

Pragmatism in *Orbis Tertius* J. L. Borges's Reading of James

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English Abstract

Many have emphasized Borges's interest in philosophical doctrines throughout his work; less evident was his enduring interest in American pragmatism, particularly James. In the prologues to *Pragmatism* (1945) and to *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1985) Borges depicts James's doctrines in the light of his own lifelong interests in metaphysical questions such as the possibility of freedom and the world as a product of the mind. For Borges these themes reflect James's pragmatist solution to the problem of the infinite, which gives Borges the framework in which his approach to the author-reader relation can be based.

Resumen en español

Muchos han destacado el interés de Borges en las doctrinas filosóficas a lo largo de su obra; menos evidente fue su perdurable interés en el pragmatismo de James. En los prólogos a *Pragmatismo* (1945) y a *Las Variedades de la Experiencia Religiosa* (1985) Borges describe las tesis de James a la luz de su interés en cuestiones metafísicas tales como la posibilidad de la libertad y el mundo como producto de la mente. Para Borges estos temas reflejan la solución pragmatista de James al problema del infinito, la cual le ofrece a Borges el marco en el que basar su enfoque de la relación autor-lector.

Resumo em português

Muitos já destacaram o interesse de Borges nas doutrinas filosóficas em toda sua obra; menos evidente foi seu permanente interesse no pragmatismo de James. Nos prólogos a *Pragmatismo* (1945) e a *Variedades de Experiência Religiosa* (1985), Borges descreve as teses de James à luz de seu interesse em questões metafísicas, tais como a possibilidade da liberdade e o mundo como produto da mente. Para Borges, esses temas refletem a solução pragmatista de James para o problema do infinito, solução esta que oferece a Borges os marcos basilares de sua maneira de entender a relação autor-leitor.

I. Introduction

Many have emphasized Borges's interest in philosophical doctrines throughout his work; less evident was his enduring interest in American Pragmatism, particularly

that of James. In 1945 Borges wrote a preliminary note for the Spanish translation of the 1906 Lowell Lectures published as *Pragmatism*; at the end of his life he wrote a prologue for another book by James, this time the edition of the collection of books "My Personal Library" gave Borges the occasion to select the books he would consider "unavoidable reading." The selection included James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In the prologue Borges outlines a definition of Pragmatism as an antideterministic thought and postulates James's commitment to metaphysical idealism. As I show, these themes are recurrent in Borges and reflect some key ideas in his writing as well as a fundamental issue of Jamesian scholarship. But before I can address this substantive issue I focus on the content of the prologues and their apparent inconsistencies concerning the metaphysical consequences of Pragmatism (II). Thus after a brief overview I examine James's version of the paradox of the infinite and its connections with his conception of time, which, according to Borges, constitutes the fundamental notion sustaining idealism (III). In the final sections of this essay I analyze the results of the previous sections in order to explain why Borges believed they could be employed to conclude that the subject matter of philosophy can be regarded as a branch of literature (IV). The world of literature is a product of the will and its fundamental stuff is experience. By assimilating the fictitious worlds of literature and those created by philosophers, Borges can find in James's arguments a confirmation of his own views.

II. The Prologues

Despite some commonly assumed views, I hold that Borges proposed genuine philosophical arguments and theses in his essays. Complementary to his speculative interests Borges wrote a number of prologues and preliminary notes throughout his literary career. A prologue, he believed, represents a brief form of critical analysis.[1]

In this section I trace a number of themes that are central to our understanding of Borges's interest in Jamesian thought as the Argentinean writer describes them in the prologues to *Pragmatism* [2] and *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. [3] The first and most basic theme is that of the connection between Pragmatism and the possibility of freedom. In his prologue to *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Borges claims that Pragmatist philosophy is a consequence of James's belief on free will as an act of faith; in the preliminary note to *Pragmatism* he relates the possibility of free will to James's conception of the universe.

The second theme is thus that of the Jamesian concept of "world." In the 1985 prologue the "substance" of the world, according to James, is experience; in 1945 Borges assimilates James's world with that which Heraclitus compared with a fluent river that is unfinished and evolves. Thus this image of the world can be opposed to those of materialism and Hegelianism alike, but its most fundamental feature is that it is compatible with our free will. In fact, Pragmatism represents a middle term between

determinism and absolute chance; that is, although the universe has a general plan, it depends on us to put that plan into action.

The third theme is that of the filiations of Pragmatism to some of the major metaphysical positions of the history of philosophy. According to the 1985 prologue James's Pragmatism is a form of idealism, but according to the 1945 preliminary note it is a form of Aristotelianism that Borges, following Coleridge, characterizes as opposite to Platonism. This dichotomy is assumed to be exhaustive. While Aristotelians believe that our ideas are mere generalizations and language is a system of arbitrary symbols, Platonists hold that ideas are real entities and language provides us with a "map of the universe" since it constitutes an ordered whole or cosmos. Representatives of the latter are Anselm and Leibniz as well as Kant and Bradley; William James, in turn, belongs to the nominalist tradition [4] and criticized Hegelianism, Bradley, and Royce, that is, absolute idealism.

In sum, three things stand out when the prologues are compared. For Borges Pragmatism is a philosophical position that makes free will possible in a universe with a general plan; it can be classified together with those philosophies that reject materialism and Hegelianism as well, insofar as the appearance of order that we see in the universe may be simply a fiction of our own partial knowledge. In the following sections I explore the conceptual relations Borges finds between these theses and their relevance for literary theory.

III. The Concept of the Infinite

As I show, Borges's references to James are not simply incidental collections of ideas he found amazing but respond to central questions of his reflection on literary praxis. In order to understand Borgean interest in Pragmatism we must refer to a series of essays he published in the 1930s in which he analyzes the ancient paradox of Zeno concerning the infinite. In fact, the first of these essays was first published in *La Prensa* in January 1929 and collected in the volume of essays titled *Discussion* in 1932 (OC I, 286-91).

A paradox emerges when we are faced with two contradictory conclusions by using two different but apparently sound lines of argumentation. In the case of Zeno's best-known paradox against motion, our reasoning based on the infinite nature of space contradicts our empirical evidence based on the fact that a faster runner, Achilles, can overtake the slower runner, the tortoise, even when the tortoise is given some advantage and starts a certain distance ahead of him. But if their paths can be conceived as a straight line, between any two points on the line there is a third. The distance between the two runners can become infinitely small but it seems that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. The evidence of reason, the Eleatics would contend, must prevail over our commonsense opinion based on ordinary perception. Borges enunciates the paradox as follows: "Aquiles, símbolo de rapidez, tiene que alcanzar la

tortuga, símbolo de morosidad. Aquiles corre diez veces más ligero que la tortuga y le da diez metros de ventaja. Aquiles corre esos diez metros, la tortuga corre uno; Aquiles corre ese metro, la tortuga corre un decímetro; Aquiles corre ese decímetro, la tortuga corre un centímetro; Aquiles corre ese centímetro, la tortuga un milímetro; Aquiles el milímetro, la tortuga un décimo de milímetro, y así infinitamente, de modo que Aquiles puede correr para siempre sin alcanzarla” (OC I, 286-87). Borges also reports some of its most famous (intended) refutations; a few paragraphs are devoted to Mill and Bergson but only B. Russell's solution, which he found in James's "Some Problems of Philosophy," is acknowledged as a genuine refutation. Despite this apparently positive opinion, he agrees with James that Russell avoids the real problem. This is the passage from "Some Problems of Philosophy," which Borges actually paraphrases:

It seems to me however that Mr. Russell's statement dodges the real difficulty, which concerns the growing variety of infinity exclusively, and not the standing variety, which is all that he envisages when he assumes the race already to have been run and thinks that the only problem remaining is that of equating the paths. The real difficulty may almost be called physical, for it attends the process of formation of the paths. Moreover, two paths are not needed – that of either runner alone, or even the lapse of empty time, involves the difficulty, which is that of touching a goal when an interval needing to be traversed first keeps permanently reproducing itself and getting in your way. (SPP 181-82; W2, 1074)

Whether an accurate account of the paradox or not,[5] our concern is to establish why Borges found it the most appropriate and reliable version. A final paragraph of the essay asserts Borges's own opinion on the problem: Zeno's paradox cannot be solved unless we admit the ideality of space and time. Moreover, the concept of the infinite, once it is accepted, makes rational thought impossible. A further consequence of introducing the idea of the infinite concerns the existence of enduring physical objects. A clue to the full understanding of how the objects of our ordinary experience can be put into question by the paradox requires considering the second essay devoted to the endless race of Achilles and the tortoise.

In *Avatars of the Tortoise* (OC I, 299-305) Borges contends that the idea of the infinite is the most corrupting and misleading concept for any other notion.[6] Once again, James's view guides his own exposition since his exemplification of the paradox is both "the most elegant and the most faithful to Zeno's" (OC I, 304). He writes: "William James ... niega que puedan transcurrir catorce minutos porque es obligatorio que hayan pasado siete, y antes de siete, tres minutos y medio, y antes de tres y medio, un minuto y tres cuartos, y así hasta el fin, hasta el invisible fin, por tenues laberintos de tiempo" (OC I, 304). Again, the paradox shows that space and time are illusions, and this is tantamount to confirming the truth of idealism. Central to Borges's account is the fact that the arguments James employs are based on a noncontinuous conception of time, "with its perfect effervescence of novelty" (OC I, 289).

In SPP James contrasts a standing infinite, which applies to the mathematical conceptions of time and space, and the growing infinite of real processes such as change and motion: “*Infinitum in actu pertransiri nequit,*’ said scholasticism; and every continuous quantum to be gradually traversed is conceived as such an infinite. The quickest way to avoid the contradiction would seem to be to give up that conception, and to treat real processes of change no longer as being continuous, but as taking place by finite not infinitesimal steps, like the successive drops by which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall into it at once or nothing” (W2, 1070). Our perceptual experiences attest to the growing infinite conception. James writes: “On the discontinuity-theory, time, change, etc., would grow by finite buds or drops, either nothing coming at all, or certain units of amount bursting into being ‘at a stroke.’ ... Such a discrete composition is what actually obtains in our perceptual experience” (W2, 1061).

The paradoxes concerning the infinite are created by confusing the standing infinite of mathematical notions and the growing infinite of our experience. In order to undermine our perceptual evidence that reality is a plurality of discrete components, as it appears to be, Zeno applied the mathematical properties of geometrical space to our spatial experiences: “Zeno’s various arguments were meant to establish the ‘Eleatic’ doctrine of true being, which was monistic. The ‘minima sensibilia’ of which space, time, motion, and change consist for our perception are not real beings, for they subdivide themselves *ad infinitum*. The nature of real being is to be entire or continuous. Our perception, being of a hopeless ‘many,’ thus is false” (W2, 1063).

Important to James’s philosophical project is the idea that change and novelty involve the perceptual notion of continuity: “We find that the picture of a reality changing by steps finite in number and discrete, remains quite as acceptable to our understanding and as congenial to our imagination as before. ... Does reality grow by abrupt increments of novelty, or not? ... The mathematical definition of continuous quantity as ‘that between any two elements or terms of which there is another term’ is directly opposed to the more empirical or perceptual notion that anything is continuous when its parts appear as immediate next neighbors, with absolutely nothing between” (W2, 1077).

The analysis of the mathematical conception is of great importance for Borges. There is good reason to believe that Borges is proposing that the reality of time can be put into question as long as it is conceived as a standing infinite. But as Borges observes, the scope of the paradox is not confined to the problem of space and time; an infinite regress can be found in every subject we can investigate by using our reason. For our present purposes it is important to note that, according to Borges, if we assume the validity of idealism, that is, that the world is a fiction, the existence of paradoxes and antinomies involving the infinite can attest to its truth. We represent the world as consisting of perceptible things located in space and enduring in time, but by introducing the concept of infinite into it we also admit to “tenuous and eternal interstices of

unreason in its structure in order to know it is false" (OC I, 305).[7] In a first reading these connections between idealism and the problem of the infinite seem far from being evident. To begin with, it is not clear what the term "world" refers to. For example, it may seem that once we accept with the idealist the ability of the understanding to tell us what reality consists of we also have to accept that the world of perceptual experience is fictional, just as the Eleatics believed. A clue to what Borges had in mind can be found in the preceding paragraph in which he equates philosophical doctrines to mere combinations of words; it can thus be questioned whether they can represent reality.[8] In the same context he mentions the case of art [9] so we can say that both philosophy and literature creates fictional worlds by means of language and those worlds can be opposed to the real world in which we live our ordinary lives. But since he also adds that not all philosophical doctrines can be wrong, there must be a more plausible one, [10] namely, the one that asserts that the world is a product of the will.[11] The thesis that the world is a product of the mind has been understood differently by different philosophical schools. According to Berkeleyan idealism, for example, external material objects are simply "collections of ideas" perceived by some mind, human or divine. For James's radical empiricism, on the other hand, even the duality of object and subject can be questioned,[12] as Borges points out in his 1985 prologue.[13] Literary practice, I shall contend, requires this latter approach. The following section explores whether Borges's interpretation of the Jamesian conception of time and experience can sustain the metaphysical consequences I ascribe to Borges.

IV. Noncontinuous Time and Language

In his *New Refutation of Time* (OC II, 164-81),[14] the idealistic arguments Berkeley introduced against the reality of material objects are extended to refute the bishop's own conception of time.[15] The key step of the argument is to show that time does not exist prior to each present instant. If we admit with Hume that there is no substantial self beyond the succession of mental states, we also have to reject time as a continuous order since every mental state is metaphysically independent from each other.[16] Consequently, not only matter and the self but also the external world and human history become imaginary objects (OC II, 179). They simply consist of our awareness of the relations between the terms of a series whose elements are discrete and prior to the whole (ibid.).

Commentators usually remark that the concept of time that Borges rejects is the Newtonian concept; they also hold that Borges favors the concept of time that twentieth-century physics introduced.[17] In effect, Borges criticized Berkeley's dogmatic acceptance of Newtonian homogeneous and absolute time (OC II, 168; 169; 170):[18] "Para Berkeley, el tiempo es 'la sucesión de ideas que fluye uniformemente y de la que todos los seres participan.' ... Sin embargo, negadas la materia y el espacio, que son continuidades, negado también el espacio, no sé con qué derecho retendremos esa continuidad que es el tiempo" (OC II, 177-78). But what Borges opposes to the continuous and unique temporal series of British empiricism is the experienced time of

our mental life.[19] The fundamental dilemma of time can be described as follows: "If time is a mental process, how can it be shared by thousands of men, or even two different men?"[20] James would add that physical time is only a rationalization from experience: "Cosmic space and cosmic time, so far from the intuitions that Kant said they were, are constructions as patently artificial as any that science can show. The great majority of the human race never use these notions, but live in plural times and spaces"(W2, 564). For Borges, as for James, what is opposed to the mathematical notion of time is not another concept but the very nature of our changing concrete experience. Intrinsically connected to the problem of the reality of time is the question of language, since Borges describes language as being "saturated in time" (OC II, 164). Given his conclusion that time is not continuous, language must involve the growing infinite of discontinuous transitions.

Interestingly, James explains the pluralistic view of the universe, the world of our finite experience, by comparing it with a text whose perfect plot we cannot know as an absolute reader but only partially experience as one of its characters:

Radical empiricism allows that the absolute sum-total of things may never be actually experienced or realized in that shape at all, and that a disseminated, distributed, or incompletely unified appearance is the only form that reality may yet have achieved. ... If we were readers only of the cosmic novel, things would be different: we should then share the author's point of view and recognize villains to be as essential as heroes in the plot. But we are not the readers but the very personages of the world drama. In our eyes each of you here is its hero, and the villains are your respective friends or enemies. The tale which the absolute reader finds so perfect, we spoil for one another through our several vital identifications with the destinies of the particular personages involved. (W2, 649; 651)

Pragmatism of the Jamesian variety postulates an unfinished universe in which we can determine its evolution by a creative fiat: "Our acts, our turning places, where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we are closest, the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate and complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value? Why may they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which they seem to be, of the world –why not the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may the world grow in any other kind of way than this?" (W2, 613). For Borges this seems to be an attractive possibility since it is perhaps the only philosophical universe in which we can have something to do, and even if it is unpredictable and risky it is ethically more valuable than other philosophical visions (TR 217).

As James puts it:

What we were discussing was the idea of a world growing not integrally but piecemeal by the contributions of its several parts. Take the hypothesis seriously and as a live one. Suppose that the world's author put the case to you before

creation saying: "I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own 'level' best." I offer you the change of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. (W2, 614)

If novelty is possible then free will and improvement are possible. Moreover, traditional defenders of free will fail to see that the term lacks abstract content; once pragmatically elucidated you understand that it is a theory of promise and relief (W2, 538-39).

On one occasion James compares the introduction of novelty in the world with the act of writing. Note that for James the world grows as a result of human activities whose model is mental causation. We know the meaning of causation from our original experiences of process and achievement or failure (W2, 1090-91). In this way efficient causation coincides with final causation since "the cause contains its effect," as traditional doctrine postulates. However, the effect is seen as a final cause only as a general direction of the process. Novelty and surprise await at every step. This is the model of process that the writer experiences; the words that she will write are contained in the previous phrases but only insofar as they are harmonious and coherent with her general plan.

That Borges believed that free will is a necessary illusion is well attested in his often provoking interviews (BA 63). More important for our present purpose is his alleged commitment to metaphysical idealism. When he proposed to accept idealism as the way to avoid the paradoxes of the infinite, he equates idealism to the acceptance of "the concrete growing of the perceived" (OC I, 291). Although he does not ascribe it explicitly to James, the description can be applied to James's universe, as we presented it above. But Borges is not interested in metaphysical speculation as such. Borges contends that language *is* time, but the time that constitutes language cannot be the mathematically conceived time of physics. This, as any other concept, is a convention, [21] and then is produced by language.

Some may assume that human history is a text in which "we are written." They can even propose limiting themselves to recording the facts by the conceptual simplification of experience, as classical writers pretend (OC 1, 254). This project, however, cannot succeed if we take into account that words are derivative in respect to immediate perceptual presence (OC 4, 99) and become inadequate for expressing esthetic experience (OC 3, 233). Fiction requires another "assumption about reality" that, if my previous presentation is not completely wrong, James's pluralism and radical empiricism can better represent.

A book is like Heraclitus's river, fluent and perpetually changing in every reading (OC 3, 301). Time as constituting language and therefore fiction not only includes the process of writing but also extends to the reader and her experience of reading. It is not

general but concrete, it is not continuous with the time in which we live our ordinary lives and produces novelty with each interpretive process.

V. Conclusions

We are now in a better position to respond to the question of the role of philosophical ideas in Borges's oeuvre. It is generally admitted that philosophical doctrines can be the instruments of literary creation, and that literary work can be the instrument for communicating philosophical conceptions. To these two possibilities we may add a third: a philosophical conception can establish the conditions of possibility of fiction more generally. Not only can philosophy be regarded as a kind of fiction, which is the case of the philosophical systems that can be classified as Platonist in the sense of Coleridge, but philosophy can offer the framework in which non realist fiction can find its ground.

As I have argued above, Borges's references to James are not mere marginal reports of ideas he found amazing but respond to central questions of Borgean reflection on literary praxis. Consequently, my purpose in this paper was not to assess Borges's accuracy and fairness as an interpreter or to report what he had to say on James in the course of his career as a writer. Rather, I focused on those features of James's philosophy he esteemed as he understood them, that is, those elements that he viewed in accordance with his own thought and perhaps contributed to developing his own ideas. It would not be totally wrong to say that Borges identified himself more closely with James than with any other thinker.

Notes

[1] Borges writes: "El prólogo, cuando son propicios los astros, no es una forma subalterna del brindis; es una especie lateral de la crítica" (OC IV, 14).

[2] Nota preliminar, *Pragmatismo* (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1945) (TR, 215-17).

[3] Prólogo, *Las variedades de la experiencia religiosa. Estudio sobre la naturaleza humana* (Hispanamérica, 1985) (OC IV, 655-57).

[4] For the relevance of nominalism in Borges's writings see Jaime Rest, *El Laberinto del Universo. Borges y el Pensamiento Nominalista* (Buenos Aires: Eterna Cadencia, 2009).

[5] For example, Moore's outstanding book on the subject does not even mention James's view as a relevant one; see A. W. Moore, *The Infinite* (London: Routledge, 2001).

[6] "Hay un concepto que es el corruptor y el desatinador de los otros. ... hablo del infinito" (OC I, 299).

[7] “Nosotros (la indivisa divinidad que opera en nosotros) hemos soñado el mundo. Lo hemos soñado resistente, misterioso, visible, ubicuo en el espacio y firme en el tiempo; pero hemos consentido en su arquitectura tenues y eternos intersticios de sin razón para saber que es falso” (OC I, 305).

[8] “Es aventurado pensar que una coordinación de palabras (otra cosa no son las filosofías) pueda parecerse mucho al universo” (OC I, 304).

[9] “El arte –siempre- requiere irrealidades visibles” (OC I, 304).

[10] “También es aventurado pensar que de esas coordinaciones ilustres, alguna --siquiera de modo infinitesimal-- no se parezca un poco más que otras” (OC I, 304).

[11] “Me atrevo a asegurar que sólo en la que formuló Schopenhauer he reconocido algún rasgo del universo. Según esa doctrina, el mundo es fábrica de la voluntad” (OC I, 304).

[12] James writes: “My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if I call that stuff ‘pure experience,’ then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its ‘terms’ becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known” (W2, 1142). Also: “As subjective we say that the experience represents, as objective it is represented. What represents and what is represented are numerically the same; but we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience *per se*” (W2, 1151). Note that my present purpose is not to discuss whether radical empiricism is a form of idealism but simply to address those theses that Borges mentions.

[13] “James afirmó que la sustancia elemental de lo que llamamos el universo es la experiencia, y que ésta es anterior a las categorías de sujeto y de objeto, de conocedor y de conocido, de espíritu y de materia” (OC IV, 655).

[14] It contains two articles, the first published in 1944 and a revised version from 1946, and a preliminary note dated December 23, 1946 (OC II, 165).

[15] “Niego, con argumentos del idealismo, la vasta serie temporal que el idealismo admite” (OC II, 165).

[16] “Negar el tiempo es dos negaciones: negar la sucesión de los términos de una serie, negar el sincronismo de los términos de dos series. En efecto, si cada término es absoluto, sus relaciones se reducen a la conciencia de que esas relaciones existen” (OC II, 179).

[17] See, for example, C. Ulises Moulines, “The most consistent idealism according to Borges: The negation of time,” in *Jorge Luis Borges: Thought and Knowledge in the XXth Century*, eds. Alfonso De Toro and Fernando De Toro, 167-74 (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert Verlag, 1999); Echarid Höfner, “Some aspects of the problem of time in the works of Jorge Luis Borges: An eclectic between Plato and the theory of relativity,” in *Jorge Luis Borges: Thought and Knowledge in the XXth Century*, eds. Alfonso De Toro and Fernando De Toro, 207-40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert Verlag, 1999).

[18] For Berkeley time is “la sucesión de ideas que fluye uniformemente y de la que todos los seres participan” (OC II, 177). His world is “un mundo hecho de tiempo, del absoluto tiempo uniforme de los *Principia*” (OC II, 168). Borges rejects “la [existencia] de un solo tiempo, en el que se eslabonan todos los hechos” (OC II, 170). Also “negados el espíritu y la materia, que son continuidades, negado también el espacio, no sé qué derecho tenemos a esa continuidad que es el tiempo” (OC II, 169).

[19] In 1979 he still holds: “La idea es que cada uno de nosotros vive una serie de hechos, y esa serie de hechos puede ser paralela o no a otras. ... La idea de que no hay un tiempo. Creo que esa idea ha sido en cierto modo cobijada por la física actual, que no comprendo y que no conozco. La idea de varios tiempos. ¿Por qué suponer la idea de un solo tiempo, un tiempo absoluto, como lo suponía Newton?” (OC IV, 248-49).

[20] “Si el tiempo es un proceso mental, ¿cómo lo pueden compartir miles de hombres, o aun dos hombres distintos?” (OC I, 418).

[21] For general terms as conventions see OC 1, 431.

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