

Bridgework in Latin American and Latinx Political Philosophy Review of Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda's *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy: From Ciudad Juarez to Ayotzinapa* Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020. P. 156. Hardcover \$131.00. ISBN 978-1498560535.

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In the foreword to Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda's (Díaz) book *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy: From Ciudad Juarez to Ayotzinapa*, Enrique Dussel mentions something about Díaz's view that seems both a bit misleading yet pregnant with philosophical significance in a helpful way. Dussel opens by saying,

This book has the advantage of placing itself in the right *place of enunciation* (*locus enuntiationis*): between the geopolitically dominating global North and the underdeveloped and exploited global South. It is then both a philosophy and methodology that plays the role of a bridge comparing and debating two worlds, doing so in dialogue and also in war.[1]

While Díaz writes in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, on the border with the United States, it is not clear that his account offers a socio-historical comparative analysis of the national discourses, institutional machinery, social movements, groups on the ground, and practices in the US and Mexico that provide the context within which the militarized production of death unfolds in both terrains. In fact, it seems that one limit of Díaz's overall account is that it could benefit from fleshing out more fully the links between the US settler-colonial state, the US military-industrial complex, and the state violence in Mexico he so painstakingly lays out for readers. The book *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy* offers an enlightening and primarily national-level analysis of the situation that cycles of social movements face in Mexico that makes useful though un-fleshed out links with the US. Making these connections is important for future research that makes visible the global structures of power that produce systemic death and violence and for building coalitions across national bridges as Díaz situates himself between the US and Mexican nation-states. Is Díaz's account limited because it does not fully flesh out the role the US plays in producing the death and violence unleashed on indigenous, Mexican youth, females, activists, and other people in Mexican civil society? Perhaps but maybe this limit provides an opening.

We can analyze phenomena from various perspectives: a macro world systems level, a national level, a city level, a collective level of social movements, or at the existential level. All of these entry points have strengths and limits that allow us to make things more or less visible. It is not clear that there is only one entry point that is a panacea. While this may be so, it is perhaps more important for us to get a clearer

handle on how we conceive these various entry points. Perhaps Díaz's work offers us one-way bridgework between Latinx and Latin American philosophers can happen. Thinkers can do national-level or local-level political analyses from where they are, from a sub-alter epistemic positionality. We can meet to form and strengthen global coalitions across difference, compare notes, make linkages, and identify the similarities and differences in historically oppressive structures occurring at institutional, discursive, collective, and existential levels. Latinx philosophers and other thinkers in the US can take Díaz's links with the US as an invitation to make those connections fuller, historicize, flesh them out and see how social movements in our proximity resist domination and attempt to usher forth transformation in their respective national or local terrains. Maybe one way of doing bridgework is to get a better grip on the various ways that a national problem is also a global problem that requires global solutions. It is in this spirit, which considers the challenges of forming global movements of solidarity, that I offer some critical reflections on Díaz's book. I hope it invites further discussion and provides clarity to the various issues his timely book raises: the causes of poverty/wealth, the reality of the Mexican state, the fragmentation problem, fraternity to solidarity concerns, how social movements can increase their political efficacy, the nature of the transmodern state and how to bring into existence a transmodern state. To this end, I do not offer remarks on all of these complex issues. However, I try to fill in some parts on the US side of things that can perhaps offer useful links that can help push Díaz's discussion in various directions and hopefully open lines of inquiry. This paper aims for clarity but not simply for metaphysical sake but in the service of understanding the political and seeking to transform our catastrophic condition. This is part of what I take it to mean to dialogue in a context that wages war on the people.

In the US, Díaz's book *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy* was published in October 2020. This is five months after the licensed public lynching of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota and ensuing cross-racial national and global protests, the re-emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement, and the demand to defund the police. As I write this, the sentencing of the four police officers has still not happened. For nine minutes and twenty-nine seconds, a white police officer calmly pressed his weighty knee on George Floyd's neck. Meanwhile, Floyd tilted his head away from the saliva-filled concrete, and looking toward the sky, took his last breath to gasp, "mom!" His mother had already passed away. Perhaps he was attempting to reach out and touch his mother's hand in heaven to leave this anti-black racist hell on earth and go somewhere else, where there is no anti-black racism. A place that does not collectively legislate, legalize and give license to enslave, lynch, imprison, murder, and dehumanize them with impunity. But instead, somewhere where meaningful human contact and genuine reciprocity are the norm. George Floyd's death is part of a long history of police and white vigilante violence unleashed on black and brown people since the founding and expansion of the US settler-colonial state and nineteenth-century post-emancipation from the slavery period to the present. Some of this brutal history is in news, social media, films, art, music, documentaries, radio talk shows, books, Africana philosophy, Latin American philosophy, ethnic studies, and other fields. It also is lived in the present depending on one's social location.

In 1935, W.E.B. Dubois's book *Black Reconstruction in America* (1860-1880) identified the origins of the police system as an integral part of the slave plantation economy in the US south. Poor white people comprised these police forces. He notes that given the labor competition between blacks and whites in the north, poor whites in the south would move up north to compete in the labor market. However, there were at least two reasons why they stayed in the police patrols. First, they were paid petty wages and it gave them a sense of "authority as overseer, slave driver and member of the patrol system. But above and beyond this, it fed [their] vanity because it associated [them] with the masters."^[2] The number of white plantation owners was small. They owned the black male and female bodies they were extracting free labor from and controlled black female's biological reproduction. White master enslavers and their white wives raped black males and females they had at their disposal.^[3] Master enslavers also had at least five million poor whites at their command who were part of the police patrol system. There were thus more police than the enslaved toiling on plantations. The slave plantation economy generated wealth for the master enslaver and produced poverty, death, and trauma for the enslaved. This racial, heterosexual, capitalist erotic plantation economy was stable and held intact by poor whites recruited into police patrols. Interestingly, Dubois points out that even though poor whites received petty wages they did not self-identify as laborers or part of a poor-working class labor movement. They felt a sense of superiority over enslaved blacks as poor whites worked in conjunction with master enslavers. The physical proximity that poor whites had to wealthy white master enslavers structured their subjectivity to form formed their over ambitions. These poor whites desired to become wealthy master enslavers even though this dream was for all practical purposes out of their reach.

Indeed, it is a history that police officers in the US are often not aware of and is not a part of their training. This historical consciousness is not a part of their identity as police or the broader US national public. Reflecting on the positive dimensions to the demand to defund the police—the part that is not simply negative in the sense of substantially shrinking their large budget but positive in the sense of redirecting these massive funds to programs and services that allow people to live—involves reimagining institutions anew. It involves reimagining mental health, housing, education, and recreation in ways that prioritize the lives of structural victims necessarily produced in the prevailing order. It involves redirecting these funds towards solutions that do not presuppose problem people—racialized criminalized populations—but as people who face problems. Defunding the police is about thoughtfully responding to the system's failures that do not allow the people to affirm their lives. This positive aspect of defunding the police is about creative reprioritizing, reimagining other futures that empower communities, provide conditions for their survival and flourishing. Creating racially conscious critical police can be an essential part of defunding the police beyond mere police training. The latter often is an ineffective waste of taxpayer funds that presupposes racism is not an area of knowledge but something else that can be assessed through individualized implicit bias testing that de-historicizes and de-politicizes racism and does not understand it as historical, systemic, global, and

institutional. The latter does not increase the racial literacies of police. It would be interesting and valuable to contextualize the history of the emergence of the police in the Mexican nation-state. A comparative analysis can help identify continuities and ruptures between the Ciudad Juarez, Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity and Ayotzinapa movements demand to de-militarize and the Black Livers Matter movement's demand to defund the police. It can be an important investigation to historicize the police. It could create police officers that are more critical. It can challenge enchanted views of them. It could perhaps be a way to increase the overall racial literacy of the broader population and allow for the acquisition of a better understanding of the history of the Mexican state. It can also provide a better sense of the absurdity that the people are paying for the police to shoot at them through their taxpayer dollars and pesos. How do the police in Mexico emerge as a historical formation? Why do people become police officers or join the military in Mexico? Are there critical police officers in Mexico?

Díaz's book discusses the alleged war on drugs and the conflicting narratives espoused by the Mexican state and social movements. The former declares that gangs or drug cartels carry out the killings or that the dead ones deserved to die because they were criminals. The latter declare the war on drugs is simply rhetoric. The many state-sanctioned deaths are really about control of the population. State violence is about limiting the emergence of social movements justifiably protesting against their impoverished conditions of structural victimhood. Social movements recognize the difference between what the state says and what it does, so they base the meaning of the state's declared war on drugs on the empirical basis of the massive deaths produced at the hands of the state. Díaz notes that in 2007-2012, according to records, there were 11,114 murders during the alleged war on drugs. From 2012-2016 there were 100,000 killed and 20,000 missing during president Calderon's administration.[4] This is not counting the massacre of 15 high school students in Villas de Salvacar who were at a party and the 43 disappeared students in Ayotzinapa. In the face of this pile of corpses, the disappearances and the creation of intergenerational trauma explanations for these facts manifest in various ways. Non-state criminals cause deaths and disappearances. They deserved it. It was accidental collateral damage. It is intentional killing of students, young activists, and social movement agents to prevent the population from entering into a state of rebellion. It is interesting to note that when Bill Clinton signed Plan Colombia in 2000 to fight the war on drugs, he was explicit about targeting leftist insurgent groups seeking social change of how to manage the oil and their natural resources in ways that address the needs of the people. One can only wonder, was the start of the Merida Initiative in 2007 under George W. Bush a continuation of Plan Colombia in the context of Mexico? It seems that defunding the police in the US can include the demand to end the Merida Initiative and legalize drugs. How might either of these demands resonate in the national discourse in Mexico? In this context, Díaz makes a perceptive observation. He says,

At first it was only a small group of SMO's [social movement organizations] making this claim [protesting the military strategy of the war on drugs]; as the

general population in fact accepted and even demanded the presence of federal forces to control violence.”[5]

Why does the general population in Mexico accept and demand the presence of federal forces to control the violence? It seems like the answer is already embedded in the question, but it contains ambiguities. Is the militarized presence there to control the violence between the drug cartels, gangs, police, and the innocent civilians caught in the crossfires? Whoever is involved in the violence does raise the question of whether armed military presence is an effective means of creating safe, less violent, secure spaces. What is the alleged drug problem? To begin answering this question in a way that builds on Díaz's account, I briefly focus on the US context and consider the question of what causes people to become drug dealers?

Cha-Cha Jimenez, founder of the Puerto Rican youth group the Young Lords, points out that they emerged as a street gang in 1959 in response to the anti-black and anti-Latino racism in the predominately white-ethnic Old Town neighborhood where they were situated in the near North Side of Chicago.[6] Historically the area is a manufacturing-based economy; steel mills, freight warehouses, meatpacking industries, construction, mail order services, distilleries, clothing shops, and other predominant industries that serviced the factories. Housing in this economy was often near factories and these industries. Being this the case, many German, Swedish, Norwegian, and Polish working-class laborers could share experiences, meet at picnics, forge shared histories, and form bonds of solidarity. This spatial arrangement of race, labor and housing was conducive to labor union organizing because white-ethnic laborers could engage in consciousness-raising activities that would make them see that their exploitative treatment was not an isolated incident idiosyncratic to them but rather was group-based class exploitation. With this higher level of organization of various white ethnic groups, labor unions could demand better wages, health care benefits, labor protections, and pensions. Over time this allowed the densely populated white ethnic working-class families in these city neighborhoods to save and enter the middle class. Amid labor unions, strident claims industries began closing down and setting up shops outside the city in the suburbs or other poor countries to exploit cheap pools of labor and maximize profits. In this context, the Border Industrialization Program identified by Diaz begins implementation in northern Mexico and is a precursor to the 1994 passage of NAFTA.[7] As the factories were shutting down and relocating and industries were closing because they were no longer serviceable, black and Latinx populations began moving into these areas that became vacated and more affordable. This confluence of factors produced white flight in the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, the Young Lords shifted from a youth gang that fought against and protected itself from anti-black and anti-Latinx racism to a social club.

Many of the social services that gave the formerly white-ethnic residential neighborhoods their stable secure middle-class allure were not available because the tax money that supported the operations of the city government, schools, parks and health care programs were no longer there but in suburbs. The shift to a service

economy focused on clerical work, banking, legal services, insurance, transportation, health care, merchandising, hotel work, security, and other information services. The jobs in this newly emerging service sector economy were spatially unfolding in the downtown area of Chicago. It produced problems for black, Latinx, and poor white residents in these neighborhoods. With many blue-collar jobs gone, this provided limited employment opportunities, gave rise to higher unemployment rates, and increased the number of people living below the poverty line. There was a high concentration of low-level jobs in the service industries, but they required low skills, training and offered low wages and little to no job security. Entrance into the relatively smaller middle and upper-level sectors of the service economy was difficult for them because it required high levels of education and/or technological knowledge to obtain secure, meaningful jobs with good wages. The newly emerging, broken-down, and underfunded school system could not prepare them for the new economic order. This change to a service economy, ethno-racial immigration shifts, weakened social services and racialized reorganization of urban space structured the parameters of the people's options. They either try to work relatively close to home, at low-level positions in the service industries for meager wages, or work in the manufacturing industries in the suburbs about one hour away for a bit more pay. In this context, the Young Lords shift from becoming a social club to a political organization that attempts to cope with the needs of the people in this post-institutional context where the buildings exist. However, the institutions do not listen to, serve or meet the real needs of the poor black, Latinx, and white people in those neighborhoods.

The historical formation of other youth groups in Chicago unfolded differently. Some went from being social club music bands that also used drugs to youth gangs that would fight other gangs and use drugs but were not a drug-selling business enterprise to turning into a drug-selling pyramidal business structure. The shift from a non-drug dealing gang to a drug dealing gang results from of a confluence of at least four factors identified by Felix Padilla that are part of the aforementioned context.[8] First, the 1971 passage of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act was a bill that gave mandatory twenty-five-year prison sentences for drug selling offenders that were eighteen years or older. This caused individual non-gang affiliated drug dealers to recruit youth gang members to sell their products. Eventually, gangs realized they could go into business and compete with the individual drug dealer because they controlled their territory. However, the youth gangs lacked the finances to purchase the drugs in bulk to start the business and turn a profit. So, they engaged in various fund-raising activities—saving, older gang leaders chipping in and collecting membership dues in the gang—and eventually managed to get the business off the ground with difficulty and time. Second, there was a high demand for cocaine at the time. The international drug trade was booming. It would be interesting to study this historical formation to see its connection to the US and Mexico. Third, during the 1970s, there was rival youth gang violence, some of which resulted in death. This produced neighborhood anti-gang initiatives where parents, residents, and the police worked together as surveillance and policing the gangs. In response to this situation, inter-gang violence decreased when gangs restructured to form two nations in the 1980s: People and Folks. Instead of fighting nearby opposing

gangs, creating this two-part gang structure allowed them to be more business-focused because part of the agreement was respecting other gangs that were different from the same nation. Fourth, their perceptions of conventional employment in the formal economy were grim. It paid little, and the available jobs required they erase their culture. People were tired of long distanced factory jobs—coming home at night on the train after backbreaking, repetitive work and missing your stop because you fall asleep from exhaustion; having to wait in the cold to get back on the train, walk home to only do it again tomorrow. They had overwhelming evidence around them to support their pessimism about the prospects that the dominant society has clear avenues and resources for their flourishing.

The broken-down school system does not prepare them for the new economic order but is a school-to-prison pipeline. Many youth gang members' Padilla interviews often point to how teachers' racist dehumanizing, violent practices contribute to their wanting to join a gang. White teachers from the suburbs lacking familiarity with impoverished urban spaces, and other non-white teachers label them as deviant, bad kids. Teachers publicly say in class that they are pathological, retarded, and mentally unstable. They are placed in disability programs. Teachers do not listen to them, blame them for every disruption in class, suspend them, and put them in detention. Teachers physically hit them and call them welfare recipients. One gang member mentioned how his fifth-grade teacher would often say, "we are supporting you welfare people." Apart from there not being enough books, the curriculum is culturally irrelevant. It does not engage them, excite them, relate to their identities or has them critically reflect on their circumstances. Gang members see drug dealers with money, new cars, jewelry, furnished living, and women. The drug dealer was not someone on television or the Hollywood screen. It was someone they could touch. It seemed attainable because of their visibility and proximity in the neighborhood. Therefore, in a space of scarcity in a culture that tells them their value lies in money and material possession, they wholeheartedly embraced American materialism. However, they rejected the American achievement ideology that stresses that success in school leads to upward socio-economic mobility. Fifth, gang members often cite police treatment as another reason why they joined a gang. Police pick up black neutrons—black youth not in any gang—throw them in the cop car, and drop them off in a white neighborhood where they have to walk and fight their way home because the police steal their money and they have to fight white gang members in the neighborhoods on their way home. Police dehumanize them in front of their families. They beat them up, bust them, plant drugs on them, kill them and get away with it. Requests for data or evidence falsely presuppose idealized conceptions of police institutions. They often do not allow citizens to file complaints. They bury reports and write up false reports. One gang member noted that when he was caught with a marijuana joint, the police filed the report as him possessing five dime-bags of weed. As one gang member said:

They blame all of this on us, and half the time it's ridiculous. Cops, they lie, and the only difference between them and is that they have a uniform and a little piece of metal on their chest that says they can get away with this. Some narcs

beat the shit out of me and I wasn't a banger. They get away with this. So, I decided if these pricks are going to mishandle me because they think I am a Diamond I might as well be one. So I did. That's what went down.[9]

The lack of viable employment opportunities in the formal economy is part of these youths and their families' situations. These people face broken racist schools with culturally irrelevant curriculums that dehumanize them. They face ongoing police violence and scholarly literature in criminology that frames them as problem people and forms a discursive background of racial common sense. These realities form a confluence of reasons why black and Latinx youth in Chicago join gangs. Imagine how much the surrounding institutions have failed them to take their —violation into the gang by a five-minute beating—and join a gang that can offer a modicum of what the wider society is inept to do. In light of these considerations, I am curious why Díaz describes the people in Mexico as vulnerable to “the power of the drug cartels.”[10] I see how innocent people in poverty are caught in crossfires when there are drug wars over territory. Sometimes non-drug related civilians are killed because they are at the wrong place at the wrong time or hanging out with someone who is involved with drugs or sometimes just trying to do ordinary things—play in a playground, purchase groceries, do their homework in their room or talking to a friend outside. These are some ways people are vulnerable to drug cartels. However, as a way of decriminalizing drug cartels it could be useful to historicize their formation in Latin America and allow people to see how they are structurally produced in a non-romanticized or sensationalized way that does not presuppose they are a priori criminals and thus not worthy of being theorized. I am not claiming Díaz makes these presuppositions about drug dealers, but it does open up a question. Why do people become drug dealers in Mexico and/or Latin America? Are there critical drug dealers?

I wish to draw attention to a different though somewhat related topic in Díaz's book. It is his discussion of violence and social movements. In chapter six of *Ethics of Liberation*, Enrique Dussel reframes what he calls “the violence question” that emerges when thinking about social movements. What is the violence question? When social movements emerge in response to the negativities produced by the prevailing order, they have to consider various means by which they will work to change society to allow structural victims to live. Will they engage in marches, demonstrations, building takeovers, sit-ins, die-ins, stopping traffic, or use guns or physical force to make visible their demands and translate them into concrete change? While these and hosts of other actions are various means by which social movements resist oppression, people often identify weapons and fists as violent means of resistance. Should we conceive of these tactics of resistance as violent? Whether people identify specific tactics as violent depends on how we conceive of violence. This raises a more fundamental question. What is violence? As one can see, the violence question in social movement theory does not refer to one question but a constellation of questions. What is violence? Dussel says,

I will reserve the word *violence* (from the Latin *vis* ["force"], used against the rights of the Other, in the sense of "violate") exclusively for the illegal and illegitimate rebellion of the anarchist (2b), or legal coercion turned illegitimate (1b) (the coercion of the prevailing order, for instance, of the state as repressive agent, for example, the eighteenth-century British army against New England, the nineteenth-century Spanish army against New Spain, Augusto Pinochet's Chilean army against a defenseless peoples who had in Allende a legal and legitimate governor).[11]

The movement against militarization in Ciudad Juarez resisted the state-sponsored violence via marches, sit-ins, blocking international bridges, convening a constituent assembly, and protests in the street. Díaz informatively walks the reader through how the movement for Peace, With Justice and Dignity resisted the Mexican state's war on drugs national discourse. He also identifies how the Ayotzinapa movement resisted the state-sanctioned violence unleashed on the 43 students via marches, closing off the Mexico City-Acapulco highway, burning buses, setting government buildings on fire, coordinated protests, university strikes, burning election materials, and boycotting elections. When Díaz identifies these various methods of resistance, he sometimes distinguishes disruptive tactics such as marches from more disruptive tactics of burning buses and setting government buildings on fire.[12] Other times he says, "They used peaceful tactics such as demonstrations as well as highly disruptive methods such as burning election materials." [13] While he is not explicitly identifying the latter as violent but more accurately as highly disruptive methods, he does say at the end of chapter four that if the people occupying a state do not satisfy Dussel's material principle of preserving human life, "they need to be removed either by peaceful or, if necessary, violent means." [14] It was not clear whether he was operating with a peaceful tactics vs. violent tactics binary when he said that. Does Díaz think some of the tactics used by the movements he highlights were violent? In the concluding chapter of the book, when discussing the challenges social organizations face when working together towards a more unified movement of movements, he says something vague. He states, "Sometimes they agree in who the common enemy is and in the overall goal, but they differ in the way they should pursue that goal. For example, some organizations may favor a pacifist route, while others are willing to use legitimate violence." [15] What is legitimate violence? This seems to run counter to Dussel's notion of violence which is always illegitimate. As Dussel says, "I would like this word "violence" to be used with a well-defined ethical sense: as negative, perverse and thus, never accepted justifiably." [16] How, if at all, is Diaz's view of legitimate violence different than Dussel's notion of legitimate force?

Díaz's book invites us all to think deeply about how to begin to transform the world. How can we go about creating a transmodern state? I think Díaz is right to point out that social movements play an essential role in these processes. SMO's have to play multiple roles beyond simply the state. It must work with the Westernized university's global structure as a critical learning community, with sports in ways that redirect its function as a mere diversion, news media outlets and other popular culture institutions. Much work remains for people to become more politically responsible and

see activism as an aspect that informs various other aspects of their complex identities. This way, social movements are not thought of as a distinct heterogeneous collectivity that shoulders all of the work that goes into the struggle to produce social change. We need all hands on deck at various local, national, and global levels in society because the catastrophe the people face is pervasive, systemic, and global. With the remarks I offer, I hope to begin to address the multifaceted issues Díaz's book makes us confront. I end with some remaining questions his work raises. In a context where there is large-scale state-sponsored death and disappearances during the Calderon administration's alleged war on drugs, how was Peña Nieto—one who makes the problem worse—able to become president—as opposed to a candidate that better serves the people in Mexico? How has Obrador approached the issue of the alleged war on drugs? How can we understand the Black Lives Matter movement in more nuanced ways that the demand to defund the police resonates with SMO's demand to demilitarize in Mexico and have a global echo? What are some of the obstacles in the way of creating a transmodern state?

Notes

[1] Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy: From Ciudad Juarez to Ayotzinapa* (Lexington Press, 2020): ix.

[2] W.E.B. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1935): 12.

[3] Tommy Curry, *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood* (Temple University Press, 2017).

[4] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 1.

[5] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, xvi.

[6] Interview with Cha-Cha Jimenez from the newspaper *The Black Panther* June, 7, 1969. "The Origins and History of the Young Lords." In *The Young Lords: A Reader* ed. Darrel Enck-Wanzer (New York University Press, 2010):27-36.

[7] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 4.

[8] Felix Padilla, *The Gang as an American Enterprise* (Rutgers University Press, 1993).

[9] Padilla, *The Gang as an American Enterprise*, 87.

[10] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 56.

[11] Enrique Dussel, *Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion* (Duke University Press, 2013):409.

[12] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 41.

[13] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 50.

[14] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 70.

[15] Díaz, *Social Movements and Latin American Philosophy*, 116.

[16] Dussel, *Ethics of Liberation*, 401.