María Lugones and White Hegemonic Feminism: Making a case for humility

by Lara Trout

English Abstract

This article is written in memory of María Lugones (1944-2020), a powerful philosopher, activist, and popular educator. It is a humble contribution to the dialogue Lugones called for to bring about a decolonial transformation of feminism. For Lugones, decolonial feminism involves coalition building that honors the cultures, knowledges, cosmologies, and resistances of the peoples who have been targeted by European colonialism. This article takes up Lugones' criticism of white hegemonic feminism's false universalization about "women's" oppression, which expresses solidarity with Women of Color, yet fails to acknowledge European colonialism's placement of European women within humanity and Indigenous women and African-descended women outside of humanity. White hegemonic feminist false universalization also fails to acknowledge the vast diversity of cultures, knowledges, cosmologies and resistances of Women of Color. Employing humility as methodology, I explore how Lugones links this false universalization with socialization into and internalization of Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes and practices.

Resumen en español

Este artículo ha sido escrito para honrar la memoria de María Lugones (1944-2020), destacada filósofa, activista, y educadora popular. Quiere ser una contribución humilde al diálogo que Lugones inició para promover una transformación decolonial del feminismo. Para Lugones, el feminismo decolonial involucra una construcción de coaliciones que honre las culturas, conocimientos, cosmologías, y resistencias de los pueblos que han sido víctimas del colonialismo europeo. Este artículo aborda la crítica que Lugones hace de la falsa universalización del feminismo blanco hegemónico en lo que se refiere a la opresión de "la mujer", el mismo que, a pesar de expresar la solidaridad con las Mujeres de Color, falla en reconocer que el colonialismo europeo sitúa a las mujeres europeas dentro del marco de la humanidad mientras que ubica a las mujeres indígenas y afrodescendientes afuera de la humanidad. La falsa universalidad del feminismo blanco hegemónico también falla en reconocer la diversidad enorme de culturas, conocimientos, cosmologías y resistencias de las Mujeres de Color. Implementando la humildad como metodología, exploro la manera en que Lugones vincula esta falsa universalización con la socialización en y la internalización de las actitudes y prácticas cognitivas eurocéntricas monoculturales.

Resumo em português

Este artigo foi escrito para homenagear a memória de María Lugones (1944-2020), notável filósofa, ativista, e educador popular. Quer ser uma humilde contribuição ao

diálogo que Lugones iniciou para promover uma transformação decolonial do feminismo. Para Lugones, o feminismo decolonial envolve uma construção de coalizões que honra as culturas, conhecimentos, cosmologias, e resistências dos povos que foram vítimas do colonialismo europeu. Este artigo trata da crítica que Lugones faz da falsa universalização do feminismo branco hegemônico sobre a opressão de "a mulher", o mesmo que, apesar de expressar solidariedade com as Mulheres de Cor, falha em reconhecer que o colonialismo europeu situa as mulheres europeias no quadro da humanidade enquanto situa as mulheres indígenas e afrodescendentes fora da humanidade. A falsa universalização do feminismo branco hegemônico também falha em reconhecer a enorme diversidade de culturas, conhecimentos, cosmologias, e resistências das Mulheres de Cor. Implementanto a humildade como metodologia, eu exploro como Lugones vincula esta falsa universalização com a socialização e internalização de atitudes e práticas cognitivas eurocêntricas monoculturais.

I write this piece with sadness in my heart about the passing of María Lugones (1944-2020), a powerful philosopher, activist, and popular educator.[1] While I did not have the privilege of working with María Lugones in person, her work continues to inspire me - as a white/Angla, cisgender, heterosexual, middle class woman born in the United States - to embrace what I call *humility as methodology* in my aspirations to pursue decolonial feminism inside and outside of the classroom.

In my project here, I humbly join recent efforts to feature Lugones' decolonial, interdisciplinary philosophy,[2] as I approach the dialogue Lugones calls for in order to bring about a decolonial transformation of feminism (2020a, 32; cf. 2010, 753). For Lugones, decolonial feminism involves coalition building that honors the cultures, knowledges, cosmologies, and resistances of the peoples who have been targeted by the European colonial project ("Toward a Decolonial Feminism," 2010). Decolonial feminism also involves a full reckoning with what she calls - in critical dialogue with Aníbal Quijano - *the coloniality of gender* (Lugones 2007, 2010). The coloniality of gender names how Indigenous peoples and peoples of African descent were dehumanized, seen by the European colonizers as not human (or not fully human) - and thus not as "men" and "women", but as merely "male" and "female" (Lugones 2007, 201-07; 2010, 743-46). Thus, they were seen as "without gender" by those who violently enforced and perpetuated the colonization of Abya Yala[3] (Lugones 2014, 69-70). Lugones calls to task white feminists who universalize about "women's" oppression, yet fail to take into account European colonialism's placement of European women within humanity and Indigenous women and African-descended women outside of humanity (e.g. 2014, 69-71; 2007, 187; 2010, 755-56).

As a white woman who aspires[4] to the decolonial feminism Lugones describes, I consider it my responsibility to engage her consistent critiques of white women who express solidarity with Women of Color[5] without acknowledging the coloniality of gender, nor the cultures, knowledges, cosmologies and resistances of Women of Color that Eurocentrism erases (e.g. 2014; 2010, 755-56).[6] My project in what follows takes up Lugones' critique of white hegemonic feminism's[7] false universalization of "women" and her linkage of this false universalization to socialization into Eurocentric patterns of cognition. In my experience, well-meaning white people committed to decoloniality - including white academic feminists - are prone to unwittingly falsely universalizing Eurocentric perspectives, due to having internalized them from childhood. I have also seen that, in at least some cases, having the details of socialization into whiteness described and explained can help these same people (including myself) resist and interrupt internalized patterns of falsely universalizing Eurocentric white experience. This disruption of false universalization is a praxical goal of my project. I maintain that this disruption is also a necessary ongoing effort for white people, like myself, who aspire to practice decolonial feminism.[8] Another praxical goal is to feature the importance of humility to these decolonial aspirations.

In what follows, I begin by highlighting the consistency with which Lugones has criticized white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women". I also feature the embodied cognitive humility that Lugones models and that I aspire to by practicing humility as methodology. In the next section, I focus on her essay "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," in which she implicitly relates white hegemonic feminism's false universalization to socialization into the Eurocentric monocultural "cognitive attitudes" of "certainty, simplicity" and "that form of agreement arrived at through compromise" (2014, 80). Lugones does not make explicit the detailed connections between these Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes and white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women" (79-80). She does, however, reference a 1995 piece that she co-wrote with anthropologist Joshua Price, "Dominant Culture," where they give a detailed account of the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes of "certainty, simplicity, and agreement" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 117-22). In order to bring these two pieces into dialogue, I examine Lugones and Price's treatment of these Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes in "Dominant Culture" (1995a), and then I read the details of this treatment into Lugones' critiques of white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women" in "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" (2014).[9] In the final two sections, with white hegemonic feminism in mind, I explore the issues of socialization into and internalization of whiteness. More specifically, I augment Lugones' and Price's insights by explicitly considering *child development* for white children born and raised within U.S. dominant culture, where they are exposed to these same Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes - certainty, simplicity, agreement - practiced and enforced institutionally. This socialization and internalization can make false universalization of whiteness second nature, as the Eurocentric monocultural attitudes come to be practiced on the personal level. I argue that this socialization and internalization are important factors to consider for white academic feminists, like myself, who aspire to decoloniality in our praxis. My goal is *not*

to let us off the hook, but rather to keep ourselves "on" the hook, of a *humility* that honors the extent of our socialization and the vastness of what we do not know.

False universalization in white hegemonic feminism

Lugones' criticism of white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women" has been a steady theme throughout her decades of writing.[10] The piece that introduced me to this issue in Lugones' thought is the 1983 essay she co-wrote with Elizabeth Spelman, "Have We Got a Theory for You!: Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice'" (Lugones and Spelman 1983). It is beyond the scope of my project to detail all of Lugones' references to this false universalization, as it comes up so consistently, including in two pieces published the year of her passing, "Gender and Universality in Colonial Methodology," and "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach" (Lugones 2020a, 2020b).[11]

In what follows, I take up yet another piece in which Lugones criticizes the false universalization of white hegemonic feminism, namely, "*Multiculturalismo radical y feminismos de mujeres de color*"/"Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" (RMWOCF) which was published in 2005 in Spanish translation, and again in 2014 in English.[12] I focus on this particular essay, due to Lugones' juxtaposition of the false universalization in white hegemonic feminism with what she calls Eurocentric monocultural *cognitive attitudes*, referencing the 1995 piece she co-wrote with Joshua Price, "Dominant Culture" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 79-80; Lugones and Price 1995a). I want to bring a more detailed exploration to the connections between these two themes. As it stands, Lugones' discussion of false universalization in white hegemonic feminism (in RMWOCF) occurs *before* her points about cognitive attitudes. And her points about cognitive attitudes, which occur at the end of the piece, make no explicit mention of white hegemonic feminism's false universalization. Yet it is clear *implicitly* that this false universalization is fueled by Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes. It is possible that Lugones leaves the details of this cognitive fueling implicit, in order to maintain a fuller treatment of the foci of her project's title, "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," (69, 77-80). I explore these implicit connections to Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes in detail below.

Lugones, "cognitive" concerns, and humility

Before continuing, I would like to address an important concern. Someone might object that my focus on "cognitive" themes in Lugones' work is problematic due to the term's association with a dualistic view that separates body from mind.[13] To respond, I stress the importance of following Lugones' own use of the term "cognitive" (and derivatives) *without presupposing* dualistic sensibilities. For example, in her *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* essay, "Tactical Strategies of the Streetwalker/*Estrategias Táticas de la Callejera*" (2003), Lugones engages in situated, embodied, and praxical *cognition* and *theorizing*. In the section of this essay entitled "The Spatiality of Theory" (207), she explains, "This theorizing of resistance...intermingles in the spatiality

of the street. This pivoting of *the spatiality of cognition* radically alters what is conceivable" (210, emphasis mine).[14] Lugones is clearly *situating* cognition within embodied contexts, from which resistant thinking and theory-creation can grow from concrete experience.

Because I am a Pragmatism scholar who prioritizes thematizing cognition as both affective and embodied,[15] I have gravitated toward the richness of Lugones' treatment of explicitly cognitive themes that challenge canonical and colonial dualistic assumptions. In fact, I suggest that her personal maxim, "I won't think what I won't practice," is a commitment to a praxical, embodied view of cognition, from which practice is not separated (Lugones 2003, 5; cf. 2015, 90n2).[16]

Lugones also articulates and models what I would call *cognitive humility*, which informs my own sensibility of "humility as methodology," the latter which I explain shortly. In their 1995 piece, "Dominant Culture," Lugones and Price mention humility in their discussion and validation of the multicultural cognitive attitude of *uncertainty*: "Uncertainty in this sense requires humility, curiosity, urgency in communication, and a sense of open-endedness to understanding and being understood. It requires a *lack* of spontaneity in communication as one questions one's own judgment about what one is seeing..." (1995a, 124, emphasis in original).[17] A cognitive attitude of uncertainty cultivates respectful space and uptake for varied cultures, cosmologies, epistemologies, and other ways of engaging the world (cf. Lugones 2010). One reason humility is key to this cognitive attitude is that certainty that one's own way of thinking is the only way of thinking undermines coalition building with those whose cultures, cosmologies, epistemologies, and modes of engagement differ from one's own (Lugones and Price 1995a, Lugones [2005]/2014, cf. 2020a, 2020b). In my project here, I wish to highlight cognitive humility, in particular, as an aspect of *resistance* to Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes. Cognitive humility supports disrupting how natural Eurocentric cognitive attitudes can feel to those who have internalized them.[18] Before describing what I call "humility as methodology," I want to highlight Lugones' modeling of cognitive humility.

In "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach," Lugones explains how decolonial methodology requires that "gender" *not* be uncritically assumed to organize the lives of those who have been targeted by coloniality: "The concept of gender itself carries conceptual, social, metaphysical, historical meaning that is inimical to the on-the-ground resistance by the inhabitants of Abya Yala, even when their habitats have been largely destroyed. I treat the term 'gender' with suspicion, because it may be nothing other than a Western descriptive or analytical artifact. The descriptive use of 'gender' often promotes the characteristically Western modern thinking in terms of categories, understood as homogenous, impermeable, separable, and monadic" (2020b, 36; cf. 2020a). For Lugones, uncritical use of "gender" - so loaded with Western, colonial assumptions - undermines decolonial methodology and decolonial coalition.

Yet this work of "treat[ing] the term 'gender' with suspicion" is far from easy, far from straightforward (ibid.). Lugones describes the care she must take to avoid inadvertently undermining decolonial coalition-building across cultures due to her own "cognitive lenses":   "As I embark in the task of moving across space and time in a nonlinear understanding of time and a nonabstract understanding of space, the concept of gender is problematic for me. I am moving historically and spatially with a conviction that my own constitution needs to be questioned, in particular my *cognitive lenses* and my being taught not to think incarnately. So in moving, I am cautious and mistrustful of what seems right to me as well as of what my feminist contemporaries have thought and written" (Lugones 2020b, 34, my emphasis). In this passage, Lugones models a cognitive humility necessary to the decolonial praxis of "deep coalition"[19] by admitting that she has "cognitive lenses" that she wants to resist; she has "[been] taught not to think incarnately" (ibid.). This acknowledgement to "being taught" that thinking is not interwoven with embodiment is transformatively significant. If Lugones has been taught to think, or not to think, in certain ways - this implies that there are other possibilities for how cognition can be conceived and practiced (Lugones and Price 1995a). I suggest that the education to which she refers stretches back to the informal and formal education involved in childhood (cf. Lugones 2003, 78-83, 97-98). I explore childhood socialization below.

For now, I want to highlight Lugones' use of the term "cognitive lenses," which could be described as patterns of thinking that can be so deeply ingrained as to function outside one's critical awareness. Along these lines, Lugones notes, "So in moving, I am cautious and mistrustful of what seems right to me as well as of what my feminist contemporaries have thought and written" (2020b, 34). This caution and mistrust, I would argue involve, *model*, cognitive humility.

Following Lugones' own lead, I suggest that cognitive humility would ideally be engaged by anyone wanting to engage in decolonial praxis.[20] For my project in this article, I engage this theme in relation to my own positionality, as a white, cis-gendered woman academic - who has been socialized since childhood and through my graduate training in philosophy to *ignore*, *erase* the colonial difference.[21] Through what I call *humility as methodology*, I strive to implement the cognitive humility that Lugones models.[22] Humility as methodology involves my ongoing efforts to interrupt and resist the "cognitive attitudes and practices" into which I have been socialized and which characterize white hegemonic feminism (Lugones and Price 1995a, Lugones [2005]/ 2014). In terms of my project in this article, *humility as methodology* includes my embrace of an exegetic voice, in order to be a conscientious student to Lugones' (and Joshua Price's) ideas. My exegetic voice is a practice of resistance to any eagerness to simply declare myself decolonial. I agree with Linda Martín Alcoff, that "it may disable self-critique if we portray feminism as necessarily anti-colonial" (2020, 201). A second aspect of humility as methodology is my engagement of Lugones and Price's invitation to their readers to engage in positionality-informed self-reflection about their own (the reader's own) experience ("Dominant Culture," 1995a, 109-110). This personal engagement occurs below, as I take up my own childhood socialization into Eurocentric

monocultural cognitive attitudes and practices. An additional aspect of humility as methodology invokes C. S. Peirce's fallibilism: I will never "finish" humility as methodology (Trout 2010). Rather it is an ongoing, ever-growing sensibility that I consider both remedial and indispensable to my decolonial aspirations.

"Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" ([2005]/2014)

In "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," Lugones explains how the "logic of resistance" enacted by both Women of Color and "radical multiculturalism" has challenged the "logic of false universalization" informing both white hegemonic feminism and Eurocentrism more broadly ([2005]/2014, 69). Lugones argues that white hegemonic feminism reflects Eurocentric hegemony and its colonial legacy ([2005]/2014, 77). And just as Eurocentric colonialist hegemony involved the false universalization of "conflat[ing] ... culture and knowledge with European culture and knowledge," so too white hegemonic feminism has falsely universalized regarding the oppression of women: "[W]hite bourgeois feminists theorized white womanhood as if all women were white" (Lugones 2014, 69). For example, the concept of femininity that white hegemonic feminism protested involved the portrayal of white bourgeois women "as fragile, weak in both body and mind, secluded in the private, and sexually passive. But it did not bring to consciousness that those characteristics only constructed white bourgeois womanhood" (69). To portray the imposition of gender experienced by white bourgeois women, as if it is the gender experience of all women is to falsely universalize white bourgeois women's experience (cf. 69-77). The fact that this false universalization was "not [brought] to consciousness" (69), I would argue, is *fueled* by internalization, which relates to points Lugones raises - at the end of RMWOCF - about Eurocentric monocultural "cognitive attitudes" that are "valorized and institutionalized" in United States culture (79-80, cf. Lugones and Price 1995a). Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes, which are culturally dominant, socialize personal cognitive attitudes.

I discuss internalization more fully below. For now, I want to situate the points Lugones makes about Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes. I do so by working from her clarification of the meaning of "Women of Color," which comprises the final lines of "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms": "We have meant 'Women of Color' as a coalitional identity, *one that stands against monologisms*, not as a racial descriptor. As a coalitional identity it is one seeking identifications that are multiple, unstable, historically situated, through complex dialogues from within the interdependence of non-dominant differences" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 80, my emphasis).[23] For Lugones, "stand[ing] against monologisms" requires "[c]ognitive conditions" - or "cognitive attitudes" - that promote radical multiculturalism (80). To "stand[] against monologisms" involves showing how there are *many* ways to understand the world, as opposed to efforts to reduce these many to just *one*. Efforts to reduce in this way reflect the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes of "certainty, simplicity" and "agreement arrived at through compromise" ([2005]/2014, 80; cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 117-22). Lugones emphasizes, on the other hand, that cognitive attitudes that enable the *resistance* to monologisms "valorize open ended

understanding, complexity, and uncertainty" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 80, citing Lugones and Price 1995a, 123-26). These resistant cognitive attitudes not only inform Women of Color feminisms, but also radical[24] multiculturalism. Both share a "common genesis" in resisting Eurocentric monoculturalism's epistemological erasures (Lugones [2005]/2014, 78), by means of "different knowledges" stemming from "resistant understandings of reality" (77). This common genesis speaks to the vast knowledges, cosmologies, experiences, and resistances offered by Women of Color and cultures that have been targeted by western European colonialism (cf. Lugones 2020a; 2015, 87-88).

Let me clarify some of the key connections at play here for Lugones. Just as the cognitive attitudes that promote radical multiculturalism also promote Women of Color feminisms, the cognitive attitudes that promote Eurocentric monoculturalism also promote white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women". As she ends "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," Lugones leaves implicit the details of how Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes are at play in this false universalization. On the one hand, she explicitly criticizes Eurocentric monoculturalism in the United States, which "valorize[s] and institutionalize[s] cognitive attitudes that would render the knowing subject paralyzed in the face of a multiplicity of knowledges, languages, cultures, ways of life through requiring a monolingual, monological, and monocultural understanding of reality" (79-80). The specific Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes in question are, again, "certainty, simplicity, and that form of agreement arrived at through compromise" (80, cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 117-22). On the other hand, Lugones does not explicitly detail how these cognitive attitudes are reflected in white hegemonic feminism's false universalization. She does reference her work with Joshua Price in the piece, "Dominant Culture" (1995a), which has a detailed discussion of the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes of "certainty, simplicity, and agreement" (ibid.). While "Dominant Culture" does not explicitly thematize the false universalization of "women" in white hegemonic feminism, Lugones and Price's discussion of cognitive attitudes in that 1995 piece can be brought into dialogue with Lugones' critique of white hegemonic feminism in "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" ([2005]/2014). With humility as methodology as my aspiration, I facilitate this dialogue in what follows.

Cognitive attitudes in "Dominant Culture" (1995)

In "Dominant Culture,"[25] Lugones and Price argue that *structural* multiculturalism (synonymous with Lugones' term "radical multiculturalism") should be sewn into "the institutional fabric of [U. S.] society," and should inform the "cognitive attitudes" of the "members" of U. S. society (1995a, 109, 123-26, cf. 103-4). They do not discuss feminism(s) in their essay, but they do include gender in "the beginnings of a theory of multiculturalism" that they offer, a multiculturalism that embraces, "living together, understanding each other, and engaging in the necessary communication for an organizing of life in society that is attentive to multiple voices, *multiple constructions of gender*, multiple understandings of what is valuable, multiple conceptions of people

and customs, and multiple understandings of how to relate to each other" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 123, my emphasis).

Lugones and Price argue against the *mono*culturalism so prevalent in U.S. society. Monoculturalism, they argue "involves both a description and a prescription" - because it "involves the claim that the United States both is and ought to be a monocultural society" (106). They explain the specifics of the mono-culture in question: "In the United States, the culture vying to become the dominant culture is a histori¬cally threaded mix of Anglo and European cultures that we will call 'Anglo culture' as a problematic shorthand. This name can be thoughtfully challenged, as it tends to reduce all the complexity in one direction. But it is the name Latinos give to this culture because the exclusive and aggressive use of the English language is one of its characteristics" (1995a, 105).[26] I describe this culture as "Eurocentrism" instead of "Anglo culture", to match Lugones' term usage in "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" ([2005]/2014). Eurocentrism is not merely "mainstream" in the U.S., it is "*dominant*", due in large part to the process of "the erasure of other cultures and their concomitant reduction to ornaments" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 104, emphasis in original).[27] This erasure involves a refusal to countenance evidence of the existence and power of other cultures: "Monoculturalism's project is to bring reality in line with its assertions. It asserts that there is but one culture, discounting all evidence to the contrary by not seeing anything as counterevidence as it simultaneously attempts to destroy all counterevidence" (107). This Eurocentric tendency to "destroy all counterevidence" links U.S. monoculturalism to the violent patterns of European colonialism (107-08).[28] Through a "slide from description to prescription" - from "there is ... only one culture" to "there ought to be only one culture" (107), the dominant cultural "logic" allows for there to be an erasure of disconfirming evidence: "Success in erasure confirms the belief that there was no such thing" (108). Lugones and Price maintain that Eurocentric monoculturalism's "process of domination...is morally abhorrent" (109).

To argue their claims, Lugones and Price use two methods - one drawing on critical reflection on their positionality-informed lived experiences among others in the United States, and the other method focusing on the differing cognitive "attitudes" that inform Eurocentric monoculturalism and structural multiculturalism (109-10). In the pages dedicated to their "first method," Lugones - "In a Latina Voice" (110-13) - and Price - "In an Anglo voice" (113-16) make vividly clear the non-ornamental multicultural struggle for "institutional recognition" in the U. S., and they highlight the lived dynamics of Eurocentric monoculturalism, such as the dominance of whiteness in U.S. culture. They also invite the reader to engage in this type of positionality-informed critical self-reflection (109-10). I take up this invitation further below, as part of my humility as methodology efforts.

My focus in this section is a humbly exegetical focus on the second method: "Our second method in this essay will be to argue that the project of monoculturalism is advanced through the adoption of a particular set of attitudes: seeking agreement or common ground, valuing and seeking simplicity, and striving for certainty as neces¬sary

for making decisions and judgments. These attitudes are integral to the monocultural project. When they are adopted into the daily conduct of social and political life, they tend to make Anglo [Eurocentric] culture a dominant culture" (110). I discuss these Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes - "agreement", "simplicity", and "certainty" - more fully below. Lugones and Price also argue that structural multiculturalism has very different cognitive attitudes: "living with uncertainty, living with and within complexity, and living with a deep appreciation for conflicting perspectives as a prerequisite for open-ended understanding" (123). Thus, monocultural cognitive attitudes are not inevitable and can be transformed, in order to bring about a structurally multiculturalist society, where cultural erasure is not endorsed and difference is embraced, valued (127). As noted above, I wish to apply this hopeful insight to transforming monocultural cognitive attitudes within white hegemonic feminism.

Lugones and Price use the terms "cognitive attitudes" and "cognitive practices" synonymously. They give the following description of their usage of "cognitive practices" - one that is inclusive of cognitive "attitudes": "By cognitive practices we mean the attitudes and expectations that constitute our attention as selective, that underlie our perceptions, evaluations, and choice of action" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 117). Thus, for Lugones and Price, cognitive practices involve "attitudes and expectations", that pattern how the world is grasped conceptually and perceptually (ibid.). They involve a deeper level of how a person *takes in* and understands the world around them, rendering one's "attention as selective" (ibid.). That is to say, they dispose a person to focus on particular aspects of their surrounding environments, possibly to the disregard of other aspects (1995a, 119-20). If I have a cognitive attitude (or practice) of competition, for example, and my friends ask me to play soccer/*fútbol* with them *without keeping score*, I might refuse. My cognitive attitude/practice of competition, in this case, involves the "expectation" that playing soccer/*fútbol* involves winners and losers. My competitive cognitive attitude shapes my attention to filter out how fun soccer/*fútbol* is regardless of keeping score. Hence my "evaluation" of unscored soccer/*fútbol* deems it unworthy of my time.[29]

I do not find problematic the synonymous use of "cognitive attitudes" and "cognitive practices", especially since Lugones and Price prioritize praxis.[30] Their critical focus on "the structure of cognition", in the sense of "the very ways in which we perceive and conceive", has the aim of transformative changes in behavior, both personally and institutionally (1995a, 127). The way humans think effects how they behave, whether the patterns of cognition in question are described as "cognitive attitudes" or "cognitive practices." I will be using the term "cognitive attitudes/practices" in what follows, to hold in place the linkages between thought and behavior.[31] In addition, I agree with PJ DiPietro's conviction, in "Beyond Benevolent Violence" (2019) that Lugones and Price's treatment of cognitive attitudes/practices does not dichotomize them from affect. Lugones and Price "link knowing practices with our emotions or desires," while not "fully delv[ing] into the domain of affect" (DiPietro 2019, 199). While it is beyond the scope of my project to explicitly engage these affective dimensions, I

appreciate DiPietro's work to do just this: "What we consider cognitive dispositions also entails physical and psychic attachments" (200).[32]

In "Dominant Culture," Lugones and Price focus on personal cognitive attitudes/ practices as "a different terrain" (1995a, 127) from which damaging culturally dominant structures can be resisted - and they highlight that personal cognitive attitudes/practices can be changed (1995a, 118, 127). That is to say, cognitive attitudes/practices are acquired, *learned* from one's social environments, and they are amenable to transformation. Thus, the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices of "certainty, simplicity, and agreement" (117-22) - to be explained shortly - can be transformed into structural/radical multicultural cognitive attitudes. These multicultural cognitive attitudes ("uncertainty, complexity, open-ended understanding") were referenced above, as Lugones celebrates them in "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 123-126; Lugones [2005]/2014, 80). I am also, as noted earlier, drawing on the humility that characterizes the cognitive attitude of "uncertainty" (1995a, 124). It is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of my project to detail these multicultural cognitive attitudes more fully. My focus is on the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices that, in my experience, many white feminists (including myself) enact without realizing it. These are cognitive attitudes/practices that undermine the multiculturalism Lugones (and Price) promote: "These [Eurocentric monocultural] cognitive practices are barriers that make it difficult, if not impossible, to see other cultures in the scene, and they work toward the erasure of other cultures" (1995a, 121). The cognitive failure to "see other cultures" and the "erasure of other cultures" go hand in hand with both falsely universalizing Eurocentric culture and with falsely universalizing a white hegemonic feminist conception of "women" (ibid.).

The interplay of certainty, simplicity and agreement

Certainty as a Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitude/practice involves "the expectation of finding all the facts about a particular matter and of potentially reaching incontrovertible judgements based on those facts" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 118). With this "disposition to certainty", there is "no room" for multiple ways of viewing a situation - nor for questioning the results of the collection of facts (119). This insistence on *the* unquestionable judgements is coupled with a refusal or erasure of evidence that is counter to the certainly held view, whether the view be held at individual or institutional levels (118-19, cf. 107-08). Thus, certainty is intertwined with *simplicity*, the cognitive attitude whereby a "sifting" occurs, in order to weed out "'extraneous,' 'irrelevant,' and 'insignificant' material from the central and significant [material]" as judged by the one(s) doing the sifting (119). The material that has been weeded out is dismissed from consideration. Yet, as Lugones and Price note, "[t]he dismissal does not problematize the sifting operation itself," because such problematization would call into question the *certainty* that is sought (119). It is the simplification provided by the unquestioned sifting out of unwelcome evidence and/or perspectives that "makes certainty possible" (119). As noted above, Lugones and Price highlight how at the

societal, structural level, Eurocentric monoculturalism involves refusing or erasing counterevidence to the Eurocentric monoculturalist position that there is only one culture, with other cultures acknowledged only in so far as serving an "ornamental", vs. structurally significant function (1995a, 107-108, 103-104).

The cognitive attitude/practice of having "the goal of a common ground" or "agreement" is interwoven with certainty and simplicity (119, 117). This third Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitude/practice ("agreement" for short) places a premium on compromise and is premised on "[t]he assumption that all people are the same" (119). Because of this assumed foundation of sameness, it is possible to compromise in order to reach agreement, common ground. Yet this assumption of sameness is fueled by the certainty and simplicity cognitive attitudes/practices just described, which refuse or erase alternative perspectives. In addition, the insistence on sameness results in *difference* being seen as problematic, rather than as a source of insight whereby multiple cultures can learn from one another (119-120). This sameness-insistent view of differences sees differences as resulting from "conflicting self-interests" that need to be set aside in order to reach common ground (119). The possibility of differences involving the complexity of cultures with "irreducible differences" in "concepts, values, and ways of doing things" is not countenanced, due to the requirements of certainty and simplicity (120).

It should be noted that what might be called *genuine* multicultural-informed compromise is possible (as Lugones and Price clarify in their 2009, "Faith in Unity") through "the common ground that may be found through the tense, long-range project of transforming social institutions toward an egalitarianism wrought through a desubalternization and decolonization of the social" (2009, 95). In contrast, what is at play in the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitude/practice of seeking common ground, is actually a *supposed* agreement through compromise, which involves unacknowledged power differentials and unacknowledged cultural differences among those participating in the discussion (Lugones and Price 1995a, 119-21, 125-6). This kind of "compromise is guided by the love of simplicity and certainty, and thus is not understood as requiring a deep understanding of another's culture" (120). Instead, this kind of "compromise" entails silencing or ignoring the experiences and concerns of those outside of the dominant Eurocentric culture (119-120).

Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes and white hegemonic feminism

Let us bring the above details from Lugones and Price's "Dominant Culture" (1995a) into explicit dialogue with Lugones' critiques white hegemonic feminism's false universalization of "women," in "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" ([2005]/2014). I believe humility as methodology requires me to look these dialogical points in exegetical detail, resisting an assumption that they are somehow too obvious to require careful study.

The Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitude/practice of certainty involves an expectation of finding *the truth* about the subject matter at hand: "no room for doubt, no

room for reevaluation" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 119). The definitive "truth" in the case of white hegemonic feminism's portrayal of "women" - has been a false universalization of white bourgeois women's experience and reflects *the erasure* of other women's experiences, knowledges, and resistances. In the section of her essay entitled, "The feminist mask of oppression," Lugones notes, "Erasing any history, including oral history, of the relation of white to non-white women, white feminism wrote white women large. ... No one else's gender oppression was countenanced" ([2005]/2014, 69, 70). Here the interplay of certainty and simplicity as cognitive attitudes/practices requires an unacknowledged "sifting": those with the power to do so, in this case white hegemonic feminists, "decide what is irrelevant and eliminate it" (Lugones and Price 1995a, 119). And because the sifting is not acknowledged or problematized, it remains *hidden*. Thus, there is an erasure of the perspectives of Women of Color, and this erasure itself is hidden, allowing for a supposedly universal "woman's" voice (Lugones 2020b 35; cf. 2020a 35-36).

The cognitive attitude/practice of agreement through compromise is inter-related here as well. In "Dominant Culture," Lugones and Price note, "Searching for a common ground and a common good is tied to simplifying reality: no important irreducible differences are allowed. All differences and conflicts are reducible and reduced toward commonality" (1995a, 120). Relating this to white hegemonic feminism's false universalization, the insistence that "we are all the same" is made about being "women" oppressed by "gender", yet this "sameness" is premised on the hidden erasures just described, which are fueled by the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/ practices of certainty and simplicity (1995a, 119). In "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," Lugones notes, "[T]hey [the white bourgeois feminists] did not understand themselves in intersectional terms, at the intersection of race, gender, and other forceful marks of subjection or domination. Because they did not perceive these deep differences[,] they did not see a need for creating coalitions. They presumed a sisterhood[33], a bond given with the subjection of the gender" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 70). As noted earlier, the gender oppression white hegemonic feminism had in mind targeted white bourgeois women, "as fragile, weak in both body and mind, secluded in the private, and sexually passive. But it did not bring to consciousness that those characteristics only constructed white bourgeois womanhood" (69). These gender stereotypes did not map onto the experiences of Women of Color targeted by western European colonialism (69-72). Thus, "women", in this context, is a white hegemonic false universalization. And the supposed sameness/sisterhood, in reality, involves a vast silencing or ignoring of the cultures, experiences, knowledges, cosmologies, and resistances of Women of Color ([2005]/2014, 70, 80).[34]

Lugones discusses intersectionality as a response by Women of Color in the United States to white hegemonic feminism's false universalization and erasures; intersectionality "unmask[s]" white hegemonic feminism ([2005]/2014, 72, cf. 72-77). It is beyond the scope of my project to fully explore all of the dimensions of this discussion.[35] Here I provide an initial sketch of connections relevant to the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices of certainty, simplicity, and agreement. In the

section of her essay entitled, "First unmasking: intersectionality," Lugones critiques the "categorial" logic informing white hegemonic feminism's conception of "women" (73, 74), crediting and drawing on Kimberlé Crenshaw's groundbreaking work in, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color" (Crenshaw 1995). Lugones also draws on Elsa Barkley Brown's "Polyrhythms and Improvisation" (1991) and Yen Le Espiritu's "Race, Class, and Gender in Asian America" (1997) for intersectional insights ([2005]/2014, 73-75).

In this context, *intersectionality* involves the *inseparability* of "gender, class, sexual, and racial oppressions" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 74). Categorial logic, however, sees categories of oppression as *separable* - as not intersecting (73-75). Lugones explains, "White bourgeois feminists, ignoring the relation between their gender formation and the gender formation of non white women, understood the logic of 'women' categorially: there are only two genders, and 'woman' has a univocal meaning. ...[W]hite bourgeois women understood the particularities of the oppression of white bourgeois women as written into the very meaning of the category 'woman'" (73). This is false universalization at work, where the "category" of woman is seen to have one meaning applying to all women, since "woman" is supposedly separable from other "categories" of oppression. But this one meaning of "woman" draws only on the oppression of white bourgeois women. Thus, this categorial understanding of "woman," involves the *erasure* of the experiences and oppressions of Women of Color.

Once again, the Eurocentric monocultural demands of certainty, simplicity, and agreement are in play, separating off what is considered inessential to the subject matter at hand (simplicity), so that incontrovertible judgments can be formed (certainty) and agreement/common ground/"sisterhood" can be reached (cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 119-20; Lugones [2005]/2014, 70). Thus, "woman" is supposedly separated off from concerns of race, class, and other aspects of colonialism, so that a "universal" depiction of "woman" remains (cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 105). But race, class and other aspects of colonialism have been there all along: "[T]hey [the white bourgeois feminists] did not understand themselves in intersectional terms, at the intersection of race, gender, and other forceful marks of subjection or domination" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 70). That is to say, the supposedly universal "woman" is actually white, bourgeois, and in a dominant position relative to European colonialism's insistence that Women of Color were outside of humanity and thus did not have gender (69-70).

By refusing this categorial logic, intersectionality involves not only rendering visible the intermeshing of oppressions, it also renders visible the *power* that white bourgeois women have had over Women of Color who were enslaved and others who were colonized (Lugones [2005]/2014, 69-70, 73-74; Brown 1991; Crenshaw 1995; Espiritu 1997). That is to say, intersectionality challenges the "sameness" supposedly characterizing those in the "category" of "women", a sameness perpetuated by white hegemonic feminism's false universalization (Lugones [2005]/2014, 73; Lugones and Price, 119).[36]

Lugones builds on the importance of intersectionality in a section entitled "Second unmasking: fusion[37]" where she highlights Audre Lorde's insights about "non-dominant differences" as a source of insight, creativity, and coalition-building (Lugones [2005]/2014, 75, 77).[38] And she wants to ensure that, in addition to describing the intermeshing of oppressions, *resistance* to these oppressions is given full attention. Her final lines of the essay, some of which were quoted above, showcase the creative fusions made possible by Women of Color feminisms and radical multiculturalism: "As we live as fusions resistant to multiple oppressions we can appreciate the ways in which others have conceived, given cultural form to, theorized, expressed, embodied, their resistance to multiple oppressions. That appreciation contributes [*sic*] and is deepened by a multiculturalist understanding. We have meant 'Women of Color' as a coalitional identity, one that stands against monologisms, not as a racial descriptor. As a coalitional identity it is one seeking identifications that are multiple, unstable, historically situated, through complex dialogues from within the interdependence of non-dominant differences" ([2005]/2014, 80). Lugones is emphasizing the radical multicultural insights and coalition-building potential that Women of Color hold, as they "bridge the communicative and *cognitive barriers* erected to keep [them] apart from each other through the institutionalization of cultural domination" (*ibid*., my emphasis). The "cognitive barriers" Lugones refers to here include categorial logic and the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices that fuel this logic - certainty, simplicity, and agreement (ibid.). Continuing my efforts at humility as methodology, I now turn, finally, to how these cognitive underpinnings of false universalization are internalized by white people - including myself - who are socialized into them.

Socialization into false universalization

As she concludes "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," in addition to the powerful points noted just above, Lugones stresses that Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes (of certainty, simplicity, and agreement) in the United States are "valorized and institutionalized" ([2005]/2014, 79-80). This valorization and institutionalization "render[s] the knowing subject paralyzed in the face of a multiplicity of knowledges, languages, cultures, ways of life through requiring a monolingual, monological, and monocultural understanding of reality" (80). Embedded in these comments about institutionalized cognitive attitudes/practices, I would argue, is a connection to child development. Young human beings' personal cognitive attitudes/ practices are shaped by dominant cultural cognitive attitudes/practices. This socialization can result in the internalization of the culturally dominant Eurocentric attitudes/practices, as they function both at the level of societal institutions and at the level of personal behavior (Trout 2010). While Lugones does not elaborate here about the connections to childhood socialization, I would like offer these connections to build on her insights - with white hegemonic feminism's false universalization in mind.

Lugones and Price's, "Dominant Culture," does not explicitly thematize how internalization involves the socialization of *children* into Eurocentric monocultural

cognitive attitudes/practices. They do, however, problematize the internalization of these attitudes/practices: "We have described here the three cognitive practices that ground monoculturalism and have suggested some of the ways in which they are part of the personality structure in dominant culture. We have shown how they are tied to the political stance of monoculturalism by arguing how it is impossible to see other cultures if one has *internalized* those practices" (1995a, 122, my emphasis). They also use "internalizing" in relation to the multicultural cognitive attitudes/practices they promote: "Internalizing them [uncertainty, complexity, open-ended understanding] inclines one toward hearing each other, learn¬ing about each other, coming to understand what we do not understand, coming to see the borders of our own worlds, and making our worlds larger or getting ourselves from our world to another's world" (1995a, 126). Lugones and Price do not give a description of what they mean by internalization, nor do they explicitly thematize the impressionability of children to Eurocentric monocultural attitudes/practices at the level of societal structure.[39] I suggest this working description of internalization based on their overall work in "Dominant Culture" (1995a): Internalization can be understood as mastering of a style of thinking or a specific behavior so fully, due to repeated exposure or practice, that conscious effort is not required to engage in the thinking and/or the practice.[40] I also suggest that explicit childhood socialization connections support and augment Lugones and Price's insights.

The Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices of certainty, simplicity, and agreement are so reinforced in the dominant culture of the U.S., that they can function automatically at the personal level for those whose experience has not taught them that there are other ways to think.[41] This is especially pertinent for white people, like myself, who were born and raised in the dominant culture of the U.S. and thus experienced childhood and young adulthood *without* sustained exposure to other ways of thinking. Lugones and Price note, "[M]onoculturalism does not have to be a consciously willed project. It is part of the logic of these three cognitive practices [certainty, simplicity, agreement], which makes other cultures impossible to see" (1995a, 121). When Eurocentric monoculturalism is institutionalized and is buoyed by its self-ascription of being universal, it can *seem* like there is no other way to legitimately think about the world, which is a monological outlook (Lugones and Price 1995a, 105-06, 127; Lugones [2005]/2014, 69, 79-80). Thus, the cognitive attitudes/practices of certainty, simplicity, and agreement can seem like "a conceptual necessity" to those who have internalized them (1995a, 127).

Here I return to the "first method" that Lugones and Price outline in "Dominant Culture," where they each undertake a positionality-informed self-reflection on their experience of Eurocentric monoculturalism in the United States (1995a, 109-117). Price in this context begins by noting, "I grew up with people taking care of me, of my material needs, cleaning up for me. I have grown up fluent in the ways of public space in [U. S.] American culture" (113). I think it is helpful to reflect on my own *growing up* in the United States, in order to excavate the details of how my *individual* cognitive attitudes/practices have been influenced by Eurocentric monocultural *societal* habits (cf. Trout 2010). What follows continues my humility as methodology by taking up Lugones and Price's

invitation to undertake positionality-informed critical self-reflection on my experience in the United States, a self-reflection that features childhood (1995a, 109-10).

For most of my life I have been fascinated by how children, in their varied contexts, learn both inside and outside of the classroom. Studying elementary education alongside philosophy in college fueled my interest in the inescapable social shaping of babies and young children by their caretakers and communities. This social shaping results in the *internalization* of patterns of thought and/or behavior that are modeled or enforced by the corresponding societal or cultural structures. These internalized patterns at the personal level of the human being, in turn, reinforce the societal/cultural structures in question (Trout 2010, cf. 2008a).[42] As noted above, I take these points about childhood socialization to complement the insights in both "Dominant Culture," (Lugones and Price 1995a) and "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," (Lugones [2005]/2014, 79-80).

It is an individualistic fallacy to assume that a baby or small child simply chooses what cognitive attitudes/practices they will adopt. As I have written elsewhere, "The infant's survival and language development both depend on the presence of caretakers; so do her other learning experiences. The community in general also helps teach the child.... Thus the child's habits are socially shaped" (Trout 2010, 111). This is *not* to say that young humans are *completely determined* by the dominant cognitive attitudes/ practices that surround them - Lugones and Price are clear that it is possible to interrupt and resist Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices, and to embrace radical multicultural ones (1995a, 110, 118, 127; cf. Trout 2010). That said, in my experience inside and outside of academia - I have observed a reluctance among well-meaning white people, including myself, to fully grasp the extent of their socialization into whiteness and into false universalization. There can be a concomitant temptation to see as unnecessary deep and sustained work to resist or interrupt this socialization. Yet having a Ph.D. in philosophy does not exempt me from my socialization - nor do my commitments to anti-racism, decoloniality, and feminism. In fact, my formal academic training has been steeped in Eurocentric monocultural false universalization, from when I was in kindergarten.

For the purposes of my project here, I highlight aspects of my upbringing that reinforced Eurocentric whiteness (in which being middle class is intermeshed) and that cultivated the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices of certainty, simplicity, and agreement. My personal habits of false universalization have grown from a strong Eurocentric foundation, and they, unfortunately, have deep roots. What follows builds on critical self-reflection I engage in throughout *The Politics of Survival* (Trout 2010).

I was born in 1969 in Nebraska, in the United States of America. My parents were explicitly clear with me and my siblings that racism is wrong. They were not intentionally trying to instill racist socialization into their children, yet they nonetheless chose neighborhoods for us to live in that were predominantly white, middle-class

suburbs. It was normalized in my experience for there to be only or predominantly white people populating all of my circles of social contact: family, school, church, sports, service, and so on. This normalization of whiteness was reinforced by books, television, and movies. The protagonists in the stories I was reading and viewing were, with very few exceptions, white.

The members of my nuclear family were/are all white. My parents worked in the business world. They encouraged my siblings and me to read, to do our best in school, and, again, to see racism as wrong. They wanted us to be critical thinkers. Yet they did not teach us to question the whiteness and colonized thinking that permeated our lives. For example, each of us was born in the United States. Both sides of our family were/ are of primarily German descent. Corresponding insights that did *not* inform our household when I was a child include these: my/our ancestors were able to enter the United States without needing a visa - as a result of their whiteness. My ancestors' access to land stolen from Indigenous peoples was also facilitated by my ancestors' whiteness. Generations later, my parents' personal successes in the business world were facilitated by their whiteness, as was their ability to take out loans and to buy a house in the suburbs, where the high property taxes funded the excellent public schools I attended.

Regarding my formal education, my parents' own socialization had taught them that white-dominant educational institutions and curricula were *neutral*.[43] So they never problematized the fact that I had *no* teachers of color from kindergarten through high school. They did not problematize the lack of radical multiculturalism in the curricula I was taught in my classes. Nor did they problematize that I was taught to minimize other cultures and knowledges and to overlook or ignore the devastating impacts of whiteness and colonization. My parents were not uniquely to blame here; they had been taught a falsely universalized curriculum as well. Their failure to problematize what I was learning, however, meant that Eurocentric monocultural false universalization went unchallenged not only inside the classroom, but in my home as well. Other aspects of my lived experience as a child reinforced this false universalization of Eurocentric monocultural whiteness - such as the other children with whom I was learning. Living in predominantly white suburbs resulted in my classmates being predominantly white too. My memories of grade school, junior high school, and high school are of each of my classes being comprised of only white students.

My formal and informal education "valorized and institutionalized" (to use Lugones' terms) the Eurocentric monocultural attitudes/practices of certainty, simplicity, and agreement - as the curriculum I was taught featured white people almost exclusively ([2005]/2014, 79-80). This involved the "sifting" out of knowledges and peoples considered unworthy or unnecessary to include in this Eurocentric monocultural curriculum (Lugones and Price 1995a, 119). I was taught to think with certainty premised on the simplification of excluding alternative perspectives (ibid.).[44] I was taught, for example, that Columbus discovered America. I was *not* taught to problematize this narrative and to consider the many voices that could dispute it. The

Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitude/practice of agreement was present in many ways in my communities inside and outside of the classroom. The promotion of an unproblematized "we" was common place. "We" celebrate Independence Day. "We" all know that anyone who works hard in the U.S. can succeed. I was *not* taught to ask, "Who is this 'we' *including* in this context? Who is this 'we' *excluding*?" (cf. Lugones and Price 2009, 96). Those critical questions were not within the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices I was being taught to adopt as my own.

Thus, just as I have internalized (and thus am fluent in) speaking English, due to my predominantly English-language socialization since birth, I have also internalized (and thus am fluent in) the Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices of U.S. dominant culture. These cognitive patterns can make the false universalization of Eurocentric whiteness feel so natural that I do not realize I am doing it. That said, I can resist only speaking in English (through learning another language), and I can also resist falsely universalizing. In both cases, however, significant and sustained intervention is required. I do not wish to overstate the analogy here, but to highlight both the possibility of resistance and the hard work that is required (cf. Trout 2010). When it comes to resisting the false universalization of Eurocentric monoculturalism and whiteness, one the one hand I would argue that the more white feminists, including myself, are critically self-reflective about the extent of our socialization into Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices, the more we can recognize and resist them. On the other hand, *ongoing humility* is also required, which involves genuine openness to learning from those who are in a position to identify false universalization that I/we enact without realizing it.[45] This requires resisting and interrupting the naive Cartesian confidence that I can simply will away my socialization through solitary efforts (Trout 2010).[46]

Conclusion: humility as methodology

In her essay, "Lugones's World-Making," Linda Martín Alcoff notes, "[T]he *aspiration* toward decolonization helps us to formulate and deepen our self-reflexive knowledge practices. As Lugones says, we must do more than announce our situatedness. We must at least *attempt* to understand the effects of our material and local contexts on the formation of our knowledge" (2020, 202, emphasis in original). My work in this project is aspirational and includes my own efforts to use Lugones' work to understand - in order to resist and interrupt - how my Eurocentric monocultural socialization into being white (and middle-class) contributes to cognitive patterns that undermine decolonial praxis.

As I continue to study the methodologies of decolonial feminism that Lugones explores (cf. 2012b, 2015, 2020a), I see my own *humility as methodology* to be an inter-related layer inspired by Lugones herself, which speaks to my positionality and socialization. Building on what I have said earlier, humility as methodology involves the many (and growing) ways I strive to be epistemologically open and critically reflective, even and especially when this is uncomfortable (Trout 2010, esp. chapter 4). In terms of

my work in this piece, I continue to problematize the internalized Eurocentric monocultural cognitive tendencies into which I was socialized. I am committed to welcoming feedback about having falsely universalized, even as I do my best to avoid this false universalizing. I consider this engaged humility to be part of my decolonial feminist responsibility and praxis, due my socialization into Eurocentric whiteness. Lugones' many critiques of white hegemonic feminism assure me of the necessity of these positionality-informed decolonial efforts. I need to lean into the discomfort these efforts entail, especially as decolonial coalitional work will surely reveal more of my ignorance and unwitting Eurocentrism. I need to embrace what Shireen Roshanravan describes as, "*the affective challenges* of María Lugones's coalitional imperative of decolonial feminism as it requires sustaining painful confrontations for acting in complicity with the very oppressions the aspiring decolonial feminist may have believed herself to be entirely against" (2020, 119, emphasis added). While Roshanravan's audience is far wider than white feminists, her incisive treatment of "affective challenges" is an important interwoven complement to the cognitive patterns highlighted in my project (ibid., cf. DiPietro 2019; Trout 2010).[47]

Closely related to these affective dimensions, I practice humility as methodology in relation to the vast scope of what I do not know about the many peoples and cultures targeted by western European colonialism.[48] Lugones' decolonial feminism requires learning from these communities, honoring the sophistication of their cultures, epistemologies, cosmologies, and resistances:

> The global, capitalist, colonial, modern system of power that Anibal Quijano characterizes as beginning in the sixteenth century in the Americas and enduring until today.... encountered complex cultural, political, economic, and religious beings: selves in complex relations to the cosmos, to other selves, to generation, to the earth, to living beings, to the inorganic, in production; selves whose erotic, aesthetic, and linguistic expressivity, whose knowledges, senses of space, longings, practices, institutions, and forms of government were not to be simply replaced but met, understood, and entered into in tense, violent, risky crossings and dialogues and negotiations that never happened. (Lugones, "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," 2010, 747)

This passage conveys to me the sheer scale of how limited my knowledge is, and how necessary it is to continue learning from decolonial figures, including Chinua Achebe, Nwando Achebe, Domitila Barrios, Rigoberta Menchú, Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí, Vandana Shiva and so many more.[49] Humility as methodology pushes me to honor the vastness of multicultural knowledges beyond "a Eurocentrist epistemology" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 79).

Lara Trout
University of Portland
trout@up.edu

_____

Works Cited

Achebe, Chinua. 2009. *The Education of a British-Protected Child: Essays*. New York: Anchor Books, Random House, Inc.

Achebe, Nwando. 2002. "Nwando Achebe--Daughter, Wife, and Guest--A Researcher at the Crossroads." *Journal of Women's History* 14 (3), 9-31.

_____. 2005. *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland*, 1900-1960. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2017. "Philosophy and Philosophical Practice: Eurocentrism as an Epistemology of Ignorance." In *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. ed. I. Kidd, J. Medina, and G. Pohlhaus, 397-408. New York and London: Routledge.

_____. 2020. "Lugones's World-Making." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 8 (1-2): 199-211.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1999. *Borderlands/La Frontera*. 2nd Ed. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.

Barrios de Chungara, Domitila and Moema Viezzer 2005. *´Si Me Permiten Hablar...´: Testimonio de Domitila, una Mujer de las Minas de Bolivia*. Siglo XXI.

Belle, Kathryn Sophia. 2020. "Interlocking, Intersecting, and Intermeshing: Critical Engagements with Black and Latina Feminist Paradigms of Identity and Oppression." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 8 (1-2): 165-198.

Brown, Elsa Barkley. 1991. "Polyrhythms and Improvization: Lessons for Women's History." *History Workshop* 31: 85-90.

Carastathis, Anna. 2019. "Beyond the 'Logic of Purity': 'Post-Post-Intersectional' Glimpses in Decolonial Feminism." In *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*. ed. DiPietro, Pedro, *et al.*, 85-102. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chávez, Manuel. 2019. "Toward a Decolonial Ethics." In *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*. ed. DiPietro, Pedro, et al., 175-94. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1995. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." In *Critical Race Theory*, ed. Kimberlé Creshaw, Neil Gotanda *et al*., 357-383 New York: The New Press.

Dewey, John. [1922] 1988. *Human Nature and Conduct. The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924*. ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Vol 14. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.

DiAngelo, Robin. 2018. *White Fragility.* Boston: Beacon Press.

DiPietro, Pedro J. 2019. "Beyond Benevolent Violence: Trans* of Color, Ornamental Multiculturalism, and the Decolonization of Affect." In *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*. ed. Pedro J. DiPietro, et al, 197-216. Albany: State University of New York Press.

DiPietro, Pedro J., Jennifer McWeeny, and Shireen Roshanravan, eds. 2019. *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Echenique, María. 2018. "Feminismo y Testimonio Femenino Latinoamericano: *Si Me Permiten Hablar* de Domitila Barrios." *Ámbitos Feministas* 7: 87-104

Espiritu, Yen. 1997. "Race, Class, and Gender in Asian America." In *Making More Waves: New Writing by Asian American Women*. Eds. Elaine Kim, et al, 135-141. Boston: Beacon Press.

Frye, Marilyn. 1983. *The Politics of Reality*. Berkeley, Ca.: The Crossing Press.

Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. 2010. "Colonial Practices/Colonial Identities: All the Women are Still White." In *The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness of Philosophy*. ed. George Yancy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

_____. 2019. "Walking Illegitimately: A *Cachapera/Tortillera* and a Dyke." In *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*. ed. Pedro J. DiPietro, *et al*, 255-71. Albany: State University of New York Press.

_____. 2020. "Aspects of the Coloniality of Knowledge." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 8 (1-2): 48-60.

Lorde, Audre. 1984. *Sister Outsider.* Berkeley, Ca.: Crossing Press.

Lowe, Barbara. 2011. "Ethereal Identities and Ethereal Subjectivity: An American Pragmatist Appreciation of María Lugones' Theory of Oppression and Resistance." *Inter-American Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1): 11-25.

Lugones, María. 1990. "Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sarah Hoagland's 'Lesbian Ethics'." *Hypatia* 5 (3): 138-146.

_____. 2003. *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers., Inc.

_____. 2005. "*Multiculturalismo Radical y Feminismos de Mujeres de Color*." [Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms] Trans. Joaquín Rodríguez Feo. *Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política* 25: 61-75.

_____. 2006. "On Complex Communication." *Hypatia* 21 (3): 75-85.

_____. 2007. "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System." *Hypatia* 22 (1): 186-209.

_____. 2010. "Toward a Decolonial Feminism." *Hypatia* 25 (4): 742-759.

_____. 2011. "It's All in Having a History: A Response to Michael Hames-García's 'Queer Theory Revisited.'" In *Gay Latino Studies: A Critical Reader*. ed. Michael Hames-García and Ernesto Javier Martinez, 46-54. Durham: Duke University Press.

_____. 2012a. "Interseccionalidad y Feminismo Decolonial [Intersectionality and Decolonial Feminism*]." In *Lugares Descoloniales: Espacios de Intervención en las Américas*. ed. Ramón Grosfoguel and Roberto Almanza Hernández, 119-24. Bogotá: Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. [*Title translation borrowed from the Lugones Chronology (DiPietro *et al* 2019, 296)]

_____. 2012b. "Methodological Notes toward a Decolonial Feminism." In *Decolonizing Epistemologies: Latina/o Theology and Philosophy*. ed. Ada María Isasi-Díaz and Eduardo Mendieta, 68-86. New York: Fordham University Press.

_____. 2012c. "Subjetividad Esclava, Colonialidad de Género, Marginalidad y Opresiones Múltiples" [Slave Subjectivity, Coloniality of Gender, Marginalization and Multiple Oppressions*]. In *Pensando los Feminismos en Bolivia: Serie Foros 2*, ed. Patricia Montes, 129-39. La Paz, Bolivia: Conexión Fondo de Emancipación. [*Title translation borrowed from the Lugones Chronology (DiPietro *et al* 2019, 297)]

_____. 2014. "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms." *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* 13 (1): 68-80.

_____. 2015. "Hacia metodologías de la decolonialidad" [Toward Decolonizing Methodologies*]. In *Prácticas Otras de Conocimiento(s): Entre Crisis, Entre Guerras* (Tomo III). ed. Xochitl Leyva Solano, *et al*, 75-92. Chiapas, México: Cooperativa Editorial RETOS. [*Title translation borrowed from the Lugones Chronology (DiPietro *et al* 2019, 297)]

_____. 2020a. "Gender and Universality in Colonial Methodology." *Critical*

Philosophy of Race 8 (1-2): 25-47.

_____. 2020b. "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach." In *Theories of the Flesh*. ed. Andrea Pitts, Mariana Ortega, and José Medina, 29-37. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lugones, María, and Joshua Price. 1995a. "Dominant Culture: *El Deseo por un Alma Pobre* (The Desire for an Impoverished Soul)." In *Multiculturalism from the Margins*. ed. Dean A. Harris, 103-27. Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey.

_____. 1995b. "Multicultural Cognition." *Phoebe: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Feminist Scholarship, Theory, and Aesthetics* 7 (1-2): 23-36.

_____. 2009. "Faith in Unity: The Nationalist Erasure of Multiplicity." In *Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader*. ed. Mariana Ortega and Linda Martín Alcoff, 91-101. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Lugones, María, and Pat Alake Rosezelle. 1995. "Sisterhood and Friendship as Feminist Models." In *Feminism and Community*. ed. Penny Weiss and Marilyn Friedman, 135-45. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lugones, María, and Elizabeth Spelman. 1983. "Have We Got a Theory for You!: Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice.'" *Women's Studies International Forum* 6 (6): 573-581.

Magubane, Zine, and Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí. 2016. "Gender and Motherhood at Rhodes University." Video recording. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NRbvqeY1xw [accessed 6-16-2021]

McIntosh, Peggy. 1988. "White Privilege and Male Privilege." Working Paper 189. Wellesley, Mass.: Wellesley Centers for Women.

Menchú, Rigoberta. 1998. *Rigoberta: La Nieta de los Mayas*. With Gianni Minà and Dante Liano. Madrid: Aguilar.

Mills, Charles. 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ortega, Mariana. 2006. "Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color." *Hypatia* 21 (3): 56-74.

Oyěwùmí, Oyèrónké. 1997. *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses*. Minneapolis, Mn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Quijano, Aníbal. 2000. "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America." *Nepantla: Views from the South* 1 (3): 533-80.

Roshanravan, Shireen. 2018. "Self-Reflection and the Coalitional Praxis of (Dis)Integration." *New Political Science* 40 (1): 151-164.

_____. 2020. "Compelled to Cross, Tempted to Master: Affective Challenges in Lugones's Decolonial Feminist Methodology." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 8 (1-2): 119-33.

Stam, Robert and Ella Shohat. 1994. "Contested Histories: Eurocentrism, Multiculturalism, and the Media." In *Multiculturalism: a Critical Reader*, 296-324. ed. David Theo Goldberg. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Sullivan, Shannon. 2001. *Living Across and Through Skins*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_____. 2006. *Revealing Whiteness*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_____. 2014. *Good White People*. Albany: State University of New York Press. Terrefe, Selamawit D. 2020. "The Pornotrope of Decolonial Feminism." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 8 (1-2): 134-164.

Trout, Lara. 2008a. "Attunement to the Invisible: Applying Paulo Freire's Problem-Posing Education to 'Invisibility'." *The Pluralist* 3 (3): 63-78.

_____. 2008b. "C. S. Peirce, Antonio Damasio, and Embodied Cognition." *Contemporary Pragmatism* 5 (1): 79-108.

_____. 2010. *The Politics of Survival: Peirce, Affectivity, and Social Criticism*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Velez, Emma and Nancy Tuana, eds. 2020. *Critical Philosophy of Race - Special Issue: Toward Decolonial Feminisms* 8 (1-2).

Veronelli, Gabriela, P.J. DiPietro, M. Ortega, C. Sandoval. 2021. "Decolonizing Epistemologies: Conversation with Latinx Philosophers." The first annual María Lugones Lecture in Philosophy and Critical Thought. Latinx Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. Video Recording. https://lrc.berkeley.edu/ 2021/02/26/decolonizing-epistemologies-conversation-with-latinx-philosophers/ [accessed 6-16-2021]

Williams, Patricia. 1991. *The Alchemy of Race and Rights*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Notes

[1] I would like to thank María Echenique for her deep support of this project - in discussing the ideas with me, giving me critical feedback on earlier drafts, helping me with Castillian Spanish translation questions, and editing the Spanish abstract of this article. I also thank Simon Aihiokhai for many discussions about and support of my study of María Lugones. My gratitude to Alejandro Santana for administrative and collegial support of my research, and to my home institution, University of Portland, for funding the sabbatical that gave me time to research and write this piece. Stephanie Michel and Chris Wiley, with Clark Library, gave me wonderful research support, for which I am deeply grateful. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees who provided invaluable critical feedback to help refine my work in this project. Finally, I thank Absalón Echeverría for teaching me innumerable lessons to help me toward decolonizing my thinking.

[2] These efforts to showcase Lugones work include the 2019 publication of the collection *Speaking Face to Face: The Visionary Philosophy of María Lugones*, edited by Pedro J. DiPietro, Jennifer McWeeny, and Shireen Roshanravan, which includes a chronological bibliography of Lugones work (291-97). In 2020, the *Critical Philosophy of Race* journal dedicated a volume to Lugones' work, "Special Issue: Toward Decolonial Feminisms," edited by Emma Velez and Nancy Tuana. In 2021, the first annual María Lugones Lecture in Philosophy and Critical Thought was hosted by the Latinx Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. This lecture was formatted as a virtual panel entitled, "Decolonizing Epistemologies: A Conversation with Latinx Philosophers", and featured PJ DiPietro, Mariana Ortega, Chela Sandoval, and Gabriela Veronelli (Veronelli et al 2021).

[3] Abya Yala, notes Lugones, is "the name that the Puna of Panama have given to the territory named America by the colonial powers; it has been adopted by a significant number of insurgents in the region, including intellectuals, activists, and indigenous movements" (2020b, 29).

[4] Cf. Linda Martín Alcoff, "Lugones's World-Making," (2020, 201-202).

[5] My usage of the term "Women of Color" follows Lugones' usage of the term as *coalitional*, complex, and dynamic: "We have meant 'Women of Color' as a coalitional identity, one that stands against monologisms, not as a racial descriptor. As a coalitional identity it is one seeking identifications that are multiple, unstable, historically situated, through complex dialogues from within the interdependence of non-dominant differences" (Lugones 2014, 80). For Lugones' decolonial problematization of the term "woman", see "Toward a Decolonial Feminism" (2010), "Methodological Notes toward a Decolonial Feminism" (2012), "Gender and Universality in Colonial Methodology" (2020a), and "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach" (2020b).

[6] I think it is important to note that Lugones is prepared to "abandon" the term "feminist" if this were to better serve decolonial work: in "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach," she states, "[A]s a US woman of color, ready to abandon the term 'feminist' if it is antagonistic to decolonial relational possibilities, I want to think the coloniality and decoloniality of gender, the body, desire, interpersonal and political relations, the production of knowledge in a coalitional, theoretical vein that is provisional

and is in constant conversation with the women of Abya Yala and the Caribbean, and US racialized women" (2020b, 36).

[7] I have chosen "white hegemonic feminism" as a term that holds space for the various ways Lugones refers to white Eurocentric feminism; it is inspired by Lugones' Castillian Spanish reference, "El feminismo hegemónico, blanco" (Lugones 2012c, 129). When I asked my good friend and colleague, María Echenique, who is natively fluent in Spanish, if "white hegemonic feminism" was an acceptable translation of "El feminismo hegemónico, blanco", she commented that Lugones' use of a comma is more like an equal sign in this context, i.e. conveying that "hegemonic feminism = white". Lugones uses the term "hegemonic/white feminists" in "Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach" (2020b, 35), and explains, in "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System": "There has been a persistent absence of a deep imbrication of race into the analysis that takes gender and sexuality as central in much white feminist theory and practice, particularly feminist philosophy. *I am cautious when I call it 'white' feminist theory and practice. One can suspect a redundancy involved in the claim...*" (2007, 187, my emphasis). In "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," which I feature below, Lugones uses the term "white bourgeois feminisms" (2014, 69). Other references include "las teorías feministas occidentales blancas" [white western feminist theories] (Lugones 2012a, 119), and "las prácticas feministas hegemónicas" [hegemonic feminist practices] (*ibid*.) [My bracketed translations]

[8] I see my project as contributing to the work that Sarah Hoagland calls for in her essay, "Aspects of the Coloniality of Knowledge," a piece where "[she is] directing [her] comments primarily to white academic feminists" (2020, 59 "Notes"). Hoagland calls attention to the ongoing deep work that white academic feminists need to engage to counter the "coloniality of knowledge." Hoagland, drawing on insights from Jackie Anderson, calls for an "epistemic shift" that pursues questions, such as, "What if we develop our critical epistemic skills/virtues outside dominant constructions that cover over oppressing ←→ resisting subjectivities? What if we develop our critical epistemic skills/virtues not in order to be *right* but in order to *engage* outside dominant constructions?" (2020, 58, Hoagland's emphasis). My project features cognitive patterns that white academic feminists need to resist/interrupt as they pursue forming "epistemic skills/virtues outside dominant constructions..." (ibid). Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes are internalized for many white people - including white academic feminists (Lugones and Price 1995a; Lugones 2014). Thus the "epistemic shift" (ibid.) called for by Hoagland requires, I would argue, humble ongoing attention to the deep roots that these Eurocentric cognitive attitudes can have beginning in childhood and fueling the coloniality of knowledge through personal cognitive patterns. Cf. "Colonial Practices/ Colonial Identities: All the Women are Still White" (Hoagland 2010).

[9] My project has benefited from PJ DiPietro's piece, "Beyond Benevolent Violence: Trans* of Color, Ornamental Multiculturalism, and the Decolonization of Affect" (2019). DiPietro engages María Lugones and Joshua Price's "Dominant Culture" (1995a) as DiPietro "explore[s] the relations between Eurocentrism and white-centered accounts of transgender phenomena, and between ornamental

multiculturalism and the affective inclinations it elicits toward trans* of color phenomena" (2019, 199).

[10] There are important points of contact to be made with Lugones' critical engagement with lesbian theory and practice in the United States: "Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sarah Hoagland's 'Lesbian Ethics'" (Lugones 1990); "*El Pasar Discontínuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento* / The Discontinuous Passing of the *Cachapera/Tortillera* from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement" (Lugones 2003, 167-80); cf. Sarah Hoagland, "Walking Illegitimately: A Cachapera/Tortillera and a Dyke" (2019).

[11] "*Hablando Cara a Cara/Speaking Face to Face*: An Exploration of Ethnocentric Racism," originally published in 1990 and "On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism," originally published in 1991 - are other important interventions Lugones makes with white hegemonic feminism. These essays are included in Lugones' *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: *Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* (2003), which as a whole is an important resource regarding her challenges to the false universalization of white hegemonic feminism. Also see, "Interseccionalidad y Feminismo Decolonial" [Intersectionality and Decolonial Feminism] (Lugones 2012a) and "Subjetividad Esclava, Colonialidad de Género, Marginalidad y Opresiones Múltiples" [Slave Subjectivity, Coloniality of Gender, Marginalization and Multiple Oppressions] (Lugones 2012c).

[12] This piece was originally published in 2005 in Castillian Spanish, "*Multiculturalismo Radical y Feminismos de Mujeres de Color*," translated by Joaquín Rodríguez Feo. The English version of the essay was published in 2014, "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms." [The bibliography of Lugones' work in *Speaking Face to Face* does not register that the 2005 version was translated by Rodríguez Feo, unfortunately (DiPietro *et al* 2019, 295)]. I do want to highlight that the nine-year difference in publication, 2005-2014, could be significant for scholars interested in a chronological study of themes across the decades of Lugones work. In what follows, to help keep these chronology points in place, my citations of the 2014, "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," will designate the publication date as "[2005]/2014" as a reminder of the original publication of these ideas. In comparing these two versions, line by line, I was able to confirm that they largely correspond with each other. That said, there are two important issues I wanted to mention. First, I discovered a serious editing error. In the 2005 version on page 68, there is a quote (that is missing a page reference), which Lugones clearly attributes to Kimberlé Crenshaw: "Crenshaw afirma que las categorías son significativas y tienen consecuencias: ". Following these words (which end in a colon) is an indented quote without a page reference. Yet in the 2014 version on page 74, the corresponding line ends with a period: "Crenshaw asserts that the categories are meaningful and have consequences." Then a new paragraph begins, giving the impression that Lugones' voice continues, yet the lines are Crenshaw's, still missing the page reference. The reader does not have the clues (present in the 2005 version) that Crenshaw is being quoted, namely from page 376 and 377 of "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color" (1995). I tracked these page references down by searching a PDF version of Crenshaw's article. There seem to be

intra-quote brackets and ellipses that are also missing. I do not have the space to comment further on this issue, but for scholars interested a close study of Lugones' treatment of Crenshaw's work (e.g. Belle 2020; Terrefe 2020), this editing error is arguably of extra significance. Secondly, there are some translation details that seem problematic to me. As a non-native speaker of Spanish, I want to tread very humbly here, with the hope that those with native fluency could possibly weigh in if they see a need to. I will highlight two points among the details I noticed. (1) I see places where I think there is an error in translation, e.g. the quote from Elsa Barkely Brown (2005, 66; 2014, 73). (2) I also see a possible translation incongruency in the Spanish terms used (by Rodríguez Feo) to convey Lugones' discussion of terms such as "intermesh" and "interlock" (Lugones 2005, 68ff; Lugones 2014, 75ff).

[13] My thanks to an anonymous referee who raised this concern.

[14] Beyond the pieces featured in my project here, Lugones explores explicitly cognitive themes in "Hard-to-Handle Anger" in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (2003, 103-18), as well as "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System" (2007, 190-192, 198, 202). cf. Lugones' reference to "epistemological habit" (2010, 753) and "hábito epistémico" (2015, 78).

[15] My book *The Politics of Survival: Peirce, Affectivity, and Social Criticism* explores affective and embodiment themes in C. S. Peirce's thought, using the work of contemporary neuroscientist Antonio Damasio to help thematize these dimensions of Peircean cognition and phenomenology. I also argue that despite Peirce's personal colonialism, racism, and sexism, his thought has insights that are deeply compatible with social criticism (Trout 2010, cf. 2008b). My work has benefitted from dialogue with Shannon Sullivan's *Revealing Whiteness* (2006, cf. Sullivan 2001, 2014)

[16] In *Pilgrimajes/Peregrinajes*, Lugones makes a brief reference to her philosophical training in a footnote to her Introduction's description of "[t]he earlier chapters" of the book (2003, 30). She notes, "One can find the traces of conversations with...*the pragmatists (particularly James and Peirce)*..." (2003, 38n13, my emphasis). Due to my commitment to *humility as methodology* - to be explained shortly - I resist the urge to show what I see as parallels between Lugones and Peirce's thought. Rather, my goal/aspiration is to have my Pragmatist sensibilities help me appreciate Lugones' (and Price's) insights, without having those same sensibilities inadvertently oversimplify my understanding of her (their) insights. For an example of dialogue between Lugones and Pragmatism, see Barbara Lowe, "Ethereal Identities and Ethereal Subjectivity: An American Pragmatist Appreciation of María Lugones' Theory of Oppression and Resistance" (2011).

[17] Lugones and Price continue, "One gives uptake to diver¬sity of expression without searching for a reduction to a standard way. One listens for different languages, to code switching, and to linguistic hybridization. ... [Uncertainty] provides an atmosphere in which one makes time for articulating what is hard to articulate, for naming that which has no name" (1995a, 124).

[18] My thinking on humility has been deeply influenced by both Peircean fallibilism (Trout 2010), as well as Lugones' work in "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception", where she has an extended discussion of arrogance that draws and builds on Marilyn Frye's work in *The Politics of Reality* (Lugones 2003; Frye 1983).

[19] "The direction of possibility lies in looking for and working toward the recuperation of resistant historical tapestries that weave understandings of relations to and of the universe, of realities that are resistant to the logic of modernity and show us alternatives that enable a communal sense of the self in relation to what there is. That work includes a rethinking, a philosophizing with a long memory, a looking again at these values, practices, understanding the recuperated sense of reality critically. That critical work needs to open and maintain possibilities of *deep coalition* with a long memory that is not just one of promoting one's own interests. That critical work also needs to avoid fixed cultural stereotypes and cultural fundamentalisms" (Lugones, "Revisiting Gender, A Decolonial Approach," 2020b, 37, emphasis mine).

[20] Lugones addresses the phenomenon of Men of Color who fail in acting in solidarity with Women of Color. In "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System," she puts it this way: "I am...interested in investigating the intersection of race, class, gender and sexuality in a way that enables me to understand the indifference that men, but, more important to our struggles, men who have been racialized as inferior, exhibit to the systematic violences inflicted upon women of color. I want to understand the construction of this indifference so as to make it unavoidably recognizable by those claiming to be involved in liberatory struggles" (2007, 188; cf. Lugones 2015, 87-88). In "Toward a Decolonial Ethics," Manuel Chávez Jr. explicitly takes up this issue (2019). In addition, regarding problems of Eurocentrism in queer theory, see Lugones' essay, "It's All in Having a History: A Response to Michael Hames-García's 'Queer Theory Revisited'" (2011). Here she highlights "the importance for [her] of Hames-García's alternative genealogy for critical thinking about sexuality in the United States, a genealogy that centers the early emergence of intersectional thinking and his focusing the recent directions that address the interrelations among race, gender, and sexuality, as well as efforts to think about sexuality outside the Eurocentric and colonial framework of queer theory" (Lugones 2011, 48). It is also relevant to consider Lugones' critical engagement with lesbian theory and practice in the United States: "Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sarah Hoagland's 'Lesbian Ethics'" (Lugones 1990); "*El Pasar Discontínuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento* / The Discontinuous Passing of the *Cachapera/Tortillera* from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement" (Lugones 2003, 167-80).

[21] In "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," Lugones writes, "What I am proposing in working toward a decolonial feminism is to learn about each other as resisters to the coloniality of gender at the colonial difference, without necessarily [*sic*] being an insider to the worlds of meaning from which resistance to the coloniality arises. That is, the decolonial feminist's task begins by her seeing the colonial difference, emphatically resisting her *epistemological habit of erasing it.* Seeing it, she sees the world anew, and then she requires herself to drop her enchantment with "woman," the universal, and begins to learn about other resisters at the colonial difference." (2010, 753, my emphasis).

[22] In the spirit of Lugones, I do not offer a strict definition of *humility as methodology*, as I think this would limit its possibilities and usefulness. Cf. "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling and Loving Perception," in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (Lugones 2003, 87).

[23] For more detail on Lugones insights about coalitional identity - see pages 75-80 of "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms" ([2005]/2014), as well as *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (2003), and "On Complex Communication" (2006).

[24] "Radical multiculturalism" is not, for Lugones, the "ornamental multiculturalism" of Eurocentrism, which entails merely a touristic engagement with other cultures, while minimizing their integrity, cosmologies, knowledges and resistances ([2005]/2014, 78; cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 1995b). Drawing on Ella Shohat and Robert Stam's "Contested Histories" (1994), Lugones clarifies that radical multiculturalism is "polycentric," involving a structural embrace of different cultures, and it insists on "resist[ing] both Eurocentrism and multiple oppressions" (Lugones [2005]/ 2014, 78). In "Dominant Culture," Lugones and Price use the term "structural multiculturalism" synonymously to Lugones' "radical multiculturalism" (Lugones and Price 1995a; Lugones [2005]/2014, 69)

[25] Lugones and Price also published the piece, "Multicultural Cognition" in 1995, which is for the most part an abridged version of "Dominant Culture" (1995a). Lugones and Price's co-authored "Faith in Unity: The Nationalist Erasure of Multiplicity" (2009) revisits the themes explored in their piece, "Dominant Culture" (1995a). In terms of the chronology of Lugones' publications, "Faith in Unity" (2009) had not yet been published when "*Multiculturalismo Radical y Feminismos de Mujeres de Color*" was published in 2005 in Spanish (translated by Joaquín Rodríguez Feo). And the 2009 "Faith in Unity" is not referenced in Lugones' 2014 re-publication, in English, of "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms". Due to this chronological issue, I only draw sparingly on "Faith In Unity," in what follows. Nonetheless, I highly recommend reading "Faith In Unity" (2009) alongside "Dominant Culture" (1995a).

[26] It is beyond the scope of my project to explicitly thematize monolingualism in the U.S. Lugones discusses her lived experience of linguistic dynamics in the U.S., in "Dominant Culture" (1995a, 110-13).

[27] "Reduction to ornaments" involves the dominant culture's refusal to allow other cultures to participate structurally in society. This reduction also involves refusing/ erasing other cultures' value beyond non-structural or ornamental roles such as culturally diverse restaurants or rituals that have been drained (by "the dominant imagination") of their deeper significance (104, 103-09). Lugones and Price explain, "The reduction of culture to ornament is both a process of interpretation and of cul¬tural erasure. As the dominant culture interprets non-dominant cultural ways as so¬cially pointless, it robs them of meaning. But interpretation by the dominant culture has the power to turn interpretation into reality, to turn non-dominant ways into mean¬ingless rituals. When one enacts a non-dominant culture as ritualized and as filtered through the dominant imagination, one's cultural practices have been successfully turned ornamental" (103-04). Cf. "Multicultural Cognition" (Lugones and Price 1995b).

[28] Lugones and Price draw on Marilyn Frye's *The Politics of Reality* on this point (Lugones and Price 1995a, 107; Frye 1983, 164-65). Their 2009 essay, "Faith In Unity" has a more detailed connection to U.S. monoculturalism as *Eurocentric*, drawing on Aníbal Quijano's 2000 essay, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America" (Lugones and Price 2009, 93, 98n2).

[29] This example is inspired by Lugones' "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling and Loving Perception," in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (2003), in which she contrasts *loving* playfulness and *agonistic* playfulness, the latter requiring a win/lose paradigm (93-96).

[30] I would suggest that, in this context, an insistence on complete precision in term usage reflects Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes that expect "certainty" and "simplicity" (cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 117-20).

[31] As a classical American Pragmatism scholar, I think there are important resonances between Lugones and Price's discussion of cognitive attitudes/practices and the Pragmatism tradition's focus on habit. As mentioned above, with humility as methodology in mind, I want to focus here on Lugones' work.

[32] cf. Shireen Roshanravan 2018, 2020; Trout 2010.

[33] cf. "Sisterhood and Friendship as Feminist Models" (Lugones and Rosezelle 1995).

[34] In "Beyond Benevolent Violence" (2019), DiPietro also employs Lugones and Price's account of the Eurocentric monocultural attitudes of certainty, simplicity, and agreement, as a mode of critique: "Studies of homonormativity and transnormativity document Westernizing cognitive practices that domesticate nonconformity (Duggan 2003; DiPietro 2015, 2016; Puar 2007; Snorton and Haritaworn 2013). They posit that lgbt counter-publics pursue white-centered projects and that, in many ways, their agreements about lgbt-led social *transformation* may work as agreements about homo- and *transnormativity*. *Gaycation's* counterpublic reflexivity recruits: (a) certainty about the content and value of indignation when prompted by transing embodiments across different cultures; (b) simplicity by favoring a Western model of sexual identification and marginalization; and (c) agreement on a common ground that explicates gender and trans* marginalization across the globe" (204, emphasis in original).

[35] Anna Carastathis' essay, "Beyond the 'Logic of Purity'" provides a helpful discussion of Lugones' thoughts on "subtle but important distinctions among the concepts of 'intermeshed,' 'interlocking,' and 'intersecting' oppressions" (2019, 85). While Carastathis does not engage either of the two essays I discuss here (Lugones and Price 1995a; Lugones [2005]/2014), she makes many points that are germane to Lugones' critique of the false universalization of white hegemonic feminism, in conjunction with problematizing Eurocentric monocultural cognitive attitudes/practices. Carastathis focuses on Lugones work in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (2003), "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System" (2007), and "Toward a Decolonial Feminism" (2010).

[36] Intersectionality also challenges the empty intersections in U.S. law that Kimberlé Crenshaw's groundbreaking scholarship discusses: "Crenshaw addresses violence against women of color at the point of the law. She unveils that violence through the intersection of race and gender. If the very meaning of 'woman' excludes women of color, then 'violence against women' will be understood solely in the terms that affect white bourgeois women. If to compound the problem, racism is understood primarily 'in terms of inequality between men,' [Crenshaw 1995, 372] neither intra-racial nor interracial violence against women of color can be countenanced" (Lugones [2005]/ 2014, 74).

[37] Lugones prefers terms like "fusion" and "intermeshing" ([2005]/2014, 76) to the term "intersectionality", as the term "intersectionality" can give the conceptual impression of the separability of that which is intersecting. Unfortunately, in pushing for this conceptual clarification, Lugones *inaccurately* portrays Kimberlé Crenshaw as maintaining separable categories (74-77). For example, "Crenshaw understands race and gender as categories of oppression in the very logical terms assumed in the hegemonical mainstream: as logically separate from each other" (74). I find Lugones' error on this front puzzling, in part, because she quotes Crenshaw: "'By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable'" (Lugones [2005]/2014, 74, citing Crenshaw 1995, 378). This quote shows that Crenshaw is *critiquing* the supposed separability of the categories, not endorsing it. Two articles that take up this important critique of Lugones' treatment of Crenshaw's work: (1) Kathryn Sophia Belle (formerly Gines), "Interlocking, Intersecting, and Intermeshing: Critical Engagements with Black and Latina Feminist Paradigms of Identity and Oppression" (2020, 174-87). In her article, Belle traces Lugones ideas about "interlocking, intersecting, and intermeshing" chronologically. (2) Selamawit D. Terrefe, "The Pornotrope of Decolonial Feminism" (2020, 151-52, 155-56). Terrefe also criticizes Lugones for the false contrast she draws between Crenshaw and Audre Lorde based on Lugones' inaccurate portrayal of Crenshaw's conception of intersectionality (2020, 150-52, 156). An additional note: Both Belle and Terrefe unproblematically attribute the date of 2014 to Lugones' "Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms," which is understandable since there is not an editor's note on the 2014 version indicating 2005 as the original publication date (in Spanish translation). I do wonder how this difference in original publication date might inform their respective chronology-related points about Lugones' work. I also wonder if the editing error I noted earlier, which involves lines from Crenshaw, could impact either scholar's arguments.

[38] Lugones draws from Lorde's essay, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House" - to embrace *nondominant differences* as a means of building coalition (Lugones [2005]/2014 68, 77; Lorde 1984, *Sister Outsider*, 111-12; cf. Lugones 2003, 83-85).

[39] I think the case can be made that Lugones and Price discuss internalization indirectly/implicitly in "Dominant Culture" (1995a) by means of the "first method" through which they engage their project of promoting structural multiculturalism in the United States and criticizing Eurocentric monoculturalism in the U.S. (109). As noted above, by critically reflecting on their personalized encounters with the dominant culture of the United States, they each highlight how they experience Eurocentric monoculturalism differently based on their positionality (109-117).

[40] In my *Politics of Survival: Peirce, Affectivity, and Social Criticism*, I discuss internalization at length (Trout 2010, e.g. 63-68, 103-27).

[41] Lugones and Price note, "*Pero para la gente de color, gente de otras culturas, la situación es completemente diferente*. People from other cultures, non-Anglos, are used to crossing, to seeing things in more than one way. They cross to places where cultures other than their own shape the ways of doing things. This crossing is done for many different reasons, and in many different ways and

directions" (1995a, 121, emphasis in original, cf. 109-13; 2009, 94; cf. Lugones 2003, 77-100).

[42] There are deep resonances here with classical American Pragmatism, which are beyond the scope of my project to address, e.g. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* ([1922] 1988).

[43] Cf. Lugones and Price 1995a, 105-06; Williams 1991; Mills 1997; McIntosh 1988; DiAngelo 2018; Sullivan 2006.

[44] I should add that I learned about Harriet Tubman when I was in grade school and about Martin Luther King when I was in high school. But these rare exceptions were taught in ways that stripped full context from these powerful figures - "certainty" and "simplicity" once again - rendering them agreeable to the false universalized "we" of U.S. dominant culture (cf. Lugones and Price 1995a).

[45] In her article "Self-Reflection and the Coalitional Praxis of (Dis)Integration," Shireen Roshanravan draws on Lugones' work to highlight the necessity for difficult self-reflective labor that must accompany "coalitional praxis":   "Deep coalitional praxis must ... involve active processes of self-reflection that challenge us to cultivate the courage to relearn ourselves in relation to each other..." (Roshanravan 2018, 164; cf. 2020). I am grateful for feedback from an anonymous referee who problematized my initial expression of how resistance can take shape, in which I inadvertently gave the impression that an individualized effort is sufficient.

[46] This humility also requires me to avoid presuming that my colleagues from Black, Indigenous and People of Color communities who do decolonial research should expend extra time and energy to educate me personally (Cf. Lorde 1984, 114-15). Yet if/when they initiate feedback or a learning opportunity, humility requires me to listen and learn (Cf. Anzaldúa 1999, 107). Humility also requires that I *proactively* pursue learning from existing decolonial research.

[47] Mariana Ortega's "Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color" (2006) is extremely important to keep in mind too, as she explains how white feminists can exhibit the arrogant perception that Marilyn Frye and María Lugones problematize (Frye 1983, 66-72; Lugones 2003, 77-100). For Ortega, this arrogance includes "loving, knowing ignorance—an ignorance of the thought and experience of women of color that is accompanied by both alleged love for and alleged knowledge about them" (2006, 57, 60-65).

[48] cf. Linda Martín Alcoff "Philosophy and Philosophical Practice: Eurocentrism as an Epistemology of Ignorance" (2017).

[49] A small sample of titles from which I have learned: Chinua Achebe, *The Education of a British-Protected Child* (2009); Nwando Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland, 1900-1960* (2005, cf. 2002), Domitila Barrios, *Si Me Permiten Hablar* (Barrios de Chungara and Viezzer 2005; cf. Echenique 2018), and Rigoberta Menchú, *Rigoberta: La Nieta de los Mayas* (1998). One classroom example: my students and I have learned a great deal from Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí, a Yorùbá sociologist, whose book *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (1997) has helped me grow epistemologically by introducing me to Yorùbá culture, cosmology, and ways of knowing before European colonization. Lugones discusses Oyěwùmí's work in "Heterosexualism

and the Colonial/Modern Gender System," (Lugones 2007, 196-98). I also recommend a video conversation between sociology professor Zine Magubane and Oyěwùmí, "Gender and Motherhood at Rhodes University" (2016).