Introduction

Alejandro Vallega’s book, *Latin American Philosophy: From Identity to Radical Exteriority*, is important and timely. It introduces a wide range of deep thinkers who are virtually unknown to students and, unfortunately, many faculty—white and non-white, with new doctoral degrees in philosophy to senior members who have worked in the discipline for forty years and cannot name one philosopher of color in Africana or Latin American thought. Some of the main figures the book introduces, in the following order are: Simón Bolívar, Leopoldo Zea, Salazar Bondy, Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla, Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, Ramón Grosfoguel, Santiago Castro-Gomez, Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, María Lugones, Frantz Fanon, Nelly Richard, Alfredo Castro and Alfredo Jaar. It also does not seem too far-fetched to note that perhaps even some specialists in Latina/o philosophy or Latin American philosophy may not have heard about some of the thinkers introduced by Vallega. This is not a criticism. The continental land mass is vast, comprised of multiple nations each with their internal heterogeneity. Couple this with the added intellectual burdens that come with being a tokenized ethno-philosopher who must also have a comprehensive background in the default Western European intellectual tradition and this ignorance is understandable. Perhaps in future books on the subject will be more focused on specific time periods, individuals or regionalized on contemporary Venezuelan or Bolivian philosophy or topic related like Latin American philosophy of education or books that go beyond these ways of understanding specialization.[1] Vallega’s book challenges the conceptual parochialism in philosophy departments and the wider epistemological structure of the Westernized university, which houses the discipline on a global scale. This work is also significant because it is not simply a book on Latin American philosophy. It is not merely a chapter that could be added to the world philosophy books published in the 1990's.[2]

These books, while appropriately responding to the single linear developmental time line of the history of Western European philosophy articulated by Hegel in his *Philosophy of History* and internalized by subsequent generations, still had their own ambiguities.[3] The absence of non-Western perspectives were addressed by including units on Eastern philosophy and Islamic philosophy. The former has institutional origins with the East-West Center established in 1960 at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and the latter rebrands Western European Medieval philosophers as Islamic; these perspectives were not only limited to philosophizing from certain social locations but replaced the meta-narrative of a single developmental time line to multiple ones. The 1990’s model of world philosophies organized these intellectual traditions in a ghettoized fashion according to multiple, separate, linear, developmental, temporal
tracks of the histories of these philosophies that constitute world philosophies (i.e. Western European, Eastern and Islamic).

Some of the problems with this approach that perhaps were more often than not an indirect response to Hegel's relegation of the East to a stage of immaturity, were not merely about the lack of African, African American, Afro-Caribbean and Latin American perspectives. There was a lack of connections between the narrowly identified list of distinct philosophies made more visible in these 1990’s books and a philosophical method associated with this temporal framing. Methodologically, one could compare notion X in Confucius and notion Y in Aristotle that is abstracted away from power relations and the social historical context from which notions X and Y emerged. If the 1990’s model of world philosophies offers an image of what a cross-cultural philosophical exchange might look like, then Vallega’s book introduces its readers to a host of thinkers attempting to offer another way of thinking about what philosophy could be and what inter-cultural philosophical dialogue might look like. Because colonialism is taken into account as a point of departure for situating Latin American philosophy, it becomes entangled with Western European, Africana, Islamic, Jewish and other philosophies. Taking colonial entanglements into consideration as a point of departure for philosophical reflection allows for multiple entry points into the conversation and is a remedy to compartmentalized philosophies and decontextualized comparative conceptual analysis found in the ethno-philosophical tradition dubbed “Eastern philosophy.” Because of the temporality assumed in the organization of some of these 1990's world philosophy books and the rationality operative in the comparative methodology of Chinese philosophy that abstracts away from power relations, these Westernized tendencies and approaches to reason complicate the East/West binary. They indicate that it may be too cavalier to think Eastern philosophy is not Westernized in certain ways or that the general category of non-Western philosophy is straightforward or purely distinct from the influence of the Western European philosophical tradition. Simply put, the existence of non-Western philosophies is an open question, given the at least five-hundred-year emergence and planetary expansion of Western European colonialism and its concomitant philosophy—with its narrative understanding, self-image, and aesthetic dispositions.

In light of these meta-philosophical issues, Vallega’s book is a welcomed, original contribution to “new” world philosophies. Because the book answers the question whether it is possible to think beyond Western instrumental rationalism, with a “yes,” despite the influence of Western European colonialism, then this book should not only be read by Latin American, Latina/o and Africana philosophers, but is an invitation to scholars whose area of specialization include other regional philosophies—Islamic, Chinese, Indian, Korean, Japanese. These philosophies might tend to think about philosophy according to the 1990’s model of world philosophies that does not take colonial considerations seriously into account when formulating questions, framing issues and thinking about philosophical methodology.[4] Please note I use the moniker “Western European philosophers,” not simply to refer to those attempting to recall the name of an Africana or Latina philosopher, but to refer to all of the aforementioned
Dussel's Metaphysics of Alterity and the Aesthetics of Liberation by Ernesto Rosen Velásquez

groups of people, including myself, who can take many insights from this book. As readers embark on the journey of thinking through this work, it can function as a mirror, reflecting how Western European you/we all are at a deep level that often goes unnoticed because it's so close to us, feels normal, banal, in our reflex responses caught unaware; our aesthetic dispositions, sensibilities, affective and physically embodied dimensions and the way philosophizing is enacted, expressed, communicated and disseminated. However, Vallega’s book does not just perform this function; it calls for an aesthetics of liberation where the emotional, cognitive, corporeal residues of coloniality need to be undone because they shape our lived experience and the way we philosophize. While the book addresses at least three distinct yet interrelated issues which can be grouped broadly as: metaphysical, pertaining to what it fundamentally means to be Latin American; epistemological, relating to whether it is possible to think beyond Westernized rationality; and meta-philosophical, concerning whether an authentic Latin American philosophy is possible, I focus primarily on the metaphysical and epistemological, and secondarily on the meta-philosophical.

Specifically, in the first part of this article, I attempt to flesh out and clarify some of the concerns directed against Dussel’s metaphysics of alterity and present rejoinders that attempt to diminish the force of the objections. In the second part, I raise a concern about art and the reconfiguration of power. The concerns raised in both parts attempt to clarify what is at stake in Vallega’s objection against Dussel’s view and perhaps provide a wider path for future investigations into terrain Vallega takes to be underemphasized in Latin American decolonial thought: the aesthetics of liberation.

Dussel’s Metaphysics of Alterity

Dussel’s approach to the metaphysics of alterity has been found to be problematic for various reasons. First, he creates two totalities by distinguishing the evil imperialist center and the good periphery, those in exteriority—the excluded, exploited, silenced victims of the system that are the source of liberation. In this sense, Dussel reproduces the metaphysics of presence, which entails a desire for immediate access to meaning, privileges presence over absence and assumes a bias in certain binary oppositions in which one side of a binary is hierarchically positioned over the other. This desire, way of thinking and constructing theory is problematic. We do not have immediate access to meaning because our language does not correspond in a one-to-one way with a non-linguistic, mind-independent reality. This is because reality is too fluid and our experience is linguistically constituted in such a way that we cannot step outside language and verify whether a correspondence relation obtains between a bit of language and non-discursive reality. If there are no stable referents for language, then there are only various interpretations. Thus, presences should not be privileged. Part of the problem with constructing hierarchically positioned binary oppositions is that upon closer scrutiny, the basis of the hierarchies is not, adequately supported; this is because each side of the binary is presented in a homogeneous, reified, essentialized way that flattens out differences, multiplicities and complexities. If Dussel's thinking reproduces this Westernized tendency, this implies his notion of concrete alterity, while different
than the formalism and absoluteness found in a Levinasian alterity, does not remain with the distinctness of the other in relative exteriority and instead reproduces the problem of representing the other. Simply put, Dussel's thinking does not quite move beyond Western rationalism insofar as his thinking remains tethered to a metaphysics of presence that is inextricably bound to the problem of representing the other.

Dussel’s response in his invocation of grand identity categories of alterity such as “victims, social movements, Guarani, Zapatistas” is strategic in that he seeks philosophical recognition for Latin American philosophy, in the restricted sense (not the strict sense according to only Western European standards of what counts as philosophy). This recognition would enable Latin American philosophy to achieve some degree of philosophical normalcy—the establishment of journals, courses, departments and conferences. This recognition would also create the conditions for the possibility of Latin American philosophy to affirm itself as such in all its cultural particularity, while being recognized as an expression of universal philosophy. This recognition would also seek to initiate a process in which Latin American philosophy would be “practiced in the main programs of philosophical studies and not in the specialized areas of Latin American studies or in a program related to a specific university chair.”[5] There are at least three reasons why Dussel's sense of the strategic should not be conceived as a kind of strategic essentialism that invokes categories of alterity in a simplified, merely pragmatic way in order to achieve certain goals of distributive justice or equal rights. First, even though Dussel understands the people in radical exteriority were socially constructed by European cartographers and colonial discourses—the Americas were not only invented but the category of Indians was, as well—he does not infer an anti-realism from this. He does not believe there really are no Mayans or Guarani, that they are too dynamic and internally heterogeneous about which to make any truthful claims. Rather, they are victims that are either not allowed to reproduce their material life or participate in the wider society or their way of being in the world is excluded. The status of victims is about the positionality of certain communities in the system and is not about identifying a passive, victim mentality. Dussel’s victims are agential, active in social movements that are the source of transformation. To avoid the real problems with reifying and fetishizing should the only option be extreme fluidity in which identity claims of alterity cannot be justifiably made and a decentering that does not privilege anything? Second, he is not committed to a theory of reference where language does not correspond to a non-linguistic mind independent reality. This view which is based in part on the fluidity of reality and the linguistic nature of experience assumes a one-to-one correspondence theory of truth as the standard of reference which language as a tool must satisfy but continuously fails to do so. Third, Dussel's reference to concrete excluded people in radical exteriority does not assume these communities are not knowledge-producing subjects that simply need to be integrated into the system by opening up lines of social mobility. In actuality, they have other concepts and lived practices that are outside of the control, manipulation and exploitation by the center. Social movements in exteriority offer other ways of thinking about social mobility. They are sources of other knowledges and other forms of sociality that have the power to
transform reality when their *potentia*—the living community in its material willfulness—develops a critical consensus and becomes organized and institutionalized *potestas*.

There is another sense in which Dussel’s interpellation of those in radical exteriority is strategic. Strategic considerations tend to be sharply counterpoised to considerations of descriptive adequacy. Dussel's distinction between the center and periphery is a strategic one in the sense that the terms constituting the relata are not, a priori, in all possible worlds essentially evil and good, respectively, he is not motivated simply by pure, conceptual clarity and precision. Instead his distinction tracks, in part, the historical emergence of the center/periphery relation by making visible what was invisible—the real material destruction and epistemic inequality in which local Amerindian knowledges was severely diminished, covered over by Westernized knowledge and made hegemonic through a process of colonization. Here, the lack of immediate access to meaning is not so much a matter of being unable to experience idealized perfect acts of communication where listeners and speakers have identical images or notions in their heads when communicating. Nor is it so much about linguistically mediated experience or the dynamism of reality. It is more a matter of real communicative inequalities produced through the colonial process of covering over local knowledge systems by Western European knowledge systems and the initiation of patterns of accumulation and disaccumulation of epistemic authority of core and peripheral knowledges, respectively. These facts of colonization that were absent in official narratives and academic philosophical discourses and are now present, constitute the concrete living experiences of the excluded and oppressed in Latin America. To Dussel, these historical facts are a basis of the hierarchy between the center and the periphery. He rejects the idea that there are no facts, but only interpretations. By contrast, there are facts which are always interpreted. Because Dussel takes colonization into consideration when he thinks about radical exteriority, his metaphysics of alterity is not motivated simply by a concern for descriptive adequacy but also by political considerations. In this sense, Dussel offers a political metaphysics of alterity where presence and absence is not merely a semantic relationship about how language operates as articulated from an ahistorical and disembodied locus of enunciation. Instead of this formalism, presence and absence are contextual, in part about the dominance of certain discourses and narratives that systematically and methodologically exclude other philosophies, histories and life-worlds through colonization.

There is a third sense in which Dussel strategically uses large identity categories of alterity. They are invoked as part of a larger political argument that creates the conditions for the possibility of thinking in radical exteriority. By situating multiple, simultaneous, co-existing civilizations within the wider proto-history of human development in the Paleolithic and Neolithic periods, Mesoamerican civilizations may be considered as one among many other civilizations prior to European colonization. When this pre-colonial snapshot is coupled with the narrower colonial history of entanglements in Latin America, the Latin American circumstance can be situated historically and other geo-political locations from which philosophical thinking can occur. Dussel's account of
the modern/colonial creation of the center and periphery shows how perspectives are not merely mathematical points; it's not about positively affirming a diversity of views and not privileging one without thoroughly and objectively analyzing all the other points of view, laid out in front of us. This assumes perspectives are not historical formations in power relations. If there are some perspectives that historically have not been allowed to emerge, have been marginalized and discarded as irrelevant, while simultaneously other perspectives have been given authority and legitimacy for over five hundred years, then it is odd to not privilege certain excluded voices or ask for an argument as to why perspectives from exteriority should have some priority over the perspectives from the center. While fetishizing can lead to thinking there is a panacea and other problems it is not clear how privileging historically discarded thought is fetishizing exteriority. While it is not automatic that perspectives from radical exteriority should be assented to, they are fallible; why not privilege those perspectives when it comes to understanding the operations of domination, various forms of resistance and life itself? For these three main reasons, it is not clear what is at stake when Vallega says in chapter four, which presents numerous objections against Dussel's view, “I believe Schutte is correct in pointing out Dussel’s failure to remain with the distinctness or alterity in the sense of radical exteriority.”[6] For Vallega it seems that what is at stake is Dussel’s way of presenting radical exteriority, while having a broader conception of rationality that allows for all kinds of reasons to be presented in a transmodern dialogue does not go beyond modern rationalism because it relies on arguments and justifications. For Vallega this is not quite a thinking in remarkable distinctness; it does not challenge the coloniality of images—of how philosophy may be embodied in a way that is beyond the presentation of argumentative explanations.[7] Should thinking in remarkable distinctness trump Dussel’s political considerations?

Art and Reconfiguring Power

Is Alfredo Jaar’s installation an instance of de-linking that displaces and overcomes the coloniality of time and image at an aesthetic level? It seems to because his 1987 piece, “A Logo for America” installed in New York’s Times Square, disrupts a deeply ingrained and commonly held association in the U.S. public domain of meanings. The term “America” is often associated with the narrowly circumscribed region of the United States and its concomitant image of the American flag. Jaar’s installation not only interrupts this normalized meaning by projecting a map of the United States, with the logo “This is not America,” followed by the American flag and the logo “This is not America’s Flag” but also subverts it by showing a map of the North American continent, including North, Central and South America followed by the word “America.” By directing the audience’s imagination toward the whole continent, this opens up the possibility for various meanings of the American flag. Chile’s flag is America’s flag; Mexico’s flag is America’s flag and so on. In this sense, Jaar’s installation is an artistic act of resistance that disrupts the coloniality of images of what America means and offers another way of thinking about it.
There is also disruption at a methodological level in how the provincial, normalized meaning of America is destabilized. The installation is not presented in a private space of an art gallery, but is publicly accessible for people of diverse socio-economic backgrounds to see, experience and understand. The former assumes a notion of space which maps sites in a compartmentalized way as an art site and non-art site, an education site and non-education site. The interruption, disruption and subversion does not happen by an individual presenting a lecture in a more privatized venue such as a university classroom or American Philosophical Association meeting, explicitly librocentrically and logocentrically grounded in the analysis and argumentation contained in books. It is a picture-based means of disrupting a certain chain of associations and offers another way for the average person to see, thereby provoking conversation and further interpretation. The installation has its own temporality that it is visible to the public eye in a way that has some stability—even though the installation had a limited showing and is no longer running in Times Square. People from different walks of life can view it or not. If the installation could see the audience’s perception of it, the audience viewing it is more random and spontaneous—who knows exactly who and how many will see it. In this sense Jaar’s installation disrupts the coloniality of images of what an artist is and does, what a Latin American philosopher could be, where learning and art can happen and how art can try to change the world, politically speaking. But does it displace and overcome the coloniality of image?

We can identify at least two simultaneous temporalities—the temporality of the installation and the rhythm of life of the modern/colonial world-system. The installation is not in a peripheral small town but is delivered in one of the world’s biggest metropolitan centers. The space where the installation is placed signifies this work of art is made visible in a place that is mapped at the apex of a linear developmental timeline. New York City is registered as a cultural, intellectual center of creativity. It is understood to be the place where things are happening, the place to be. While this does not deny that this metropolitan center is not a great place to be; the point is other surrounding peripheral cities and spaces are not perceived as simultaneous with New York City—things aren’t seen to be happening there, they are not the place to be, they are not where it is at. This denial of coevalness, of simultaneity, is part of how racialized temporality organizes the spatial backdrop informing the audience’s perceptions of Jaar’s installation. By widening the audience’s understanding of America, the content of the installation puts Central and South America on the map of racialized time that positions large “third world” regions back in an underdeveloped stage of time or puts them completely off the linear development timeline of civilization—America in the narrow sense of the United States is at the apex and Latin America is outside history. In this context, Jaar’s installation disrupts the coloniality of time. If an artist were interested in making an impact on people’s habitual perceptions through art and wanted to have the widest audience possible, then getting support to put up an installation in New York City, in the middle of Times Square, would be one of the best ways to do this, if not the best place to achieve these goals. However, despite this visibility and disruptive character, the installation does have a short-term life, that emerges and disappears from view to then remerges in a reenactment years later. Even though the disruptive image
not only challenges the cartography of power, it also offers audiences an opportunity to acquire other perceptual habits about America. Jaar’s images, from a perspective of the south, have a temporally unstable quality and thus seem to lack the power to reach a certain level of public memory in the United States. Also, the installation is situated within the context of bombardment from an overwhelming number of other advertising images that can drown out Jaar’s installation. In this regard, the installation is a modest example of resistance; but its very modesty speaks screams out how bad the situation is in a progressive, intellectual, artistic, metropolitan center such as New York City. Consider how the current Donald Trump logo “Make America Great Again” might seem to diminish the force of Jaar’s no-longer-installed-installation by re-inscribing certain narratives and images of the narrow sense of America that was at some point in U.S. history alleged to be great. In light of colonial considerations, it is not clear exactly when America was great or if there actually was a time when it was great for not only white males but many other people. Nonetheless, the Trump slogan and images associated with it have force for some people. Because public meanings are contested and clash, I am curious as to why Vallega would say Jaar’s installation “overcomes the coloniality of time and image.”[8] I wonder how can disruptions such as Jaar’s have more impact in the U.S. domain of public meanings and public memory and lessen the impact that the Trump slogan and oversaturated advertising images have on people. How can meanings that challenge our assumptions emerge and have a public life in such a way that make people perceive something such as the Trump slogan in a more critical way? An aesthetics of liberation Vallega is calling for can provide an intellectual landscape to help navigate the nuances of a difficult symbolic domain. To undo Western rationalism and think in remarkable distinctness still can leave open the question of how to reconfigure power. The concern is that it is not clear how thinking in remarkable distinctness does not leave us with what Dussel identifies in his “Carta a Los Indignados” as a kind of spontaneism that lacks organization and institutionalization.

Museums as a Global Structure of Power?

When Ramon Grosfoguel says, “what arrived in the Americas was a broader and entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the world system is unable to account for” he is pointing to a limit in Wallerstein’s class based modern world system theory that does not take coloniality into account.[9] To overcome this, Grosfoguel not only shows how coloniality is constitutive of modernity but also presents nine global structures of power in his 2007 work, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn.” I am curious as to why Vallega would say in a footnote, “Here at issue is Wallerstein’s world-system theory, not Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power and knowledge.”[10] This can make it sound as if there is no tension between Quijano’s and Grosfoguel’s theories of modernity/coloniality.

Isn’t Grosfoguel’s theory showing how Quijano’s Marxist historical materialist method involves a thinking about the Latin American circumstance and other concrete regions in the global south? In contrast, Grosfoguel is thinking with and from a perspective of radical exteriority (i.e. the gaze of the indigenous woman standing at the
shores of the “Caribbean” seeing the boats coming toward her). Furthermore, isn’t Grosfoguel’s theory also broader and builds on Quijano’s theory which takes race and the economy as fundamental principles of organization of the modern/colonial world system? Isn’t Grosfoguel’s theory broader than Maria Lugones’s theory which focuses on how race, class, sex and gender are basic entangled dimensions of the modern/colonial world system?

I wonder why Vallega did not critically evaluate Ramon Grosfoguel’s 2007 article. Because up to this point in the book, Vallega has introduced the works of Bolivar, Zea, Vallenilla, Bondy, Dussel and Quijano, pointing out the limits of how each, in different ways, is not able to think beyond Western instrumental rationalism. I expected a criticism of Grosfoguel’s view, by Vallega of a missing aesthetic dimension in Grosfoguel’s articulation of the entangled package in that 2007 article. Since Vallega’s book explicitly aims, in part, to be a preparation for a future work focused on the aesthetics of liberation, it seems that a helpful ingredient in this direction would be to consider Ramon Grosfoguel’s more recent 2011 article where he expresses more complexity in the entangled package by identifying fifteen global structures of power of the modern/colonial world system, one of which includes:

an aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naïve or primitive art where the West is considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of inferior expressions of art institutionalized in Museums, Art Galleries and global art markets. [11]

What potentials and limits would Vallega identify in Grosfoguel’s highlighting an aesthetic dimension, intersecting with the other fourteen global structures that constitute the coloniality of power and knowledge as seen out of the consciousness of the colonized? The concerns raised do not imply that the aesthetic dimensions do not matter. What it is asking for is how political art can reconfigure power in a way that can transform institutions and the aesthetic sensibilities underlying them? How might Vallega’s aesthetics of liberation build on, perhaps interweave with and go further than Quijano and Lugones discussions of the modern/colonial world system?[12] As preparation for a future work focused on the aesthetics of liberation, it seems that these publications can be helpful in this direction. Grosfoguel does not unpack the aesthetic dimension in his updated article but provides a broad layout so others can pursue various aspects of the entangled package, in more detail, in the future. It seems that a challenge with a transmodern dialogue is whether eventually in the future a North-South dialogue is possible if Western European philosophy does not see itself as one among many other culturally particular expressions of universal philosophy, but instead as one formal, non-culturally located universal among other culturally specific ethno-philosophies. If the latter happens then it seems difficult to avoid the challenge of a unidirectional transfer of knowledge that Santiago-Castro Gomez recognizes as involving a pragmatic recognition of indigenous knowledges which are recognized merely for their informational value, as information products to be used by pharmaceutical and other companies. In this situation, excluded knowledges are
extracted from their local contexts in ways that enables their use by technology for the sake of capital expansion. How can this be avoided, if at all? How can we create the conditions for the possibility of the recognition of epistemic diversity? If we should expect pragmatic recognition of indigenous knowledges to happen, then how can this kind of instrumentalization have less power? These are some questions I think Vallega’s book prepares us to begin thinking about.

Notes

[1] Perhaps in the future philosophy departments in the U.S. will have four or five faculty doing research in various areas of Latin American philosophy.


[7] Vallega identifies this Westernized attitude as the “subjectivist rationalist attitude.” This is one attitude among other Westernized attitudes he identifies as: (1) the ontological attitude, (2) the onto-historical attitude (3) the traditional phenomenological attitude and (4) the appropriative attitude. To approach radical exteriority in its fluid singularity from below would be to think in remarkable distinctness, it is to be free from these Westernized attitudes. This notion of liberation thinking should not be confused with a decontextualized notion of freedom from all desires but only certain Westernized