end of the discussion the interlocutors have at least provisionally established some parameters to the topic and question the value of some of the views they previously accepted uncritically? In short, a via negativa in philosophy is often enlightening in itself and may even be a necessary step to a via affirmativa.

Now let me briefly explore the question that Jaksić has introduced concerning the role that students and collaborators have in the intellectual life of a philosopher. In my view, the relation between teacher and student is symbiotic. Teachers give what they have to their students, and students respond by doing the same to their teachers. Still, many philosophers, perhaps most, work on their own, almost secretly, shut up in their minds, as Descartes advocated. This is in part connected to the notion that philosophy is a personal, individual quest and related essentially to the individual person. But if one thinks, as I do, that philosophy is founded on dialogue and based on a community working together to advance the discipline and our knowledge, then we must seek the input of others who share their intuitions and insights with us. It is in this context that the work of students and teachers offers a unique opportunity to philosophers.

I have pretty much followed this path almost from the very beginning of my career. I have tried to integrate my students into common projects. Not all of them have responded positively, but I pride myself in thinking that those who have, have enriched their philosophical work as much as I.
This entails that teachers should take seriously the proposals that students make and that teachers should give credit where credit is due. When students and teachers collaborate, they should be full partners, even though teachers generally have greater disciplinary experience. However, student contributions should not be underestimated, for they often bring to a project a fresh, unbiased opinion, whereas teachers often fall back into conceptual ruts difficult to avoid.

I pride myself in having worked with most of my students in articles and even some books. And I must say that I have profited much from these partnerships. Cooperation is sometimes difficult and can even be painful, but in the long run, at least for me, it has always turned out to be enlightening. Of course, I should mention that sometimes it has not been possible to partner with students, and that not all my students feel warmly toward me. In part this has been because, although I have tried to accept their judgments, I am quite intolerant when it comes to obscurity or florid style. Concerned, as I am, with truth and its grasp as well as with the arguments given in its support, I have always thought that obscurity and unnecessary textual embellishments are often obstacles to achieving that goal. Following Socrates, I am not particularly fond of using rhetoric in philosophy.

The conception of philosophy as a quest for truth based on dialogue and exchange, has made me appreciate the value of considering and taking seriously different perspectives. I have frequently referred to John Stuart Mill’s claim that philosophers would do well to consider the views of those who are opposed to their own views. Indeed, getting accolades and preaching to one’s choir offer little value in the philosophical quest. This has led me to seek others with whom I disagree and whose method is foreign to my instincts. In my university, for example, I have sought to establish close relations with Continental philosophers, when in fact, although I admire some philosophers that fall under that characterization, such as Michel Foucault, I am more comfortable within a more traditional analytic approach. Not that I am not a critic of analysis, but I have always admired the search for clarity and precision emulated, although not always achieved, by analytic philosophers.

That I like to communicate with philosophers from all philosophical traditions should be clear from the list of philosophers contributing to *Debating Race*. Indeed, the list includes not only philosophers, but also an intellectual historian (Jaksić) and a cultural essayist (Ilan Stavans). Among the philosophers various traditions are represented, such as the Analytic, Continental, Aristotelian, Marxist, and Pragmatic. Moreover, it includes philosophers whose ancestry goes back to a variety of places – such as Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Puerto Rico, Greece, Central America, Africa, Mexico, and the US – that color their intuitions in various ways. Several ethnic and racial groups are also represented, including Anglo Americans, Hispanics/Latinos, Jews, Blacks, Whites, and so on. I am pleased that Naomi Zack notices the broad inclusiveness that I try to practice, but keep in mind that I have not been inclusive simply for the sake of inclusion. I favor inclusiveness because it allows the consideration of a wide field of experience and a great diversity of views that challenge our own cultural,
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So much, then, for the nature of philosophy and the role that cooperation between students and teachers plays in it. Now let me turn to the questions raised by Naomi Zack, which pertain in particular to race and ethnicity.

II. The Reality of Race and Its Relation to Oppression

I begin my response by pointing out that many philosophical discussions about race and its reality are confusing because what is meant by race or its reality is not always the same. In some cases philosophers speak about a group of people who have, say, a common gene; in other cases they speak about the discriminatory and oppressive structures that permeate societies; still others refer to physical phenotypes that are largely inheritable and are common among certain populations; and so on. The obstacle to greater understanding, then, is that philosophers frequently use different understandings of race and its reality. Indeed, Zack knows quite well what I am talking about because her position on the reality of race has been often criticized out of a lack of a proper understanding of her view.

Under these circumstances, the point of departure of any discussion of race that can hope to make headway in achieving some clarity must be a careful logical analysis of the notion of race through a metaphysical categorization of it, which is precisely what I tried to do in *Surviving Race* and other pertinent publications (Gracia 2005a). Now, with these general remarks as background, I turn to the three questions that Zack asks in her commentary on my position.

The first question is the following: “Why do you speak of race as a relation instead of the idea of a relation or common beliefs in society about human relations?”

The answer to this question is that dubbing something a relation does not entail anything about its reality, for there are all kinds of relations, some quite real, some quite unreal, and a host of others that fall in between. The relation of motherhood that my late mother had to me was very real because it entailed the fact that she gave birth to me. The relation of color identity that someone who is color blind holds between something green and something red is unreal because the objects do not have the same color – the color identity between the two objects is a figment of the imagination the color-blind person who cannot see the difference between red and green. And the relation of love between two human beings is difficult to categorize, a reason why philosophers have spend many hours trying to figure out what it is exactly. Now, let me repeat, to call something a relation does not entail anything about the reality of the relation. Moreover, it is best not to specify the degree of reality of a relation before one has provided a careful analysis of the relation, otherwise one might end up doing the same thing that many of those who discuss race do, namely, talk about different things without achieving a meeting of the minds.
The second question that Zack asks echoes an objection brought up by Linda Alcoff in her criticism of my position (Alcoff, 2015, 38-47; my response in Gracia 2015a, 65-90). As Zack recasts it, “How is it possible to have a model of race that ignores oppression?”

The answer is not only that it is quite possible but heuristically necessary in order not to cloud the discussion with predetermined ideological biases. It seems to me that Zack is following the path of a fashionable stance current in philosophy today according to which one can never separate fact from value. But is this right? I do not think so. I can say many things about chocolate without saying whether I like it – as I indeed do – or not. I can also judge the musical ability of my grandchildren keeping separate the love I have for them. Likewise, it seems quite possible to talk about race without considering the history of racial oppression. As philosophers, we must begin at the beginning and keep that beginning as unencumbered and simple as possible. Then, slowly, we can build on it.

In the case of race, the word ‘oppression’ is loaded. To tie the notion of oppression in some way to race, as Zack wants me to do, is to muddle the waters at the outset because race is identified with many different phenomena, such as ethnicity and nationality for example, which may also be subject to oppression, but in different ways. Mind you, I am not arguing that one should not bring oppression based on race as a motive for discussing race; in fact I do bring it into my own analyses of race (Gracia 2005, Preface). My claim is that it makes sense to settle on what race is before one takes up the question of how and why persons have been oppressed because of their race. Of course, the consideration of oppression may lead to a change in the concept of race we had originally adopted but this does not change the procedural point I am making.

Consider that oppression is not only a loaded word, but that it is applied not just to race, but also to ethnic groups, national groups, women, gays, lesbians, and religious communities, to name just a few examples. If this is so, it would seem important to settle on an understanding of race and oppression separately, before asking the question of the particular relation between them. That the oppressive and unjust aspects of race may be primarily matters of social-political philosophy, and ethics, as Zack points out, indicates precisely that before exploring the social, political, and ethical aspects of the race phenomenon we should have some clarity as to what race is.

It seems to me that Zack is going too far in her insistence that discourse about race should be colored by social, political, and ethical considerations, indeed, that it may be impossible, not only recommended, that social, political, and ethical ideology be always mixed in the brew. I am afraid I am not sympathetic to this point of view. Good philosophy begins by keeping things separate whenever possible, proceeding afterwards to make connections on the bases of good arguments and evidence. Keeping the relations between metaphysics, epistemology, social/political thought, and
ethics as clear as possible, unless otherwise demonstrated, is essential for the success of a philosophical analysis.

Indeed, a metaphysical categorization, and what I like to call a “metaphysical analysis,” is the way the greatest philosophers from the past have begun their inquiries (more on this in Gracia 1999, and 2005, ch 2). Remember Plato and the question, What is justice? Surely it makes sense to have a clear idea of what justice is before we go on to consider its relation to other concepts and phenomena, such as the state, or oppression. The same applies to race. Indeed, if we accept Zack’s point that “metaphysics is supposed to truly tell us about what exists,” then there is an even greater reason to figure out what metaphysics tells us about race so we can establish with some degree of certainty and clarity, the question of the reality of race. This is precisely what I have done in Surviving Race, and why I argue that a metaphysical analysis of race has priority over political, social, or ethical ones precisely because metaphysics is more general than the disciplines that study these dimensions of human experience (Gracia 2005, ch 2).

Zack’s third question is the following: “If members of the U.S. ethnic and racial groups were relieved of oppression and the race – and ethnicity-related slander, prejudice, discrimination, and oppression committed against them, how would Gracia’s theory of race and ethnicity be informative or useful?”

My answer is, first, that we should not be very optimistic about an end to all the evils that Zack lists. Remember the post racial age that was so frequently touted after Obama was elected president? Since then we have had the rather rough awakening of Ferguson and what has followed it. Second, I think that discrimination against those who are different in any particular society is an endemic problem that is unlikely to go away, particularly when the groups that suffer from it live according to rules that separate them from others. Consider the case of Jews, Muslims, and Christians when they live in places where they are a minority and follow rules that separate them from what a society regards as the social mainstream. So whatever advantages my position has today, I do not think it will cease to have them in the foreseeable future.

Now let me repeat the advantage of my view, namely, that the clarification of such phenomena as race, ethnicity, and nationality helps to identify the grounds of discrimination, segregation, oppression, and similar nefarious practices. This is important because the sources or causes of these practices cannot be clear if we do not understand race and its relation to such other phenomena as ethnicity and nationality.

Consider the case of Hispanics/Latinos in the US. What are the causes of discrimination against them? Is it that Hispanics/Latinos constitute a race? Is it that they constitute a nation? Or is it that they constitute an ethnic group? We need to know which: one of these, more than one of these, all three of these, or none of these? It makes no sense to think of Hispanics/Latinos as a nation, for they originate in many nations. And it does not make sense to say that the reason is their race, for the race of
Hispanics/Latinos often differs. Indeed, some of them are White, including the two current Republican candidates for the presidency who, by the way, were called non-White by CNN (no matter that they look White and their ancestry is European).

What makes sense is not that they are not White, but that they belong to an ethnic group which is not part of the American mainstream with all that entails, such as historical and familial connections, that have evolved over the years. Indeed, I am happy to see that the categories that apply to Hispanics/Latinos in the US Census are getting better with time, reflecting nuances that were previously ignored.

Does this mean that Hispanics/Latinos do not suffer racial discrimination? Of course not, because there are some of them whose phenotypes or descent identify them in the eyes of other groups as being Black, Native American or other groups that suffer discrimination. This also applies to some other groups, such as Blacks, because often it is not their phenotypes or descent that are the cause of the discrimination they suffer, but their ethnicity, that is, such things as their history of slavery and their values and customs that set them apart from Whites, as Du Bois perceptibly suggested. Knowledge of the causes of an evil is essential in order to eliminate the evil. So we must begin by understanding the differences between races, ethnic groups, and nationalities, for example, in order to eradicate the abuses that have been committed against Blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, Jews, Muslims, Native Americans, and other social groups. In short, then, the metaphysical analysis I propose is valuable, and it is so not only for us today, but for the future as well. Now let me turn to Steven Tammelleo’s criticisms of my position.

III. Facts, Opinion, and Hispanic/Latino Identity

Tammelleo’s comments deal with the part of Debating Race that is concerned with issues of Latino identity in contrast with those addressed by Jaksić, that concern the relation of teacher and student, or those raised by Zack, which refer to race and ethnicity. Let me begin by saying that I am delighted that Tammelleo strongly endorses my view that it is essential for discussions of race, ethnicity, and social identity to keep a clear distinction between criteria for social identity, say, Latino identity, and political agendas concerning the conditions of such identities in society. It is one thing to talk about who is Latino and another to explore the situation of Latinos in, say, the US. Naturally, the position one takes concerning the first will affect the analysis of the second and the measures that one may recommend to eliminate ethnic discrimination, for example. But it is a mistake to confuse these two problems, for that can only lead to further confusion and eventually the discredit of positions that otherwise may be commendable.

It surprises me, however, that Tammelleo argues against my view that metaphysical claims should be carefully distinguished from epistemic ones, for it seems to me that this sort of confusion is similar to the one he strongly rejects. Now, my claim is that one should be as careful concerning fact and opinion as one is between fact and
political agendas. Remember the example I gave in answer to Bernstein to which Tammelleo refers, namely that my knowledge of who hit me over the head cannot alter the bump I have on my head or the identity of the person who caused it (Gracia 2015b, 156-162; Bernstein 2015, 106-113). I do not see how Tammelleo, or Bernstein for that matter, can possibly argue that what someone thinks about a fact can change the fact, that is, unless one were God and God were as powerful as Peter Damien thought he was. Peter Damien is the guy that argued in the early Middle Ages, that God could bring it about that what has happened did not happen. Of course, those in the period who were sane correctly thought that the claim, even in the case of God, was absurd. Reality is one thing, and what I think of it is something else, even if I were God. Of course, what I think about X may be correct and exactly represent what X is, but it could also not represent it accurately.

In fact, however, I do not believe this is what concerns Tammelleo precisely. I think what he has in mind is something more interesting, as he clarifies later in his commentary. This is that social kinds are essentially constituted by human opinion. The rules that apply to a dollar bill, just as those that apply to ethnic groups, are different because what makes up a dollar bill is that people think it has value, and what constitutes an ethnic group, say Latinos, is that the members of the group think they are Latinos. Now let me put this in a slightly different way. The claim that Tammelleo seems to be making is that in the case of social kinds, such as dollar bills and ethnic groups, human opinion is either a necessary or a sufficient condition of their identity as dollar bills or as the particular ethnic groups they are. Put this way, I think we can see with more clarity the issue and how distinct the position of Bernstein and Tammelleo is from my own. For my long-standing claim is that human opinion is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of ethnicity even though it certainly can affect it.

In my books I made this clear with examples, particularly that of Latinos: being a Latino is not determined by what the person or some other persons think, for we are not like dollar bills. I accept that ethnicity is a social kind insofar as it is partly the result of construction, but the construction is not like the one that makes dollar bills be what they are (Gracia 2015b, 156-162; 2005, 32, 42-44). The construction involves complex historical events and relations rather than mere opinion and convention. Of course, this does not mean that self identification or social identification are irrelevant to ethnicity – something to which I explicitly make clear in my publications – but it does mean that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, as mentioned before. You might remember Giorgio’s interesting novel The Twenty Fifth Hour, in which the protagonist, who is circumcised but not Jewish, is taken for a Jew and as a result has to endure endless calamities. So, does someone have to think he or she is Jewish in order to be so? And does thinking oneself as Jewish make one so? The answer to both questions is negative. Think of small children, persons who are mad, and those who suffer from some mental disabilities.

Another confusion present in the views of Bernstein and Tammelleo is that both seem to take my view to imply that knowledge cannot be a cause of who we are. But
that is certainly not my position. Indeed, in the very text quoted by Tammelleo I explicitly acknowledge that our knowledge can modify facts or produce new ones, even though none of this changes what the facts were originally. And my entire theory of ethnicity, as Tammelleo acknowledges, explicitly recognizes the importance of human action, obviously directed by opinion or knowledge, for the formation of ethnic groups.

Now let me turn to the second objection that Tammelleo raises against my view of Hispanics/Latinos. And before I get to it let me make clear that I explicitly reject that the terms ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ pick the same group of people. I argue in favor of encompassing Latinos, Iberians, and Latin Americans under the group of Hispanics, whereas I exclude Iberians from the group of Latinos. Also I should correct the views presented in a text from Bernstein that Tammelleo quotes and with which he seems to agree to wit:

When the expression (Hispanics) is used in the United States or even Latin America, it is not commonly used to include ancestors of current residents in the Iberian Peninsula. And I doubt that those residents of the Iberian Peninsula after 1492 (and their descendants) think of themselves as Hispanic . . . .

Contrary to this, I would like to point out the fact that the term ‘Hispanic,’ derived from the name Romans gave to the Iberian peninsula, is indeed commonly used today, and has been used for more than a century, to refer both to peoples from the peninsula, particularly Spain, and their descendants in Latin America. It is also a fact that the term ‘Hispanic’ is commonly used in Latin America to refer to populations who speak Spanish, rather than French, English, or Portuguese – thus the common talk of hispanoamérica. Moreover, American dictionaries going back decades record the term as referring to persons in the US who have ancestors in the Iberian peninsula or Latin America. The idea, common among some misinformed American scholars (some of them ironically with Hispanic origins) is that the term was invented by the US government. But this is false. The term was already current much earlier, as dictionaries predating the 1970's when the term was adopted by the American government bureaucracy make clear. Incidentally, this is a clear instance of political ideology distorting facts, since it is politically useful to believe that the US government invented the term.

The case with ‘Latino’ is different. For this is a term derived from the Spanish term ‘Latinoamérica,’ and thus ‘latinoamericano,’ that is, Latin America and Latin-American. It is a term invented by the French to counteract the influence of Spain in the new world, a political move that did not gain the political traction for which they hoped, but which stuck nonetheless. Keep in mind that before the French intervention, the Spanish term ‘latino’ meant simply someone from the part of Italy Romans called “latium.” But let me just leave this matter for another time for lack of time and indicate that you can find an account of both terms in Hispanic/Latino Identity and Latinos in America.
Tammelleo’s final objection, which echoes one voiced by Eduardo Mendieta, is that the use of a common term for Iberians and Latin Americans based on a cultural foundation ignores the impact of the wars of independence on those to whom the term is supposed to refer (for Mendieta, see 2015b, 138-146). In short, since there is no common language or culture common to all Iberians, Latin Americans, or their descendants in the US, it makes no sense to encompass all of them under the same label.

My response is that, indeed, if that were my position it would be easily defeatable, but it is not. My view is not that a language and a common culture justify considering Hispanics/Latinos an ethnic group. Indeed, I explicitly argue not only that a common culture and language are not only insufficient, but also not necessary to justify the use of the term because there are no such things, and that the key to Hispanic or Latino ethnicity is not primarily rooted in culture and language, but rather in history. It is historical events, which in turn create similarities of various kinds among peoples in certain contexts that create ethnic groups. My Familial Historical View, with its family resemblance dimension, is clearly opposed to the position that Tammelleo attributes to me and then rejects. In Debating Race, I make the very point in answer to Gregory Pappas and Ilan Stavans, who appear to favor cultural and linguistic justifications for their use (Pappas 2015, 122-130; Stavans 2015, 131-137).

Let me close by repeating that I am very grateful to the commentators for bringing up the objections they have voiced. Their work is truly philosophical in the sense I presented at the beginning. Indeed, I have profited from the discussion and hope that my commentators, and anyone else who has access to this, does as well.

Jorge J. E. Gracia
Samuel P. Capen Chair
SUNY Distinguished Professor
Philosophy and Comparative Literature University at Buffalo, Amherst, NY 14260
gracia@buffalo.edu

References


