English Abstract

In this essay, I link Pragmatism and the philosophy of liberation by making a comparison between John Dewey’s concept of the public and Enrique Dussel’s concept of the pueblo. I am specifically interested in how these concepts set up the relationship between intellectuals and their constituency—the community from which their thought emerges and to which they take themselves to be responsible. Reading the public and the pueblo together, I emphasize the need for intellectuals to consider further how their scholarship affects those they claim to serve. I conclude via what AnaLouise Keating calls “risking the personal”—offering some autobiographical remarks on the questions I raise below.

Resumen en español

En este ensayo propongo un diálogo entre el pragmatismo y la filosofía de la liberación. Hago una comparación entre el concepto del público de John Dewey y el concepto del pueblo de Enrique Dussel. Me interesa específicamente cómo estos conceptos establecen la relación entre los intelectuales y su comunidad, la comunidad de la que surge su pensamiento y de la que se consideran responsables. Enfatizo la necesidad de que los intelectuales consideren cómo sus prácticas profesionales afectan a aquellos a quienes sirven. Concluyo con lo que AnaLouise Keating llama “arriesgar lo personal,” ofreciendo algunos comentarios autobiográficos sobre las preguntas que hago.

Resumo em português

Neste ensaio, proponho um diálogo entre o pragmatismo e a filosofia da libertação. Eu faço uma comparação entre o conceito de público de John Dewey e o conceito de povo de Enrique Dussel. Estou especificamente interessado em como esses conceitos estabelecem a relação entre os intelectuais e sua comunidade, a comunidade da qual seu pensamento surge e pela qual eles se consideram responsáveis. Enfatizo a necessidade de os intelectuais considerarem como suas práticas profissionais afetam aqueles a quem servem. Concluo com o que AnaLouise Keating chama de “arriscar o pessoal,” oferecendo alguns comentários autobiográficos sobre as perguntas que faço.
Introduction

I want to consider here the relationship between the intellectual and the communities with which she is engaged in practice. Indeed, just whom does the intellectual serve? Students? Literary, journalistic, or academic colleagues? A broader public or nation? My focus, then, will be less on representations, as Edward Said puts it in his famous BBC lectures “Representations of the Intellectual,” and more on the responsibilities of the intellectual. I proceed by examining John Dewey’s public and Enrique Dussel’s pueblo, then addressing a limitation of each model, namely, Dewey’s middle-class constituency and Dussel’s reliance on opposition. I will then argue that it is worth reading these philosophers together because they correct each other: Dussel’s attention to “the underside of history” and concept of “substitution” pushes the middle-class intellectual to more committed solidarities, while Dewey’s emphasis on experimentation allows for more flexibility than a model of solidarity based on opposition.

Important recent literature has read Dewey’s public and Dussel’s pueblo together. I am following the method of Alex Sager and Albert Spencer’s 2016 article “Liberation Pragmatism,” which argues for a mutually corrective reading of Dewey and Dussel with a view toward experimentation. I apply their method to a narrower question related to democratic practice, that of the intellectual’s responsibilities. Second, I am in conversation with Alexander Stehn’s 2011 article “El Pueblo and Its Problems,” which helpfully notes that while North American philosophers often worry about the eclipse of publics, an inter-American inquiry recalls “the fact that there are pueblos with a sense of history, a current sense of belonging, and an ongoing desire to govern themselves, all voiced in a discourse of liberation.” This insight has pushed me to consider questions of democracy in dialogue with recent (though ongoing and historical) Indigenous political struggles, to which I will return in my conclusion.

I contribute to these previous lines of scholarship by adding to the conversation an engagement with Melvin Rogers’s 2010 re-visiting of Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems through his guest-edited issue of Contemporary Pragmatism. My addition takes advantage of what the guest-edited issue provides: an opportunity to connect liberation philosophy to resonant recent work conducted under the Deweyan banner of, in Rogers’s words, “the widest applications of inquiry to the problems that confront collective organization,” including thematic links between projects of liberation and African-American publics, as Eddie Glaude addresses in his article in the issue. In what follows, in light of how Rogers re-visits Dewey’s public, I examine the role of the intellectual with respect to the community she claims to serve. My aim is to stress that if democracy is to be a way of life and a habit of action, then intellectuals engaged in democratic pursuits would do well to make explicit how their work serves their
1a. Dewey’s Public

Pragmatic in character, Dewey’s political philosophy does not put forth definitions by beginning from a formal consideration or another a priori departure. He is not inquiring into political form as a state, necessary unity, or other given. When you look for origins, he writes, you ultimately “find nothing but singular persons, you, they, me.” “We shall not… find the public,” he continues, “if we look for it on the side of originators of voluntary actions” or other causal forces. His definition, instead, turns to consequences: “The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.” Certain social interactions lead to certain outcomes, and when those outcomes occur on a large enough scale, they need to be organized. “In itself,” then, the public is “unorganized and formless.” Organization or care occurs through representatives who tend to the specific interests of the group, those “guardians of custom” such as legislators, executives, and judges.

Dewey’s public begins from associated activity, which is natural for human beings. This association becomes a public, more than a natural association, only when it gains importance—when those affected by indirect consequences “form a group distinctive enough to require recognition and a name.” The public does not form in a vacuum, but rather in relation to other associations. For this reason, its recognition is a break with the past order of associations. In other words, the public emerges in a kind of division: “To form itself, the public has to break existing political forms.”

This formation, however, is not necessarily radical in its break. Instead, the break is often quickly subsumed under existing political forms, even when it is driven by forces external to those forms. Transactions already socially operative cause shifts in political agencies and methods. Many of these transactions are guided by or become incorporated into the state or other institutions. In this way, while social conditions generating a new public pave the way for changes, often “the state sets a formal seal upon forces already in operation by giving them a defined channel through which to act.” Can anything concrete and fixed be said, then, about the public’s relationship to the state, and by extension the intellectual’s relationship with the state?

Again, the pragmatic answer is experimental and relates to the environment. On Melvin Rogers’s reading, Dewey “envisions publics as standing in a directive and supportive relationship to the state and its representative and administrative institutions.” “But insofar as the state is resistant to transformation because of reification,” Rogers adds, “publics then function in a more oppositional role that builds their power external to the state.” Here political theorists will raise questions about delineation. How wide is the group indirectly affected, especially in a globalized...
In a context where the state affects the possibilities for all actors, how can we differentiate a public supportive of the state from a public external to it? If “the public” is pluralistic in its conceptualization, then how do we differentiate between publics that seem to overlap? How do we account for contestation within and among publics, which generate shifts in who are affected? Writing with a view toward the changing conditions of family life and print culture ushered in by modernity, Dewey was aware of these questions. A mean must be found between associations too narrow and intimate and others too remote and disconnected. He thinks this can be found through experimentation, without any lines drawn “sharp and fast.”

These questions of delineation open onto the main problem of the public, namely, its achievement of self-consciousness—“to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights.” Someone indirectly affected must be able to see others similarly indirectly affected. It is not the case that the association of individuals that becomes the public existed before the problem; rather, the problem shapes the public. That the public cannot recognize itself is a function of the environment. In our time, the digital age has expanded and complicated the relevant indirect consequences, on a basis impersonal and not communal, such that the public struggles to distinguish itself. There are, indeed, too many publics. That effective mobilization requires self-consciousness and recognition remains a question of building intersectional coalitions today.

The pragmatic question here is future-oriented: How to organize the next public, the public that is emerging? How to do so in a way that treats multiple publics, even those with different aims, as a reflection of the vitality of public life? Eddie Glaude provides an initial answer, to which I will return in my conclusion: “Our task as social critics during such moments is to ask hard questions about the public under such conditions, to ascertain the various forces behind its eclipse, and to devise means and methods of organizing an emergent public into effective political action relevant to current social needs.”

1b. The Intellectual and The Public

The main problem of the public is its self-recognition, and this, Dewey emphasizes, is “primarily and essentially an intellectual problem.” Integrating publics, organizing non-political forces to transform political structures, is the intellectual task. When a public feels and suffers consequences, it does not necessarily perceive and know them. It needs to be able to perceive them explicitly and, in turn, order and organize how future consequences occur. What is needed is communication.

“Communication” is Dewey’s broad term for that which generates shared interest in the consequences of various activities. To the extent that communication informs
desire and effort, it can then direct action.[29] Put differently, a public can emerge from
diffuse publics through publicity, i.e. making known the consequences that concern the
public.[30] The intellectual is responsible to the public in contributing to the self-
recognition of the public through communication and publicity. Some have recently
argued that this responsibility has been neglected. As María Lugones observes, “I do
not see enough theorists, activists, and popular educators devoted to this question of
barriers to coalition, in particular, the communicative side of the issue.”[31] This
“communicative side” can be addressed through what Dewey calls “translation.” The
intellectual can clarify the changing conditions, translating, as Dewey puts it, “into terms
which are generally understood, into signs denoting human consequences of services
and disservices rendered.”[32] This translation, then, does not start from esoteric
concepts and move to general understanding. Rather, “the inquiry which alone can
furnish knowledge as a precondition of public judgment must be contemporary and
quotidian.”[33] Translation is an art, in that art’s function “has always been to break
through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness.”[34] Dewey re-states
the intellectual task: “The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of
the public.”[35] Here we can ask: For this communication and translation to be
“contemporary and quotidian,” starting from and referring back to the experience of
those in the emerging public, what relationship is required between the intellectual and
her constituency? How much distance can there be between the intellectual and those
to whom she considers herself responsible?

In a discussion on constituency, Cornel West calls into question Dewey’s
presentation of the intellectual. In his genealogy of Pragmatism, West notes that major
Pragmatists are organic intellectuals, which he defines as “participants in the life of the
mind who revel in ideas and relate ideas to action by means of creating, constituting, or
consolidating constituencies for moral aims and political purposes.”[36] West’s organic
intellectuals often achieve this aim through the language of crisis, which leads to
questions of leadership. Pragmatic projects can be evaluated in part based on their
ability to mobilize their constituencies, leading communities from crises and problems to
alternative social outcomes. On West’s genealogical analysis, a practical limitation of R.
W. Emerson’s efforts, for instance, is the social location of his constituency, namely, the
mildly oppositional intelligentsia and certain “enlightened” businessmen of his day.[37]
By West’s lights, Dewey, too, does not engage more populist groups; instead, he wrote
toward a “professional constituency,” which limited his engagement with Marxism given
“the professional and academic circles he traveled in” as well as his “career
purposes.”[38] In both cases, the practical effects were limited. “Like Emerson’s
moralism,” West writes, “Dewey's culturalism was relatively impotent”; indeed, his
project “never really got off the ground.”[39] This is precisely because his “favored
historical agents” were “the professional and reformist elements of the middle class”
captured in a managerial approach to leadership.[40] What is needed for Pragmatism to
realize itself in cultural criticism, West concludes, is for it to shift the constituency to
which it considers itself responsible: Emerson’s vision and provocation and Dewey’s
emphasis on historical consciousness, yes, and DuBois’ attention those on the
underside of capitalism and democracy.[41] It is in this stress on constituency, on attending to what he calls “the underside of history,” that Enrique Dussel is particularly helpful to my purposes in this essay. In making this point, I follow Sager and Spencer’s 2016 mutually corrective reading of Dewey and Dussel.

2a. Dussel’s Pueblo

Dussel understands that the framing used to present political demands will bear on the means taken to achieve political goals. For Dewey mobilizations of a public require some level of recognition. For Dussel successful mobilizations require articulate demands, which are grounded in material needs, say the need for an element of life, such as water, or for political participation. Those making these demands for water or equality or food or fairness—for which they will no longer wait as if they were a gift from those in power—attempt to achieve justice in their practice. Describing mobilization in this way means that there could be as many movements as demand-based claims. Again the question arises regarding how disparate movements cohere.

Dussel claims that his concept of the pueblo addresses the question of coherent political demands. He wants to trace the lineage of the pueblo in a way much different from the nation of European romanticism or class categories. He looks instead to the Aztec altepetl and the Mayan Amaq’, “the ‘we’ that has been forgotten by modern, Western experience.”[42] The pueblo invokes communities on the colonial underside of modernity. Dussel’s conceptualization of the pueblo distances him from the term “populist” as it is employed to refer to vulgar or right-wing politics, an ascription he thinks is merely a denigration.[43] He turns his attention to those excluded from “proper” or respectable political discourse. Because, by definition, the excluded cannot participate in the contract or agreement that denies them, they are already linked by virtue of this exclusion. This is the more specific form in which a pueblo can emerge. Dussel gives the example of feminism: feminists form a critical consciousness that becomes a consensus within the oppressed community. From the position of dissidence, this is a dominant consensus, calling into question the legitimacy of the current order.[44]

The pueblo, Dussel elaborates, “is that strictly political category (since it is not properly sociological or economic) that appears as absolutely essential, despite its ambiguity (and indeed this ambiguity does not result from misunderstanding but rather from inevitable complexity).”[45] Dussel’s point is that differences within the pueblo, its “inevitable complexity,” do not have to drive its movements apart. Indeed, the ambiguity of the pueblo, itself encompassing, is a strength insofar as it militates against reification. The pueblo can be integrated and disintegrated, as Antonio Gramsci says of a bloc. It is a mobile political category, internally heterogenous, what George Ciccariello-Maher calls “a multiplicity of overlapping microdialec-tics without displacing any of these identities.”[46] But what does it mean, concretely and practically, to describe a pueblo in terms of “microdialec-tics”? 
The *pueblo* emerges only through struggle, from conflict in “material fields”—for instance, ecological extinction, poverty, and deracination of culture and identity.[47] Prior to this struggle, certain people were ignored and reified—“they do not exist except as *things* at the disposal of the powerful.”[48] This explains why the *pueblo* is explicitly political: it emerges in *opposition* to the powerful—as “the very embodiment of rupture,” Ciccariello-Maher writes forcefully.[49] In other words, it not only comes into being, but also comes into being *against*.

María Lugones has recently presented a critique of the opposition model of organization. We can extend her critique to consider the limitations of Dussel's *pueblo*. An oppositional “coincidence of interests,” Lugones writes, tends to be “epistemically shallow”; coalitions that last longer require “an openness to the interlocutors as real.”[50] Dussel's oppositional stress lacks this focused attention on the interlocutors, emphasizing instead “an internal frontier or a fracture within the political community.”[51] But recent commentators have also expanded on how Dussel's *pueblo* can take into consideration something closer to Lugones's epistemological insights. Ciccariello-Maher explains that the *pueblo* draws into alliance “those internally oppressed within that system and those excluded from it.”[52] On his reading, political identities come together through dialogue (conversation and negotiation among positions) and translation (the mutability of these positions). These occur, for example, “when white feminists respond to the demands of Black feminists not merely with a respectful tolerance of difference, but instead with a self-transformative process of internalizing critique.”[53]

Dussel's discussion of the *pueblo* ultimately leads to a commentary on democracy, which he considers not only as “an institutional system” but also—and resonant with Dewey's and other Pragmatists' sense of democracy as a way of life—as “a normative principle that always seeks to overcome the limits of the previously determined definition of who represented effective members of the community.”[54] In creating a critical consensus in their quest for recognition, the excluded call into question the prevailing “democratic” system. The call is to more openness, to more participation—“that is,” Dussel concludes, “to democracy.”[55] Crucially, this is not a call for mere diversity but, rather, a call to participate in a new institutional moment or order—a call not to inclusion but to transformation.[56]

2b: The Intellectual and The *Pueblo*

To understand how Dussel positions the intellectual *vis-à-vis* the *pueblo*, it is helpful to turn to his *Ethics of Liberation*. There he distinguishes between the functional and the critical social sciences. Ultimately, the distinction is one of responsibility. Whereas the functional social scientist responds to the bourgeoisie—the state's funding, the campus administrator, the disciplinary pressures—the critical social scientist responds to the “call” of the community of victims, the “call for solidarity and for the
responsibility of ‘organic intellectuals’ who are invited to collaborate responsibly in the scientific critique of the system that oppresses them.”[57] The trajectory is as follows: with Marx as an example, the intellectual—"[t]he expert, the social scientist, the philosopher”—“moved to a posture of co-responsibility by the interpellation of the victims,” considers this interpellation through reason and analysis, and “returns” it to the victims “who need this argumentation in order to achieve a new order of validity beyond that of the validity of the system of domination.”[58] The role of the intellectual here is more articulation than direction: intellectuals work to articulate critical theory in a process “directed by the victims from within.”[59] Echoing Immanuel Kant’s famous line on thoughts and intuitions, Dussel writes, “The community of experts is ‘empty’ without the critical community of victims; the community of victims is ‘blind’ in respect to the ‘explanation’ of its negativity without the community of experts.”[60]

Dussel goes on to read his positioning of the intellectual through Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of substitution: “By virtue of this ‘interpellation,’ intellectuals come to occupy a ‘position’ of exteriority or a transcendental position with respect to the established social order”; they become “‘hostages’ by substituting themselves for the victims to the point of suffering persecution for them.”[61] He explains in a far-reaching definition:

Those who comply with the ethical duty of assuming the burden of the victim as their own in the face of the system, exercising the duty of criticism, end up confronting the structures that produce victims, and because of this their mere responsibility manifested in criticism (which delegitimates) cannot fail to be followed by persecution of one kind or another inflicted upon them, as Levinas described in phenomenological terms when he spoke of the process of substitution by which the hostage took the place of the victim. Whoever assumes this kind of responsibility with the victim in the face of the system is persecuted by the power that produces such victims. And it is in that place, when they have exercised the power of criticism as responsibility, that they will be caught as preys, as a ‘substitute’ victim who ‘bears witness’ (martys in Greek) within the system, and who thereby stands in for the absent presence of the victims.[62]

I will return to the implications of this definition in my conclusion below.

Toward Democratic Habits

In sum, I have suggested that what justice-oriented actors gain from reading Dewey and Dussel together is not just a more fruitful way to think about making claims on the state. From reading West, Dussel, and Lugones alongside a Deweyan experimental push, we also gain an understanding that further trials will be more effective to the extent that they are grounded in the community they claim to serve. It is not enough, in Said’s definition, to be a “disturber of the status quo,” “the author of a language that tries to speak truth to power.”[63] As Joy James has emphasized, you first choose your community. That choice orders—but does not directly determine—your theory and practice.[64] To put this in another way, responsibility orders reflection. This
conceptualization of the experimental, engaged intellectual is an important reminder for professional academics, who often write about community more than living, struggling, celebrating, and suffering in community.[65]

To conclude this article by moving from the abstract to the concrete, I will give an example of outstanding intellectual practice and cite a few personal reflections regarding responsibility. An inter-American example of combining fruitfully Dewey’s and Dussel’s approaches can be found in the Lakota People’s Law Project (LPLP). Formed around 2004 when Lakota grandmothers asked lawyers to investigate South Dakota’s Department of Social Services in order to thwart “the slow genocide of the Lakota” occurring through state-sanctioned removals of grandchildren from Lakota families via the foster-care system, the LPLP worked to return Lakota children to their communities, obtaining federal funds to bypass the requirements of the state of South Dakota.[66] In 2016 the LPLP challenged both state and federal governments as several members of its staff participated in the protests of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). Currently conducting legal work on behalf of protestors across the US, the LPLP “is committed to protecting the First Amendment rights of Native peoples and their allies.”[67] In shifting its approach to state actors as circumstances change, the LPLP exemplifies a resistant experimentalism. In starting from the concerns of the communities it claims to serve (as opposed to a top-down, paternalistic agenda), the LPLP understands the dispossessed, and not merely the middle-class, as effective theoretical and practical agents. The LPLP lawyer Chase Iron Eyes exemplifies an intellectual who is carving a path of community-based experimentalism. During the protests against DAPL, he hosted tribal leadership, provided legal services, and joined protests as a water protector. In 2016 he was the Democratic congressional nominee for North Dakota. He is not afraid to change his approach as situations change, and in different ways he consistently speaks truth to power based on the needs, desires, and claims articulated by those in the community with which he lives and works.

Finally, it is worth “risking the personal” in giving an example about questions of responsibility and contemporary intellectual life. A few years ago, I attended the American Anthropological Association’s annual meeting, where to the great detriment of my graduate-student budget and with the hope of networking, I stayed at the conference hotel, the Washington Marriott Wardman Park. Many of those who could not obtain a room at the Marriott stayed at the Omni Shoreham Hotel across Calvert Street. To stay at a four-star hotel instead of with friends in the city demonstrated that in this case my career aspiration was greater than my connection with communities of struggle across the country. That we academics often do not know about the labor struggles at the hotels where we stay for conferences or the Indigenous struggles for repatriation of the land on which the hotels sit, manifests the uprootedness of contemporary academic life and calls into question our claims to “relational freedom” or “ruptures” in forms of life that we make on panels at those conferences. Most of us, as far as I can tell, do not recognize Indigenous sovereignty by contacting the nations whose ancestral land we are planning to enter before we book our conference flights and hotels. To the extent that this is the case, our habits remain more aristocratic than democratic. Whereas the
responsible option is simple: “American Indian representation is not difficult,” Nancy Mithlo states in her 2020 *Knowing Native Arts*. “Google the tribe and call the representatives.” “Do the work.”

The point I aim to stress here is that predominant contemporary models for sharing academic research—often gaining hotel rewards points and not garnering state persecution—are a long way from Dussel’s substitution. Instead, akin to Dewey’s limitation that West critiques, most of us traffic primarily in professional and academic circles. One reason for this, as Gregory Pappas has underscored, is that much research still maintains a claim to theoretical purity instead of acknowledging that it is always already situated amidst living struggles. A noteworthy example working against the grain of this uprooted and uprooting tendency is the Philosophies of Liberation Encuentro, which actively connects research to local struggles in its format, thus resonating strongly with efforts such as the aforementioned LPLP.

Some academics would concede that their research is thoroughly professional, yes, but the classroom is their space of radical practice. For those of us who work at elite institutions, statistics from the Career Services Office, noting that many students get jobs with consulting firms or go to law school on their way to becoming corporate defense lawyers, belie claims to radical pedagogy that trains activists or even anti-capitalist citizens. Dewey and Dussel remind the intellectual that they are in networks of discourse much larger than the conference and the classroom. Reading them together, I am suggesting that the academic give more thought to their own constituency, to those to whom they consider themselves responsible. A first step in this thinking is a conceptualization of the intellectual-constituency relation. From this reflection, we can have a better sense of what research is worth pursuing in our context of environmental and political crisis.

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Notes


[8] Ibid., 247-248. Dewey’s turn to consequences bears on, or indeed is part of, his method: he looks not to theories of the state but to observation, much like a clinical scientist looks not to theories of the cell but to how the cell is shaped by and acts upon other cells in the body. Even when political action is diverse and complex, it is not hidden; rather, these “facts of human behavior” are “accessible to human observation” (ibid., 248). In sum, Dewey’s empirical method “proceeds on the basis of the interrelations of observable acts and their results” (ibid., 258).

[9] Ibid., 245-246.

[10] Ibid., 277, 314.


[12] Said writes that “the intellectual appeals to (rather than excoriates) as wide as possible a public, who is his or her natural constituency” (Said, *Representations*, xiii). Dewey helps us see how this appeal actually works in practice—how a constituency is socially formed.


[14] Ibid., 255.

[15] Ibid., 278. Eric MacGilvray notes that Dewey’s treats the term “public” in two ways: as a tool for thinking about politics and political forms and as a hypothesis about how democratic aims could, over time, be achieved through this particular kind of political association (see Eric MacGilvray, “Dewey’s Public,” *Contemporary Pragmatism* 7, no. 1 [2010]: 31).

[16] Melvin L. Rogers, “Dewey and His Vision of Democracy,” *Contemporary Pragmatism* 7, no. 1 [2010]: 84. With regard to institutionalization, he continues, “the public is that space in which the democratic state attempts to see widely and feel deeply in order to make an informed judgment” (ibid., 87). With regard to transformation, by contrast, other publics do not just flow into the state; they build power external to the state and can thus serve as a “counterweight” to entrenched publics (ibid., 89).

[17] Ibid.
“It is said, and said truly, that for the world’s peace it is necessary that we understand the peoples of foreign lands. How well do we understand, I wonder, our next door neighbors? … Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community” (Dewey, *Public*, 368). For a discussion of Pragmatism’s response to globalization, see Benjamin P. Davis, “Pragmatic Saintliness: Toward a Criticism and Celebration of Community,” *Contemporary Pragmatism*, forthcoming.


Ibid., 275, 261-263.

Ibid., 283.

Ibid., 314, 320.

This claim would be denied by post-structural emphases on decentering “the subject”; anarchists would want to make sure this remains self-recognition and not recognition by the state.

Eddie Glaude writes that Dewey avoids what Habermas requires, namely, “that we bracket the fact that some of us are wealthy and others poor; that we are diverse in terms of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and race… These differences and the problems that may arise from them may even call multiple publics into existence that challenge restricted conceptions of the common good. And, for Dewey, this does not undermine democratic life but, instead, is a reflection of its vibrancy” (Eddie Glaude, “The Problem of African American Public(s): Dewey and African American Politics in the 21st Century,” *Contemporary Pragmatism* 7, no. 1 [2010]: 12).

Ibid.


Ibid., 315.

Ibid., 317. This claims sheds light on Dewey’s theory of social change more broadly: here he looks not to politics itself but to what MacGilvray calls “the extra-political realm of voluntary association among human beings, where political problems are generated and become salient in the first place” (MacGilvray, “Dewey’s Public,” 32).


Ibid., 339.


Ibid., 348.

Ibid., 349.

Ibid., 365.


Ibid., 39-40.

Ibid., 109, 108.

Ibid., 107.

Ibid.

Ibid., 212.

[43] Ibid., 76-77.
[44] Ibid., 80.
[45] Ibid., 73.
[48] Ibid., 79.
[52] Ibid., 130.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid. In a related book whose treatment is beyond the scope of this essay, W.E.B. DuBois notes how colonialism is a limit to democracy as both a form of government and a practice: “[T]he modern world… may easily be lulled to sleep and forget that the exclusion of something between one-fourth and one-half of the whole population of the world from participation in democratic government and socialized wealth is a direct threat to the spread of democracy” (W.E.B. DuBois, *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace* [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1945], 56-57). “Democracy,” he goes on, “has failed because so many fear it” (ibid., 99).
[58] Ibid., 233.
[59] Ibid., 237.
[60] Ibid., 349-350, see also pp. 353, 413. We might ask of Dussel: Is there really a “community of victims” asking for guidance or representation? How is this delineated?
[61] Ibid., 326.
[62] Ibid., 277-278.
[65] I thank Ashley Bohrer for discussions about this question.
[67] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., 227. In relation to an internationalist application of democratic intellectual practices, we can also consider the advice not to publish on Palestine until one is tenured. To heed this advice demonstrates a responsibility to one’s career
success, not to democratic constituencies working, as the DuBois epigraph puts it, to ensure that democracy encircles the earth.


[72] As is often the case, other disciplines are ahead of philosophy in pressing these questions. See for example Robert Borofsky, *An Anthropology of Anthropology: Is It Time to Shift Paradigms?* (Kailua, HI: Center for a Public Anthropology, 2019).