

Vallega, Dussel, and Radical Exteriority

by Linda Martín Alcoff

Winning an anti-colonial war can create an intellectual crisis. After decades of negative arguments, a positive set of questions suddenly looms: who are we, and who do we want to become? In this important new work, *Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority* (2014), Alejandro Vallega offers a critical analysis of the debates over liberation that emerged as Latin America gained independence from Spain, debates that continue into the present. After independence, Latin Americans found themselves still bounded by their colonial masters in the realm of ideas. Thus, a philosophical tradition began to emerge early on “distinguished by its struggle first for liberation and self-identification and later for decolonization, for recovering and giving articulation to lives and ways of thinking that have been suppressed, silenced, or virtually destroyed.”[1]

Vallega’s focus is on the work of theorists who have been debating how best to free Latin American philosophy from the vestiges of European colonialism. These questions of liberation that unite such disparate works from Simón Bolívar writing in the early 1800s to Santiago Castro-Gómez writing today gave rise to new ideas about philosophical methodology as well as the understanding of philosophy itself. As this essay will discuss, what makes this tradition of thought strikingly distinct from most of the work still emerging from Europe and Anglo-dominant societies is the idea that philosophy has a historically specific, material context of enunciation, that emerges in a particular time and a place as a mechanism of reflection and intervention. Philosophy is not inherently liberatory but can play a useful role for structures of domination. Because of this meta-philosophical approach, Latin American liberatory thought has not seen itself as formulating a universalist account of either domination or emancipation for all people for all time, but for the particular challenges in this hemisphere given its specific colonial history and hybrid nations and peoples. Further, as Vallega shows here, the universalist pretensions of Eurocentric philosophy have had a damaging effect in Latin America.

Vallega explains that “the definitive insight” that motivated him to write this book was “that the ‘modern Western rationalist and instrumental’ interpretation of the world is insufficient to address the experiences of being Latin American and the thought that arises from it.”[2] Thus, his central argument is that Latin America, its intellectual and literary traditions, political institutions, art, and culture, have been assessed incorrectly and unfavorably through the lens of this form of rationalism. From this lens Latin America has been viewed as manifesting cultural incoherence and sterility primarily because of its failure to consolidate as a modern society. And this failure is due to the persistence of multiple temporalities---pre-modern and modern---that continue to exert a practical influence.

Modern Western instrumental rationality was created in the midst of capitalist industrialization and global colonial ventures and provided helpful concepts and

arguments useful for those projects. The articulation and critical analysis of the framework that developed within Europe, however, is persistently oblivious to the effects of the colonial context on its formation. Thus, the critique of Western instrumental rationality that Vallega finds in the Latin American philosophical tradition is different than the critique offered by Adorno and Horkheimer, who focused on the problems of scientism (or the idea that science has a monopoly on knowledge) and the attempt to master nature. They articulated the problem as ‘instrumental rationality,’ not ‘Western instrumental rationality.’ Following Heidegger, Vallega sees the form of rationality that developed in modern Europe as a symptom of a deeply cultural alienation and mass dysfunction, not simply an intellectual error but a kind of deviation or fall. Vallega’s work here and in his earlier books (2003, 2009) points out that Heidegger’s focus on language as ‘world-disclosure’ allows for a more robust attentiveness to specific cultural and historical experience, as Mariana Ortega (2016) has also recently argued.

However, Vallega’s analysis departs from Heidegger in arguing that the emancipatory counter-tradition that developed within European philosophy to critique scientism lacked a colonial awareness. Instrumental rationality was not simply functional for capitalism but also, and originally, for the colonial project, which needed to predict and control the Other, and not simply nature. This is an important correction. European critical theory has mistakenly placed the problem of the natural sciences as prior to, and in fact causing, the problem of the social sciences---as if the objectifications of human beings occurred only as a collateral effect of the hyper-empiricism of the scientific revolution, almost as a methodological error. Decolonial theorists such as Anibal Quijano (2008) reverse this order: colonialism in the new world required a new set of apparatuses for instrumentalizing and managing populations, their resources and labor. The central feature of the Latin American critique of reason, then, is shifted from the empirical sciences in their application to the natural world, to the human sciences in their application to both individuals as well as groups. This is an ongoing pattern of oversight: for example, in Foucault’s neglect of colonial settings as the crucible for disciplinary practices to Žižek’s monochromatic characterization of multi-culturalism as essentializing difference.

The very aim of achieving a universal, collaborative community requires precisely the reflexive awareness of one’s own particularity of experience, an awareness the European framework continually eclipses.[3] No dialogic methods are required when one’s thought represents the whole. Even the radical tradition of European philosophy continues to present itself as a decontextualized universal whose truth value is transcendent of material or historical location. As Leopoldo Zea (1992) argued, European philosophy thought it was speaking the language of humanity, expressing the vanguard of human endeavors, and that it was therefore only right and proper that the rest of the world engage in philosophy under this umbrella. Vallega explains that for Zea, “Western thought has inserted itself in such a way in the Americas that there cannot be a Latin American thought that does not take its departure from European philosophy.”[4]

By contrast, many of the central problematics Latin American thinkers formulated took their departure from specific conditions of their countries, for example, the fundamentally hybrid nature of Latin America, as well as the particular kind of hybrid that is manifested. This problematic is articulated by the first philosopher Vallega discusses: Simón Bolívar, whose work sets the stage for the ongoing debates. Hybridity poses a challenge by producing a discord between divergent but juxtaposed cultural meanings and ways of life, ostensibly blocking the formation of a common identity based on a coherent experience. And the particular form of hybridity that exists in post-colonial Latin America manifests a distinct challenge for any decolonial project, given the mix of settlers together with slaves and native peoples, Africans and the indigenous with European as well as Arab and Asian peoples, many of whom produced children with mixed lineages who yet retained diverse political possibilities vis-à-vis colonial structures. The European populations of Latin America were generally from the derided south of Europe, such as Spain and Italy, further justifying derision of the continent. We should note that these features of Latin America are also features of the north American continent: a post-slavery society, a history of genocide against the indigenous peoples coupled with a significant mixing of peoples, and a legacy of European intellectual and cultural colonization. So the charge of Latin American philosophy—how to think through the complex effects of colonialism and achieve what Castro-Gómez calls “hybrid thinking”—is one that should unite the Americas. It would in fact be incredibly useful for Anglo-European philosophical traditions to engage with the Latin American philosophical tradition (as well as others, esp. Caribbean and African) in order to develop an understanding of how philosophy emerges in the particularity of its context. Vallega takes the most significant aspect of hybridity to be the confluence of distinct temporalities co-existing in simultaneity, confounding the teleologies of Western rationality with radically asymmetrical narratives of meaning. These multiple temporalities express ways of being or a “sense of life,” Vallega argues, that co-exist in tension. Importantly, the Latin American experience involves living in between these native and European temporalities and sensibilities, rather than moving between discretely separated areas. The Western conceptualization of historical progression is challenged by the simultaneous coexistence in much of Latin America of “pre-modern, modern and post-modern” forms of life, but this should reveal the inadequacy of these temporal markers. European categories organize by teleologies of progress that rank economic practices and political institutions, making it impossible to imagine coexistence and harmony or even come to terms with the implications of the fact that there are multiple temporalities co-existing in interdependent relation to one another.

From this one can begin to see why a rationalist representation falls short. Including indigenous knowers into Westernized spaces is only possible by representing them through inadequate tropes and instrumentalizing them to Western agendas, as “guardians of biodiversity,” as Castro-Gómez puts it (Quoted in Vallega, 170). Their own self-conceptualization as, for example, “water-protectors,” is un-representable. The incursion of a spiritual metaphysics within scientific practices is beyond the West’s comprehension, so epistemological democracy is impossible, Vallega argues, given the incommensurability of conceptual frameworks.

Vallega's principle solution to the problem of Western instrumental rationality has to do with articulating particularity and distinctness as a means to escape the historicism of progressivist teleologies that render Latin America as "underdeveloped" or culturally "backward." There should be no attempt to build a new system after decolonization, or a new prescriptive teleology: instead "we are left with the engagement of concrete lived experiences in their dense images, histories, fragmented representations... [that is] distinct singular life in its very movement..."[5] A thorough displacement of the strangulating ideas of unified temporal progression requires moving from identity to radical exteriority, since, on his view, identities emerge as discrete, coherent and intelligible only from within the unified temporal, rationalist framework. By contrast, radical exteriority is defined as that which cannot be represented in the conceptual frame of Western rationality.

The general idea of radical exteriority is one that Vallega takes from Enrique Dussel, where the exterior is defined in terms of "pre-rational lived experience or sensibility, [at] the level of affective, embodied knowledge and experience." [6] Building from this claim Vallega argues that the decolonial project that Latin American philosophy has been pursuing desperately needs more of an aesthetic attentiveness that can reach beyond the rationalist parameters of critical judgment and discern the persistent resistance and survival of non-commodified ways of being. Decolonization is required to perceive the "level of sensibility" that one can find "articulated in painting, music, poetry, popular art, rituals, oral traditions, etc". [7] It is in this "aesthetic sensibility from which a people's consciousness toward dignity and equality may arise." [8] This is not an aesthetics concerned only or primarily with art, but with the "heart-mind [that] is the ground and time-space of attunement or disposition for conceptual knowledge and for the configuration of normative institutions." [9] Only by attending to this arena can Western instrumental rationality be challenged with a thought outside itself, Vallega suggests; only in this way can the rich resources of the colonized exteriority become available in their transformative potential.

Vallega clarifies that radical exteriority is not meant to suggest the existence of an unknown but unified culture, or a Hegelian discernment of the cultural essence manifest by a given peoples at a historical moment (in which case all that the Latin American thinkers would be doing is to recast or re-describe the content of that essence). Rather, we should think of radical exteriority as a communal sensibility primarily defined by its different temporality, where the idea of the communal displaces identity-based border concepts such as nation or culture or ethnos. Hence radical exteriority cannot be represented in the conceptual frame of Western rationality. This reveals the subversive potential of a decolonized aesthetic capable of relating to the more complex temporality of Latin America.

Vallega's account helps to explain the weakness of Žižekian type defenses of Eurocentrism. [10] The emancipatory counter-narratives Žižek wants to mobilize, such as Lacanian Marxism, need to be understood in their particularity, as addressing

specific conditions in particular kinds of societies, rather than as meta-frameworks applicable everywhere. At stake is our ability to effectively understand the forms of domination we face as well as the alternative possibilities already present in our diverse locations.

To summarize, then, the overall theme of Vallega's project is to analyze the various liberatory philosophies of Latin America to see how well or poorly they displace the framework of decontextualized rationalism. He argues that a thorough displacement requires redressing the strangulating ideas of a unified temporal progression, and it is this charge that motivates him to call for moving from identity to radical exteriority, since, on his view, identities emerge as discrete, coherent and intelligible from within the unified temporal, rationalist framework.

This is a thumbnail sketch that explains how Vallega analyzes the varying contributions and limitations of the many philosophers he discusses. The specific analyses he makes of these philosophers of course contain many more rich analyses and astute insights. Because of space limitations, I will develop here just one line of debate with him, primarily in regard to the work of Dussel. Let me begin by characterizing my general concerns in regard to his overall thesis.

My worry is that the concept of radical exteriority Vallega presents can become a kind of absolute even though the very idea of 'exteriority' is by definition relational. Clearly, for Dussel, Marx and others, the radically exterior is defined in relation to a system, such as the modern capitalist and patriarchal colonial system. This system cannot incorporate practices such as communal land use, non-commodified labor, or non-commodifiable cultural productions or values of any sort. Nor, as feminists have shown, can it come to terms with the value and necessity of care-work. As I understand him, Vallega wants to demarcate a sensibility capable of acknowledging distinctness but that is not about producing a counter or alternative, since this would remain within, in a certain sense, the Western frame. To represent (and thus describe, demarcate, elucidate) the exterior requires an engagement with existing conceptual resources in order to show how what is being claimed as the exterior is exterior, i.e. in relation to the dominant frame, but the hegemony of this frame is precisely what needs to be displaced in his view. This is persuasive, to an extent, and I think it is what drives the more postmodern impulses in Castro-Gómez and others who are endeavoring to think outside the frame.

However, while a focus on the distinct and the particular and a rejection of all counter narratives as necessarily compromised appears to escape a historicist, colonizing teleology, it sacrifices an ability to formulate the relationality between practices, identity formations, enunciations of value and meaning, and so on. Thus, from my perspective, an absolutist take on the radically exterior succeeds in escaping the framework of the West in a formal sense but sacrifices explanatory value precisely because it has posited the exterior creative forms of sensibility *ex nihilo*, as it were. Certainly, it is possible to explore pre-colonial formations, ideas, and practices, and yet

Vallega's focus is precisely on Latin America today, in which multiple temporalities, sensibilities and values comeingle.

Vallega's book exhibits an unresolved tension, I'd suggest, between historicism and anti-historicism: the historical framing of modern Western instrumental rationality, on the one hand, and an attempt at an escape from history in order to ensure the possibilities of an 'opening' to difference. This echoes for me the debates between Hegel and Kierkegaard, over ineliminable particularity versus being subsumed within a universal or unified frame. In the context of the Latin American philosophical tradition, this debate is put in the historical context of colonialism, a critical point of departure that should not be lost in the quest for absolute exteriority. In my discussion of Dussel I will offer an alternative resolution to the tension.

While Vallega appreciates much about Enrique Dussel's critique of Western totalizing rationality, ultimately he argues that Dussel's approach capitulates too much to the Western rationalist frame, and hence his approach to liberation cannot fully succeed in forging a true alternative. Dussel has been persistent in his claim over the years that the critique of Western rationality must lead to reform and not deconstruction, but Vallega takes this as motivating Dussel's inadequate response to Eurocentrism.

In Vallega's reading, Dussel's promising early turn to Levinas and, to some extent, Heidegger created a potential for an overcoming of the logocentric tendencies of the West that congeal the fecundity of phenomenal life into linguistic propositions, but that Dussel's subsequent turn to universal pragmatics à la Apel and Habermas preempted this possibility. (This is an aspect of debate among Dussel's interpreters—whether he is still basically a Levinasian, or whether this has been dropped in his more recent work, and thinkers of course disagree on what would be best).[11] Dussel has long been a decolonial thinker, but Vallega believes his decolonial aspirations are compromised by the effort to make the radically exterior comprehensible to the center, to translate the subaltern sensibilities into a form of speech that can enter a discursive terrain dominated by rationality. Hence, Dussel's dogged engagements with Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Rorty, and others was a prelude, Vallega argues, to a re-centering of Western rationality, sans a Heideggerian de-struction or Derridean deconstruction. Here his argument is not the facile charge one hears sometimes that Dussel has simply spent too much time on Western writers, but the more philosophical argument that, despite his intent, Dussel's hermeneutics must necessarily cover over (*cubierto*) or bypass the level of sensibilities key to a decolonial rendering of the world, or what he describes as the “heart-mind [that] is the ground and time-space of attunement or disposition for conceptual knowledge and for the configuration of normative institutions.” [12] This is the “level of sensibility” that Vallega argues requires an aesthetic approach, since it is essentially an “aesthetic sensibility” that one can find “articulated in painting, music, poetry, popular art, rituals, oral traditions, etc” (ibid) of the sort one can find in the evocative poetry of Cesar Vallejo for example. It is in this “aesthetic sensibility from which a people's consciousness toward dignity and equality may arise.”[13] Only by attending to this arena can Western instrumental rationality be challenged with a

thought outside itself, Vallega suggests; only in this way can the rich resources of the colonized exteriority become available in their transformative potential.

If this charge is true, it is indeed damning to Dussel's project of liberation. That is, if the register of rational discourse as one finds in the theory of communicative praxis covers over the aesthetic sensibility, as some of Habermas's critics maintain, then Dussel's approach is incompatible to his own project of *descubrimiento*. And here I think Vallega has masterfully articulated and developed, better than other critics such as Schutte and Castro-Gómez, their own worries that Dussel's Marxism and Habermasianism, however modified, remains insufficient to the cause to which he subscribes.

Yet, I read Dussel's philosophy of liberation as centrally an argument for a democratic epistemology (or, if 'epistemology' sounds too much like rationality, we might follow Mignolo's use of the term gnoseology) that takes him beyond the Habermasian framework. Dussel argues that change will come not via the perfect procedural processes of deliberation or of theory-making, nor by a universal ethical criteria articulated and defended by academic theorists, but by the ideas and practices and forms of relationality developed by the activist oppressed working in crisis to defend and secure material life, and through this effort coming to enact relationality differently.[14] Thus he and Vallega agree on the source of transformation---the radical exteriority---but Vallega articulates this primarily in a form of sensibility with a capacity of complete openness rather than in specific practices of the activist oppressed. Vallega argues that Dussel's reliance on communicative pragmatics will make it impossible for him to either comprehend or advance the aesthetic sensibility that will be key to activating the potential of the main source of subversion and revolution, but I'm not clear on whether that incapacity would apply to Dussel's ability to comprehend the activist oppressed. Dussel does not imagine a scenario where the oppressed convince the mainstream through discourse: as Vallega notes, "Dussel is clear about the fact that 'recognition' of the hegemonic community is not the origin of our philosophy." [15] But Dussel does argue that the oppressed need to be able to articulate their aims, to "engage in a self-affirmation" (ibid), and to produce, in effect a counter-narrative and positive engagement with power.[16] His approach manifests precisely the sort of reflexive positional consciousness required for productive collaboration, as suggested earlier.

To some extent this debate can be related to the Heidegger/Habermas debate, and there are certainly important ways in which Vallega and Dussel manifest contrasting philosophical sensibilities and priorities that track this older distinction. But (1) it seems clear that Vallega's differences with Dussel should not be mapped onto the differences between Heidegger and Habermas because neither of the latter thinkers are centrally concerned with decoloniality, or the pressing need to understand and counter the suffocation of colonized people's thought and sensibilities by Western concepts and approaches. Moreover, neither Heidegger nor Habermas's work is centrally concerned with democratizing our epistemology (or gnoseology). And (2), I would suggest, further, that Heidegger and Habermas need not be oppositional. Nicolas Kompridis has argued

persuasively in his book, *Critique and Disclosure* (2006), that, in fact, the program of critical theory can only be realized by an approach that takes Heideggerian world-disclosure as the central term. This is necessary to address precisely the challenges to intelligibility Vallega describes, challenges that are posed by diverse cultural contexts and the unacknowledged pre-history that constitutes the sphere of intelligibility and meaningfulness. World disclosure brings in just the sort of larger panoply of elements—such as affect, aesthetics, effective historical consciousness—that Vallega identifies as necessary for an effective decolonial turn. Kompridis, Charles Taylor (1989) and others such as Brazilian philosopher Amos Nascimento (2013) have been expanding the pragmatic communicative proceduralism approach in order to recognize the necessary priority of culture and history against pure procedures. Dussel is himself, in my view, still working from Levinas and Heidegger, very close in many respects to Taylor, which indicates that he is a part of this attempted rapprochement of Heidegger and Habermas. Hence he has a far different understanding of what reason actually is and how it actually operates. Rather than standing above culture, in judgment of it, this trend understands reason as an immanent exercise within and between worlds.

So I would suggest that Vallega's critique is diminished by a narrow understanding of rationality, and it is this that leads him to view Dussel's approach to the decolonial project as inadequate. Dussel has steadfastly held to a certain Levinasian approach that locates alterity not in the idea, linguistically articulated and intelligible, but in the body of the excluded other. For Dussel it is the body of the other that provides the perspective of radical exteriority to global capitalism, given its incapacity within current global political economies to sustain its own life. So it is the body of the poor, the woman, the Indian, the worker, the sexual minority, those identity terms Dussel uses that we may view as the overly homogenized way of speaking of an earlier era. But it is in this very formulation that I would argue Dussel challenges a Western logocentric rationality that is organized around the contestation of ideas transcendent of their locus of enunciation. Dussel's contestation occurs on two counts: because identity is invoked, where identity clearly means a contextual positionality within history, not apart from it, and because the body is invoked, as the locus of a material need whose reproducibility provides a non-linguistic yet damning challenge to the justifiability, indeed, as he says, the 'truth' of the current status quo. This is also of course Dussel's central challenge to Habermas, his primacy of the material principle.

I would secondly suggest that what Vallega reads as Dussel's rationalism should rather be interpreted as a difference concerning the approach to the politics of social revolutions. Dussel has for a long time opposed what he takes to be an anarchist tendency to valorize the radical tactic over the ideational organizing and institution building of a type we might associate with some forms of democratic socialism, though I think this phrase might unduly restrict our understanding of the sorts of transformative politics Dussel endorses. His support for Occupy movements and the Spanish Indignados, for instance, was tempered by his sense that they needed more than an occupation but also an articulation of alternative policy and program, a positive reconstruction of the political sphere as well as the political economy. "The more the

individual members of the life-community participate and the more the individual and common demands are satisfied, the more the power of the community—*the power of the people*—becomes through reasoned belief a protective wall and a productive and innovative motor for that community.”[17] This is work he characterizes, following the Zapatistas, as the work of obediential power, and I would suggest that for Dussel, the aesthetic sensibility is vitally necessary for this work but also insufficient by itself: we need both radical art and radical institutions, and for this the articulation of intelligible ideas is a critically necessary component. But this does not require that the intelligibility extend to elites or even the mainstream---the main audience of the activist oppressed are the oppressed and marginalized.

Vallega’s call to attend to sensibility made me think of Marcuse’s wonderful little *Essay on Liberation*, in which Marcuse defends the hippie counterculture against Adorno-style skepticism by analyzing its moral roots and political potential. For Marcuse, flower power was anything but trivial since it manifested a deep desire, an inarticulable desire under the terms of conformist middle class life, for moral and meaningful human relationships and relations with nature. It revealed a sedimentation of moral sensibilities at a biological level, he suggested, meaning that despite the powers of conformity in the sphere of conscious life, there persisted a level of sensibility that could constitute a political demand, becoming a source for a new political program. This is both a critique of Adorno’s pessimism but also a renewal of Adorno’s idea that the Enlightenment has not vanquished myth, nor is myth truly a repository of unreason. If we rightly understand what reason is and how it works, we will incorporate these spheres rather than continue to marginalize and underestimate them.

My concern is that Vallega’s approach and deconstruction in general maintains this bifurcation. And this does not serve the cause we share of democratizing and decolonizing the way in which ideas, beliefs, knowledge, and sensibilities are judged. Separating out the aesthetic domain of sensibilities as having special significance bypasses the possibility of including this into democratic forms of theory making and political practice, where the goal should be to seek understanding across contextual differences and find ways to moderate the challenges to intelligibility rather than assuming all such attempts will be aiding Western rationalism. Decolonizing requires a degree of democratization beyond what has been generally visible to European thinkers, but democratization requires translation work in order to animate diverse public spheres with the influx of covered over sensibilities.

Dussel’s engagement with leading theorists of the global North, from Hegel to Habermas, no doubt follows from his own typical educational path, in which Eurocentrism continues unabated to dominate curriculum all over the world. But I would suggest these conversations have also been pursued by Dussel not in pursuit of recognition, but as a necessary aspect of South-South debate. Where Žižek is read across the Landless Workers’ movement study groups in Brazil, and while Badiou and Deleuze, Butler and Fraser, are dominating leftist discussions in Latin America, to engage these thinkers with a set of decolonial questions is to engage in a South-South

discourse. What is critical here is who is setting the agenda of radical theory. This agenda should include: questioning where revolutionary ideas come from, inserting analyses of power at every level of analysis, pursuing the project of how to overcome the west without replicating the West, and theorizing identities beyond class.

So to conclude, Vallega's main project as I understand it is, in a way, an escape for the categories of historical frameworks that subsume, and cover over, distinctness. He argues persuasively that we need an orientation that allows an opening that will not close down possible meanings and experiences. My concern is that the escape from Western historical frameworks has been conflated with an escape from history, not necessarily meta-narratives, but perhaps just the small narratives of relationality and connection we can find among disparate formations of meaning. In terms of the tension between historicism (or effective historical consciousness) and anti-historicism, I'd suggest that the emphasis on the dialogic is an important approach to addressing this. Openness to that which is beyond one's own prior understanding is critical to true dialogue—this is Kompridis's point about the necessity of world-disclosure in critical theory. Against a pure proceduralism that closes itself off to revisions of the procedures, and against a meta-narrative framing that emerges from one side, a true dialogic encounter involves the capacity to experience something new. This is what Vallega himself describes beautifully in several passages of the book, and what makes his approach less oppositional to Dussel than I'd suggest he imagines it to be.

For me, there is no question but that Vallega's work will stand as a major contribution to this debate for many generations, given its powerful articulation of a decolonial philosophy and sensibility.

Notes

[1] Vallega 2014, 2

[2] *ibid*, 3

[3] *ibid*, 29

[4] *ibid*, 27

[5] *ibid*, 140

[6] *ibid*, 7

[7] *ibid*, 72

[8] *ibid*, 73

[9] *ibid*, 72

[10] Žižek 1997, 1998, 2015

[11] See Maldonado-Torres 2008; Saenz 1999; Mendieta 2007

[12] Vallega, 2014, 72

[13] *ibid*, 73

- [14] Dussel 2013, 2008
- [15] Vallega, 2014, 82
- [16] Dussel 2008
- [17] Dussel, 2008, 15

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